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This Article identifies four major global climate change problems, analyzes 
whether the most prominent of the greenhouse gas (GHG) control proposals is 
likely to be either effective or efficient in solving each of the problems, and then 
extensively analyzes both management and technological alternatives to the 
proposals.  Efforts to reduce emissions of GHGs, such as carbon dioxide, in a 
decentralized way or even in a few countries (such as the United States or under 
the Kyoto Protocol) without equivalent actions by all the other countries of the 
world, particularly the most rapidly growing ones, cannot realistically achieve 
the temperature change limits most emission control advocates believe are neces-
sary to avoid dangerous climatic changes, and would be unlikely to do so even 
with the cooperation of these other countries.  This Article concludes that the 
most effective and efficient solution would be to use a concept long proven by 
nature to reduce the radiation reaching the earth by adding particles optimized 
for this purpose to the stratosphere to scatter a small portion of the incoming 
sunlight back into space, as well as to undertake a new effort to better under-
stand and reduce ocean acidification.  Current temperature change goals could 
be quickly achieved by stratospheric scattering at a very modest cost without the 
need for costly adaptation, human lifestyle changes, or the general public’s ac-
tive cooperation, all required by rigorous emission controls.  Although strato-
spheric scattering would not reduce ocean acidification, for which several reme-
dies are explored in this Article, it appears to be the most effective and efficient 
first step toward global climate change control.  Stratospheric scattering is not 
currently being pursued or even developed, however; such development is par-
ticularly needed to verify the lack of significant adverse environmental effects of 
this remedy.  Reducing GHG emissions to the extent proposed by advocates, 
 † Senior Economist. United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Wash-
ington, D.C.  The author is indebted to Dr. John Davidson of the EPA and Dr. Richard 
Ball of Annandale, VA, for comments on earlier drafts.  The views expressed are those 
of the author alone, however, and do not necessarily reflect those of the EPA or the 
U.S. Government.  This Article was presented at the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view Symposium on Responses to Global Warming:  The Law, Economics, and Science 
of Climate Change, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on November 17, 2006 and revised for 
publication in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review in 2007. 
  
1402 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1401 
even if achievable, would cost many trillions of dollars, and is best viewed as a 
last resort rather than the preferred strategy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As of late 2006, many environmentalists, some developed nations, 
and the State of California appear to have concluded that there is one 
climate change problem, global warming, and that there is only one 
solution to it:  reducing emissions of greenhouse gas (GHGs), such as 
carbon dioxide, usually in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol1 or 
similar decarbonization approaches.  This Article asks whether there 
are other related problems and other solutions to climate change that 
would be more effective and efficient, and, if so, what they might be.  
The problem is potentially so important to the future of humans on 
Earth, and the proposed solution is so expensive, that it is vital to care-
fully examine whether reducing GHGs really is the best strategy be-
fore any solution is implemented.  Yet to date there has been surpris-
ingly little analysis of this issue. 
The standard response to most pollution problems has been to 
impose regulations limiting the production and/or discharge of the 
pollutants involved, in this case GHGs.  This regulatory approach has 
been the basis for most of the discussions of global warming as well, 
and underlies the major current efforts represented by the Kyoto Pro-
tocol and other proposals for controlling GHG emissions.  Economists 
have suggested that a more economically efficient approach would be 
1 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf 
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
  
1404 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1401 
to provide economic incentives to reduce discharges, and this ap-
proach has generally been accepted by proponents of GHG control, 
perhaps in recognition of the very high costs involved in GHG reduc-
tion.  This pollutant mitigation approach to global warming assumes 
that if somehow human-induced pollution (in this case GHGs) could 
be reduced or eliminated, then all of Earth’s climate change problems 
would be solved.  This Article examines whether this underlying as-
sumption is incorrect and whether the current Kyoto appraoch is 
likely to reduce GHG emissions to "nondangerous" levels. 
Humans have embarked on an inadvertent and potentially very 
risky experiment involving rapidly increasing GHG levels in the at-
mosphere.  The question examined here is not whether the experi-
ment is taking place or the degree of control that might be required, 
but rather whether there are efficient and effective remedies for 
global climate change problems and what they might be.  Because of 
the extreme complexity of the problem and the number of disciplines 
that need to be involved in defining a practical solution, the analysis 
must necessarily be equally complicated and broadly based.  Unfortu-
nately, the few previous analyses have ignored the reality that any 
remedies adopted, if they are to be successful, must not only be tech-
nically sound but also economically and politically feasible.  Although 
the emphasis in this Article will be on economics, a serious attempt 
has been made to consider all the other factors that need to be taken 
into account to find a workable solution to what may be the most dif-
ficult environmental problem that modern humans have faced. 
One of the major difficulties in solving climate change problems 
results from the fact that no one has really leveled with the public as 
to how difficult it would be to achieve the goals that the advocates of 
emissions control believe are necessary.  This may entice the public to 
embrace particular solutions to the problem, but in the longer run 
may result in major problems for implementing these solutions as it 
becomes clearer what is really involved.  It seems better to outline the 
full difficulties involved and then attempt to find the best available so-
lutions.  That is the goal of this Article. 
Others have called for an objective analysis of available techno-
logical options to solve climate change problems.  Braden Allenby ex-
pressed this as follows in a recent report from the National Academy 
of Engineering: 
 The current approach to global climate change carries within it not 
just policies, but also a vision, a teleology of the world that is, in impor-
tant ways, both unexpressed and exclusionary.  Perhaps for this reason, 
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the role of technology has been relatively ignored throughout the nego-
tiating process and, when it has come up, has been quickly marginalized. 
 In fact, there are many possible technologies that might reduce car-
bon loading in the atmosphere, but many of the most important ones 
are out of favor.  For example, nuclear energy has been excluded by 
general agreement, and geoengineering (e.g., aluminum balloons in the 
stratosphere to reduce incoming energy to the atmosphere) has been 
shunted aside, regarded as the dream of a few eccentrics.  Biotechnology 
to improve agricultural efficiency and biological carbon sequestration 
are clearly not acceptable to many participants in the Kyoto process, and 
to many environmentalists generally.  The rejection of these and other 
technologies tends to reinforce the impression that the Kyoto process is 
an exercise in social engineering by Europe targeted at the United 
States.  Regardless of the truth, this impression is obviously conducive to 
conflict and deadlock (as indeed has happened). . . . 
 A useful process that would contribute significantly to the rational, 
ethical management of the future would be to categorize technological 
possibilities and determine, as objectively as we can, their risks and bene-
fits and the optimal scale for each.  We could then develop a portfolio of 
options for future negotiations.  Technology, especially in emotionally 
and ideologically charged environmental debates, almost never provides 
complete answers.  But an array of technological options enables choice 
and thus increases the chances that we will be able to balance the dispa-
rate values, ethics, and design objectives and constraints implicit in the 
climate change discourse.  Technology may help us respond to the world 
we are creating in responsible, ethical, and rational ways.
2
A good example of what Allenby appears to be talking about in his 
second paragraph above, concerning the rejection of new technology, 
is provided by the recent Stern Review3 in Great Britain, which reviewed 
the economics of climate change.  The Stern Review never uses the 
word geoengineering, which is the term often used for many of the 
global technological solutions to the problem, and reaches radically 
different conclusions from this Article.  The Review enumerates nu-
merous benefits (B) from controlling GHGs and argues that the costs 
of control (C) would be less than the costs of global warming.4  But if, 
2 Braden R. Allenby, Global Climate Change and the Anthropogenic Earth, in NAT’L 
ACAD. ENG’G, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE CARBON DIOXIDE DILEMMA:  PROMISING TECH-
NOLOGIES AND POLICIES 3, 8-10 (2003), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/ 
10798.html (citations omitted). 
3
 NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW:  THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1-61 
(2007), HM Treasury, United Kingdom.  A prepublication version of the Stern Review is 
available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_ 
climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm. 
4 Id. 
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as argued in this Article, most of the claimed benefits (B) can be ob-
tained for a cost many orders of magnitude less than C (say C/4000 
for the sake of discussion) by using engineered climate selection, hu-
mans would be foolish to pay the much higher cost C.  Listing all the 
components of B and comparing them to C does not change this real-
ity.  Other reviewers have raised other concerns regarding the Review.5
Allenby’s call for a reexamination of geoengineering approaches 
has recently been reinforced by a number of other prominent scien-
tists who have supported the use of geoengineering approaches for 
global climate change control.6
This Article first analyzes whether the most prominent of the 
GHG approaches is likely to be either effective or efficient in solving 
the global warming problem as defined by the advocates of GHG con-
trols, and then analyzes several management and technological alter-
natives.  This Article assumes that recent predictions as to the effects 
of GHG emissions on climate by proponents of GHG control are 
broadly correct and will not discuss the reasons for believing that 
warming is or is not currently occurring.  It will further assume that 
the degree of GHG control required for controlling global warming 
advocated by GHG control proponents is also correct.  Rather, the 
purpose of this Article is to ask what the climate change problems are, 
whether the Kyoto Protocol and other decarbonization approaches 
are the most useful tool for solving them, and what other approaches 
might be more efficient and effective. 
This Article takes a broad view of the issue not only by looking at a 
broad range of climate change problems and the management and 
technological options for their solution, such as Allenby suggests, but 
also by viewing climate change in the larger context of both short- and 
5 See, e.g., Shots Across the Stern, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2006, at 80, 80 (discussing 
criticisms of the Stern Review’s emphasis of the “welfare of future generations” and 
“consumption of the rich relative to that of the poor”). 
6 See Oliver Morton, Is This What It Takes to Save the World?, 447 NATURE 132-36 
(2007);  P.J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections:  A Contribution 
To Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 7 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211 (2006) (advocating placing reflec-
tive particles in the stratosphere as more cost effective than reducing GHGs); T.M.L. 
Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate Stabilization, 314 SCI-
ENCE 452, (2006) (urging a combined GHG reduction with geoengineering ap-
proaches to combat both climate change and ocean acidity); William J. Broad, How To 
Cool a Planet (Maybe), N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2006, at F1 (discussing proposals to rear-
range the earth’s environment on a large scale, including cooling the planet by inject-
ing sulfur into the stratosphere); Charles J. Hanley, Could Smog Protect Against Global 
Warming?, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
html/nationworld/2003433914_webwarming16.html.  
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long-term effects of natural forces and human activities on climate.  
This Article argues that it is particularly important to consider the 
practical implications of attempting to implement a variety of man-
agement and technological options in terms of the psychological and 
political changes that would be required.  Climate history is consid-
ered over the last three million years, since the beginning of the cur-
rent chapter in Earth’s history, rather than the last hundred years or 
even the current Holocene Epoch, which is the focus of most discus-
sions on climate policy. 
A.  Needed Characteristics of Approaches Used To Control Climate Change 
Joseph Aldy et al. recently enumerated six criteria to “guide an as-
sessment of proposed global climate policy regimes:  (1) the environ-
mental outcome; (2) dynamic efficiency; (3) dynamic cost-
effectiveness; (4) distributional equity . . . ; (5) flexibility in the pres-
ence of new information; and (6) participation and compliance.”7  
Except for the addition of a seventh and an eighth criteria, the criteria 
proposed in this Part are very similar to those, so substantial added 
justification and detail concerning the first six criteria can be found in 
the article by Aldy et al., with one exception:  criterion five has been 
made much more specific because of the broader perspective taken in 
this Article toward the range of climate change situations that may re-
quire attention.  The seventh criterion may be captured by criteria two 
and three because such risks have economic costs, but since these risks 
are usually poorly understood and therefore very difficult to quantify, 
it appears better to make this an added criterion.  The eighth is an 
“other” category needed for a more general comparison of the pro-
posals. 
(1)  Effective environmental outcome:  Will implementing the man-
agement tool or remedy result in the desired climate management in 
a timely manner?  Remedies that are not effective can be worse than 
no remedy, since people may believe that a problem is being solved 
when it is not.  Where applicable, effectiveness in controlling global 
warming will be measured in terms of the likelihood that the Euro-
pean Union/United Nations Framework for Convention on Climate 
7 See Joseph E. Aldy, Scott Barrett & Robert N. Stavins, Thirteen Plus One:  A Com-
parison of Global Climate Policy Architectures, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 373, 374-79 (2003). 
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Change 2oC maximum temperature change goal8 will not be exceeded 
(discussed below in Part III.B), since that is the goal promoted by 
most GHG control advocates. 
(2)  Economic feasibility:  Will implementing the management tool 
or remedy produce positive net economic benefits?  Remedies that do 
not will decrease overall human economic welfare. 
(3) Cost-effectivenes: In the case of global average temperature 
change, what is the cost-effectiveness of the management tool or rem-
edy in terms (more specifically) of (3a), its long-term marginal cost 
expressed in dollars per ton carbon of CO2 emissions mitigated?  All 
other things equal, remedies that can achieve a given goal (in this case 
a given level of CO2 emissions) at lower cost are preferable to those 
that achieve them at a higher cost.  Marginal costs measure the cost of 
the last and presumably most expensive project that would be under-
taken using a given remedy and facilitate comparisons with the alter-
natives and with estimates of the economic benefits to be achieved.  
Where there is little variation between the cost of projects per unit of 
emissions reduction, this distinction concerning marginal costs is of 
little importance.  But where there is a broad range, this is important.  
Obviously there are also opportunities for controlling other GHG 
emissions, but it is assumed here that CO2 emissions control is broadly 
representative of those available for other GHG emissions in terms of 
the broad remedies or tools available for doing so.  As discussed in 
Part V.F, infra, not all the remedies discussed produce exactly the 
same benefits.  This makes cost-effectiveness comparisons a little dan-
gerous, but I believe still useful in comparing the remedies if these 
differences are kept in mind. 
(4)  Improved distributional equity:  What is the impact of the man-
agement tool or remedy in terms of its impact on various human in-
come groups or nations?  Remedies that improve distributional equity 
would appear to be preferable to those that do not. 
(5)  Provide policy flexibility:  If conditions change, how easily and 
how rapidly can the management tool or remedy being pursued be 
changed to meet the new conditions?  Because natural climate 
changes may occur abruptly, particularly during periods of climate 
transition, major volcanic eruptions, or nuclear conflicts, and because 
of the substantial uncertainties involved, a static approach that is diffi-
8 European Environment Agency, CSI 013 Specification:  Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas 
Concentrations,  http://themes.eea.europa.eu/IMS/ISpecs/ISpecification20041007131717/ 
guide_summary_plus_public (last visited May 1, 2007). 
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cult to change in a relatively short timeframe will be much less useful 
than a more flexible one.  There are at least three important aspects 
of flexibility in the context of climate change.  The first (5a) is the 
ability to alter the pace of implementation of a remedy being consid-
ered as needed to meet changing conditions.  The second (5b) is the 
capability to deal with global cooling as well as global warming if con-
ditions change or a major volcanic eruption results in rapid cooling.  
A third aspect (5c) is the ability to deal with global temperature distri-
bution.  As discussed in Part II, global warming and to some extent 
cooling represent real risks for Spaceship Earth and its living cargo.  
Given the reality of long lead times for changing the atmospheric lev-
els of GHGs and given the less than overwhelming correlation be-
tween these levels and global temperatures, it would appear that a 
faster-acting, more effective, lower-cost, and quickly reversible ap-
proach is much to be preferred in any attempt to influence global 
temperatures. 
(6)  Not place undue demands on participation and compliance:  Does 
the management tool or remedy require widespread active participa-
tion and compliance to be successful?  How likely is that to occur?  
Greater such demands reduce the likelihood of successful implemen-
tation of a management tool or remedy. 
(7)  Not pose other major environmental risks or provide other environ-
mental benefits:  Does the management tool or remedy create other en-
vironmental risks unrelated to climate control?  If the remedy poses a 
significant risk of creating other environmental risks, the world may 
not be better off as a result of using it.  Or are there other environ-
mental benefits? 
(8)  Have other important favorable or unfavorable characteristics:  Are 
there other important advantages or drawbacks to the proposed man-
agement tool or remedy not already discussed? 
B.  What Are the Problems? 
Although the problems posed by climate change are often consid-
ered to be a single problem (usually referred to as global warming) 
with a single solution (reducing GHG emissions), they can more use-
fully be viewed as four interrelated problems (shown in Tables 1 and 
1a in the Appendix) that have both human and natural origins since 
the effects of and solutions to these problems are significantly differ-
ent.  Conclusions concerning effective and efficient control measures 
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for each problem can be found in Part V.F, infra.  The four problems 
are: 
(P1) The general trend of global temperatures is currently a 
gradual increase, and this appears likely to continue for the foresee-
able future (discussed further in Part II, infra).  This gives rise to most 
of the identifiable adverse effects usually mentioned as the results of 
global warming, including sea level rise, Arctic thawing, and possibly 
increased hurricane strength, among others. 
(P2)  Changes in atmospheric levels of GHGs have other nontem-
perature-related effects.  In some cases these are believed to be posi-
tive, but at least one of them, ocean acidification, appears to have im-
portant adverse effects.  There may be other such adverse effects that 
are not yet known. 
(P3)  There is an increasing risk that climate changes will trigger 
various “tipping points,” where some believe that there will be particu-
larly adverse feedbacks or other abrupt climate changes from contin-
ued global warming; some of these changes may be of a catastrophic 
nature.  There may also be other natural events that will result in 
abrupt climate changes as well.  A brief discussion of the scientific as-
pects of these effects can be found in Part II.F, infra. 
(P4)  There will almost certainly be shorter-term episodes of 
global cooling resulting from major volcanic eruptions and possibly 
from other natural causes as well as possible nuclear conflicts.  In the 
twentieth century such volcanic eruptions occurred on average about 
once a decade and had significant, but not overwhelming, adverse ef-
fects.  In the extreme case, however, a few of these episodes have in 
the past and are practically certain at some point in the future to be 
catastrophic to humans and to much of life on Earth.  It is also likely 
that any nuclear conflict, even a regional one, would have similar ef-
fects.  A brief discussion of the scientific aspects of these effects can be 
found in Part II.G, infra. 
It is important to emphasize that the risks posed by each of these 
problems are different in magnitude, timing, and likelihood, so they 
are not directly comparable with each other.  But they all impose risks 
and have potential adverse effects. 
C.  What Are the Solutions? 
One of the primary purposes of this Article is to examine some of 
the major available remedies, approaches, and tools for climate con-
trol using the criteria discussed in Part I.A.  These approaches can be 
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divided into two general types:  management and technological.  In a 
number of ways these two approaches are parallel and either one 
could be used.  In an attempt to simplify this confusing situation, 
however, this Article combines the two approaches primarily on the 
basis of the management approaches (MAs) but with some aspects of 
the technological approaches (TAs). 
1.  Management Approaches 
There are at least four general approaches to how humans could 
“manage” these problems, with several sub-scenarios based on differ-
ent assumptions: 
• (MA1) Nonstabilized “business-as-usual” carbonization and ad- 
  aptation; 
• (MA2) Regulatory decarbonization; 
• (MA2a) Kyoto and possible follow-ons; 
• (MA2b) Decentralized; 
• (MA2c) Liability based; 
• (MA3) Engineering projects to directly change temperatures or  
  atmospheric GHG levels; 
• (MA4) International approach using all available technologies  
  and approaches. 
a.   (MA1) Nonstabilized “Business-as-Usual” Carbonization and Adaptation 
This management approach assumes that fossil fuel use and GHG 
releases continue at roughly the same rate as in recent decades in 
countries other than the participating Annex I nations to the Kyoto 
Protocol.  This means that atmospheric levels of CO2 would continue 
to increase at roughly two to three parts per million by volume 
(ppmv) per year.9  This approach corresponds to remedy A in Parts IV 
and V and Table 2.  A variation on this management approach 
(MA1a) is the increased use of public information and education 
campaigns to encourage people, companies, and governments to vol-
untarily reduce energy use or to reduce GHG emissions resulting from 
9 David Adam, Surge in Carbon Levels Raises Fears of Runaway Warming, GUARDIAN 
UNLIMITED (London), Jan. 19, 2007, available at http://environment.guardian.co.uk/ 
climatechange/story/0,,1994071,00.html (reporting that from 1970 to 2000, CO2 con-
centrations increased by about 1.5 ppm each year, from 2001 to 2005 they increased by 
an average of 2.2 ppm each year, and in 2006 by 2.6 ppm). 
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its use.  This variation will be referred to as MA1a and will be dis-
cussed further in Part V.E.1. 
b.   (MA2) Regulatory Decarbonization 
This management approach assumes that governments use their 
regulatory powers, such as executive actions or judicial decisions, to 
decrease GHG emissions compared to what they otherwise would have 
been, but do not assume direct responsibility for management of 
world climate.  Since most of the actions would presumably be cen-
tered on reducing GHG levels, and most GHGs contain carbon, the 
approach is characterized as "decarbonization."  The approach could 
be described as “coercive” because the governments involved would 
have to find ways and means to actively encourage their citizens and 
economic units to decrease GHG emissions or to penalize those that 
did not. 
i.   (MA2a) Kyoto Protocol and Possible Follow-ons 
This management approach assumes that the world attempts to 
implement the Kyoto Protocol and that similar follow-ons to it are 
eventually negotiated.  Since this is the most prominent of the decar-
bonization alternatives, it will be discussed at some length in Part III 
and analyzed primarily under Remedy B in Parts IV and V and Tables 
1, 1a, and 2.  The Protocol allows use of certain of the technological 
approaches that can also be used under MA3. 
ii.   (MA2b) Decentralized Approaches 
This management approach assumes that governmental decar-
bonization takes a more decentralized approach.  It assumes that vari-
ous local or subnational governments take action other than through 
the use of liability laws to limit GHG emissions or force one or more 
unwilling national government to do so using existing laws.  Examples 
include California’s recent enactment of laws limiting emissions of 
GHGs10 and the case of Massachusetts v. EPA.11  Alternatively, it as-
10 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 38500-385710 (West 2007). 
11 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (holding that state government plaintiffs did have stand-
ing to challenge the EPA’s assertion that it does not have authority to regulate the 
emissions of GHGs associated with climate change); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 74 
U.S.L.W. 3713 (U.S. 2006) (No. 05-1120) (addressing the question of whether the 
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sumes that one or a few nations decide to pursue an approach that is 
broadly consistent with the Kyoto Protocol but independent of actions 
taken by any international body and uncoordinated with the actions 
of a group of nations with significant emissions.  Such legislative ac-
tions have been proposed at the national level in the United States12 
and appear to be the objective being pursued by many U.S. environ-
mental organizations.  This approach will be considered as a subcase 
of MA2a and will be analyzed in Part V.E.2. 
iii.   (MA2c) Liability-Based Approaches 
This management approach assumes that “tobacco-style” liability 
cases are successfully used to force major GHG emitters or manufac-
turers of GHG-emitting equipment to reduce emissions in one or 
more countries.  The State of California, for example, has recently 
filed suit against the six largest automakers asking that they pay dam-
ages for the GHGs that their vehicles emit.13  This will also be consid-
ered as a subcase of MA2a and will be analyzed in Part V.E.3. 
c.  (MA3) Engineering Projects To Directly Change Temperatures or 
Atmospheric GHG Levels 
This management approach, sometimes referred to as geoengi-
neering, assumes that one or more governments, or an international 
governmental body with the economic and technological resources to 
do so, select and implement engineering projects to directly change 
temperature regimes or atmospheric GHG levels for the world.  These 
projects may or may not involve decarbonization.  In the case of engi-
neered climate selection, use of this technology does not receive any 
credit under the Kyoto Protocol.14  Although international coopera-
tion and coordination would be desirable, one nation could theoreti-
“EPA administrator ha[s] authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other air pollutants 
associated with climate change”). 
12 See, e.g., Safe Climate Act of 2006, H.R. 5642 109th Cong. (2006); Global Warm-
ing Pollution Reduction Act, S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006). 
13 Nick Bunkley, California Sues 6 Automakers over Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
21, 2006, at C2. 
14  The Kyoto Protocol requires that Annex I nations reduce their emissions of 
GHGs.  Such reductions are not required under engineered climate selection so coun-
tries would not recieve "credit" for such efforts.  Kyoto does have some provisons allow-
ing credit for carbon sequestration under some circumstances.  It contains no such 
provisons for TA3 approaches (defined in Part I.C.2 infra) such as engineered climate 
selection. 
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cally carry out a program to engineer temperatures or GHG levels for 
the whole world, although probably facing great condemnation from 
other countries. 
d.  (MA4) International Approach Including Use of All Available 
Technologies and Approaches 
This option is a hypothetical new international approach utilizing 
the best features of all the other management approaches.  It would 
use all available technologies and include all sources of GHG emis-
sions, but would apply a better rationale based on relative responsibil-
ity for the problem and the “polluter pays” principle to determine the 
costs to each country.  One possibility would be the creation of a 
mandatory international fund based on past and present emissions.15  
This is intended as something of an “ideal” approach that solves some 
of the major problems with Kyoto while also providing an interna-
tional framework for coordinated reductions in GHG emissions.  This 
approach will be analyzed in Part V.E.4. 
2.   Technological Approaches 
At the risk of some minor oversimplification, there would appear 
to be only three general technological approaches for controlling 
Earth’s temperature climate: 
Alter world atmospheric GHG levels by 
• (TA2a) Changing GHG emissions (referred to here as “conven- 
   tional approaches” or “conventional decarbonization” and dis- 
           cussed in Row B of Tables 1, 1a. and 2),  
• (TA2b) Removing or sequestering GHGs already in or about to  
  enter the atmosphere (referred to in this Article as “noncon- 
           ventional decarbonization” and discussed in Part IV.C.1, infra,  
  and in Row C of Tables 1 and 1a and Rows C through E of Ta- 
  ble 2), 
or 
• (TA3) Altering Earth’s radiation balance through other means 
   (referred to as “engineered climate selection” or “radiative  
  forcing,” or “solar radiation management” and discussed in 
15 One recent suggestion along these lines has been made by Jagdish Bhagwati, A 
Global Warming Fund Could Succeed Where Kyoto Failed, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006, at 13, 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7849f5b2-2cc3-11db-9845-0000779e2340.html. 
  
2007] GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL 1415 
 
   Part IV.C.2 and Row G of  Tables 1 and 1a and Rows F, G, and  
           H of Table 2).   
The first two technological approaches (TA2a and TA2b) will be 
referred to as decarbonization.  The last two (TA2b and TA3) will be 
defined as nonconventional or geoengineering approaches.  Radiative 
forcing is the change in the balance between radiation coming into 
the atmosphere and radiation going out.  Note that TA3 impacts only 
the temperature-related effects of higher atmospheric GHG levels as 
defined in Part II.D, while TA2a and TA2b impact both temperature 
and nontemperature-related effects.  It is also important to note that 
removing GHGs that are already in the atmosphere (TA2b) can satisfy 
the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol, but changing Earth’s radia-
tion balance (TA3) cannot.16  The Kyoto Protocol also does not give 
full credit for the substitution of nuclear for fossil fuel power sources, 
which are nevertheless included in group TA2a to simplify the analy-
sis. 
Engineered climate selection has often been referred to as geoen-
gineering, which has been defined by David Keith as “intentional 
large-scale manipulation of the environment.”17  There are a number 
of grey areas that fall between decarbonization and geoengineering, 
but where in doubt they will be assumed to constitute geoengineering 
for the purposes of this Article. 
3.   Remedies To Be Extensively Evaluated 
In the interests of simplifying the analysis to manageable propor-
tions, the two approaches towards control—management and tech-
nologial—will be consolidated for the purposes of this Article into 
consideration of more limited general types of remedies, which will be 
extensively analyzed.  Since MA1 has a technological counterpart, 
which is not to apply technology, and MA3 also has a technological 
counterpart (TA2b and TA3), the choices of remedies R1 and R3 are 
easy.  R2 and R2a, however, are more complicated.  To simplify the 
analysis, this delineation omits the following management sub-
options:  MA1a, MA2b, MA2c, and MA4.  Fortunately, these appear to 
be closely related in their characteristics to the options that are con-
sidered, so will be briefly analyzed in Part V.E after the analysis of the 
16 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 3. 
17 David W. Keith, Geoengineerig the Climate:  History and Prospect, 25 ANN. REV. EN-
ERGY & ENV’T 245, 247 (2000), available at http://www.ucalgary.ca/~keith/papers/ 
26.Keith.2000.GeoengineeringHistoryandProspect.e.pdf. 
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other options.  This leaves the following remedies for the main analy-
sis: 
• (R1) Nonstabilized “business-as-usual” carbonization and adap- 
  tation, based on MA1; 
• (R2) Regulatory decarbonization using “conventional” tech- 
  nologies (TA1a) under the Kyoto Protocol (MA2a); 
• (R2a) Nonconventional decarbonization or sequestration  
  (TA1b), which could be undertaken under either MA2 or MA3,  
   depending on how MA2 is implemented; 
• (R3) Engineered climate selection, combining MA3 and TA3. 
Remedies R2a and R3 are broken down into subremedies, primar-
ily along technological lines, since different technologies have differ-
ent characteristics. 
The primary comparison of these remedies can be found in Table 
2, which uses the criteria (Columns in Table 2) outlined in Part I.A as 
the basis for the comparison of the remedies (Rows in Table 2) dis-
cussed in Part IV.  Figure 1 presents the economic benefit and cost as-
pects of results shown in Table 2, except that the tools or remedies are 
shown as vertical columns.  This Article relies on a number of previous 
surveys and reviews in discussing remedies.18
This Article considers how each of the four specific problems 
identified earlier in this Part could be most effectively and efficiently 
addressed after reviewing a range of alternative solutions that have 
been proposed for the climate change control problem.  The Article 
18 See Martin I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability:  
Energy for a Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCIENCE 981 (2002) (providing a broad overview of 
the conventional and some of the nonconventional options available, with emphasis 
on energy production options).  There are extensive review articles on both the ra-
tionale for using nonconventional approaches as remedies for climate change, see e.g., 
Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering:  A Climate Change Manhattan Project, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
73, 76 (1998) (arguing that “the time has now come to expand our policy horizons to 
include geoengineering”), and on the approaches themselves, see Keith, supra note 17, 
at 259-69 (reviewing various proposals to “geoengineer the climate”).  An earlier dis-
cussion of some of these remedies can be found in a 1992 National Academy of Sci-
ences report.  NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., PANEL ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE 
WARMING, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING 433-60 (1992).  Judge Pos-
ner provides a legal and economic perspective on some of the alternatives.  RICHARD 
A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE:  RISK AND RESPONSE (2004).  Recent summaries of selected 
nonconventional options can be found in Tyndall Centre & Cambridge-MIT Institute 
Symposium, Macro-Engineering Options for Climate Change Management and Mitigation 
(Jan. 7-9, 2004), http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/events/past_events/cmi.shtml [hereinafter 
Tyndall].  To the extent possible, the options are evaluated using peer-reviewed litera-
ture.  Where this is not available, the proponents’ statements are used as the basis for 
comparisons, but with the source noted. 
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begins by briefly summarizing some of the relevant science (Part II) 
and analyzing the prospects for the Kyoto approach (Part III).  The 
primary discussion of alternative climate change remedies is found in 
Parts IV and V.  The general conclusions with regard to available al-
ternatives are in Part V.D, the application to other management tools 
in Part V.E, and the application to the four specific problems in Part 
V.F.  The implications of the analysis for the choice of remedies are 
discussed in Part V.G.  Part VI discusses some of the likely major ob-
jections to the use of engineered climate selection, and Part VII pre-
sents a summary of the Article.   
II.  CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND 
Although the purpose of this Article is not to survey the scientific 
literature on climate change, a brief discussion of some aspects pro-
vides useful background for the remainder of the Article.  The em-
phasis in this Part is on the major causes and effects of global climate 
change—both anthropogenic and natural. 
A.  “Recent” Earth Climate History 
Much of the extensive discussion in recent years of global warm-
ing and what, if anything, needs to be done about it, seems to have 
been largely carried out as if the only  alternative to global warming is 
the climate that prevailed in the late nineteenth or early twentieth 
century or, at most, that which prevailed over the last twelve thousand 
years or so of the current interglacial or Holocene Epoch.  This ap-
pears to ignore the larger reality that Earth has been gripped in a se-
ries of extended and worsening ice ages for the last 2.7 million years, 
so that the “norm” is not the gentle climate of the current Holocene 
years but rather the predominantly horrific climate of the last three 
million years since the present series of ice ages began (broken only 
by relatively short interglacial periods).  Interglacial periods have ac-
counted for less than ten percent of the past 900,000 years19 and rep-
resent one extreme of this longer period—-the warm extreme.  And if 
the current Holocene interglacial period had followed the pattern of 
the last several, it would now be ending, in the view of William Rud-
diman, with possibly disastrous consequences for further human de-
velopment.20  In addition, there is evidence of a Holocene era 1500-
19 WILLIAM F. RUDDIMAN, PLOWS, PLAGUES, AND PETROLEUM 43 (2005). 
20 Id. at 95-105. 
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year periodicity in Northern Hemisphere temperatures, with the last 
minimum occurring 400-500 years ago.21  During the previous inter-
glacial period, there were several such “cold snaps” over intervals of a 
few decades without significant climatological precursors or warn-
ings.22  So if “recent” history were the only guide, there is reason to be 
concerned that the current interglacial period may be near its end 
and Earth could be headed for another 100,000 years or so in the ice 
box, or that a new “cold snap” could occur during the current cen-
tury.23  Since at least the first of these possibilities would seem to have 
much greater consequences than global warming, this Article exam-
ines the climate change question from a larger perspective of preserv-
ing as human friendly a climate as possible rather than the more lim-
ited (but still important) objective of avoiding the global warming that 
now appears to be occurring. 
B.  Explanations for Ice Ages 
A number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain these pe-
riodic ice ages.  The most widely accepted of these is the Milankovitch 
cycles, but others have suggested variations in the levels of cosmic dust 
entering Earth’s atmosphere, and in solar output.24  A particularly 
comprehensive attempt to explain variations in global temperatures 
based on the Milankovitch cycles and human impacts can be found in 
Ploughs, Plagues and Petroleum.25
The important point is that basic causation has not been firmly es-
tablished, or at least not universally accepted, and is the subject of 
continuing debate.  It is therefore important that any remedies pro-
21 Edward Teller et al., Global Warming and Ice Ages:  I. Prospects for Physics-Based 
Modulation of Global Change 17 (Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., Working 
Paper, 1997), available at http://www.llnl.gov/global-warm/231636.pdf [hereinafter 
Teller et al., Global Warming and Ice Ages]. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See Charles Breiterman, Considering the Earth as an Open System, 1 J. EARTH SYS. 
SCI. EDUC. (2004), http://jesse.usra.edu/articles/breiterman/breiterman-paper.html 
for a recent survey of this literature.  A very recent study suggests that there is a corre-
lation between solar sunspot activity and global temperatures prior to 1970, and that 
the sun may be going into a quiescent period in which global temperatures could fall 
by 0.2oC.  See Stuart Clark, Saved by the Sun, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 32, 
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg19125691.100&print=true. 
25 See RUDDIMAN, supra note 19, at 35-168 (arguing that while Earth's climate was 
determined largely by the Milankovitch cycles prior to 8,000 years ago, man has in-
creasingly assumed indirect control since then). 
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posed take this uncertainty into account—-hence the importance of a 
criterion allowing for flexible responses (see criterion 5 in Part I.A 
above). 
C.  Long Response Times for Climate System and Influence of Carbon Dioxide 
and Earth’s Radiation Balance on Climate 
Response times are an important aspect of Earth’s climate system 
and vary widely.  The system responds very rapidly in terms of changes 
in ice-cover on land but very slowly in the case of the deep ocean.  Be-
cause of the slow response times of many of the earth’s climate sys-
tems, there are long lags in the response of temperatures to changes 
in GHG emissions and concentrations.26  Any attempt to actively con-
trol climate change needs to take these long response components 
into account. 
It is likely that changes in CO2 levels in the atmosphere, for exam-
ple, are important influences on global climate but have a fairly long 
lead time in human terms.27  Although not the most potent GHG, CO2 
is the one that many scientists are most concerned about.  However, 
direct attempts to change the incoming radiation from the sun or the 
outgoing radiation reflected back into space appear to be a more im-
mediate means to influence global temperatures than changing CO2 
levels. 
D.  A Very Brief Overview of the Causes and Effects of Global Warming 
The generally accepted theory of global warming is that global 
temperatures depend on the concentrations of GHGs in the atmos-
phere, since these change the earth’s absorption and retention of 
heat from the sun.  The GHG concentrations, in turn, are determined 
by the emission of these gases into the atmosphere minus their re-
moval from the atmosphere.  The effects of higher GHG concentra-
tions can be broken down into two major categories for the purposes 
of this analysis, which correspond to problems P1 and P2 delineated 
in Part I.B: 
• (P1) Those that are a direct result of higher global tempera- 
  tures; 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 20-21 (comparing the amount of CO2 in the atomosphere to water in a 
leaky bathtub, gradually cooling the earth as more and more leaks out). 
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• (P2) Those that are the result of nontemperature effects of  
  higher GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. 
E.  Why Accidental Global Warming May No Longer Be Good 
Ruddiman’s research implies that Earth and its human cargo had 
a very narrow escape from the start of a new ice age, and entirely by 
luck and by human activity undertaken for other reasons, happened 
to escape what would have been an early end to modern civilization in 
the northern latitudes.28  Under this interpretation, human-induced 
global warming may have saved the day by avoiding a truly catastro-
phic new ice age, rather than being the cause of the problem.29  But 
do we really want to run such risks in the future?  Although it appears 
unlikely that a new ice age would start at current or foreseeable CO2 
levels, it is important to ask:  what if Ruddiman is wrong and a new ice 
age is only a few decades away if there is no intentional human inter-
vention? 
F.  Instability, Lack of Full Understanding of Earth’s Climate, and the  
Effects of Short-Term and Unexpected Events 
Substantial uncertainties exist in predicting climate changes.  
There can be little doubt, based on the results of ice cores retrieved 
from Greenland and Antarctica, that there have been substantial and 
sometimes abrupt (as in a decade) climate variations in the past that 
cannot be explained by the Milankovitch cycles.  The result, scientists 
now believe, is that ice ages can begin or end in as little as a few dec-
ades or even a few years.30
There is also considerable debate about whether there may be ad-
verse feedback (or triggering of “tipping points,” where a slight rise in 
the earth’s temperature can cause a dramatic change in the environ-
ment that triggers a far greater increase in global temperatures) from 
global warming such that further warming would either accelerate 
global warming, or, working in reverse, bring about an abrupt climate 
cooling (defined as problem P3 in Part I.B).  Hans Joachim 
28 Id. at 95-105. 
29 Id. 
30 See RICHARD B. ALLEY, THE TWO-MILE TIME MACHINE:  ICE CORES, ABRUPT CLI-
MATE CHANGE, AND OUR FUTURE 4-5 (2000) (describing the variance in onset times for 
past ice ages as ranging from less than a decade to more than 10,000 years). 
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Schellnhuber,31 James Lovelock,32 and others have offered a number 
of concerns about this, including the following: 
(1)  Thawing of Arctic permafrost may release methane, a potent 
GHG, which would promote further warming.33
(2)  Arctic thawing may release sufficient fresh water so as to re-
duce or even eliminate the oceanic “conveyor belt” that brings warm 
water into the North Atlantic, warming Europe and North America, 
and carries away cold, salty water into the South Atlantic and beyond.  
This could lead to a shift of the tropical rainfall belts.34
(3)  Disintegration of the Greenland or West Antarctic ice sheets 
may result in a substantial rise in sea level, and, in the case of 
Greenland, a reduction in the conveyor belt.35
(4)  Loss of sea ice in the Arctic Sea may result in increased ab-
sorption of sunlight and possibly change major weather patterns.36  
Similarly, a decrease in land coverage of ice and snow would also in-
crease the absorption of sunlight.37
(5)  As the oceans warm, the ocean area covered by nutrient-poor 
water may increase and algae growth decrease.  This is likely to reduce 
31 See AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber ed., 
2006), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/internat/ 
pdf/avoid-dangercc.pdf (focusing on the large ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica 
and the ocean’s thermonaline circulation as the main causes of abrupt climate 
changes). 
32 See JAMES LOVELOCK, THE REVENGE OF GAIA:  EARTH’S CLIMATE IN CRISIS AND 
THE FATE OF HUMANITY 34-35 (2006) (arguing that the systems affecting the Earth’s 
climate reinforce one another). 
33 See Fred Pearce, Climate Warning as Siberia Melts, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 13, 2005, 
at 12; K.M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling from Siberian Thaw Lakes as a Positive Feedback 
to Climate Warming, 443 NATURE 71, 71 (2006) (using new methods of measuring ebul-
lition to show that melting permafrost has increased methane release in the Siberian 
thaw lakes at much higher rates than previously believed); Sergey A. Zimov, Edward A. 
G. Schuur, & F. Stuart Chapin III, Permafrost and the Global Carbon Budget, 312 SCIENCE 
1612, 1612-13 (2006) (describing the impact of permafrost melting on atmospheric 
carbon content). 
34 See Laurent Augustin et al., Eight Glacial Cycles from an Atlantic Ice Cove, 429 NA-
TURE 623, 626-27 (2004) (describing the effect Arctic thawing has on water tempera-
ture in the North and South Atlantic). 
35 See Jonathan T. Overpeck et al., Paleoclimatic Evidence for Future Ice-Sheet Instability 
and Rapid Sea-Level Rise, 311 SCIENCE 1747, 1747 (2006) (linking melting ice sheets to 
rising sea levels). 
36 See Gabrielle Walker, The Tipping Point of the Iceberg, 441 NATURE, 802, 802 
(2006) (discussing the process through which sunlight melts Arctic ice, which creates 
more open water absorbing more sunlight, thus making warmer summers). 
37 LOVELOCK, supra note 32, at 34. 
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the absorption of CO2 by the algae and the generation of marine stra-
tus clouds that reflect sunlight.38
(6)  Increasing global temperatures may destabilize tropical rain 
forests and lessen the area they cover and the global cooling they pro-
vide.39
(7)  The dark, heat absorbing, boreal forests of Siberia and Can-
ada are likely to extend their range as global temperatures increase.40
Whether any or all of these adverse feedbacks exist or not is sub-
ject to varying degrees of scientific conjecture, as is whether or when 
they may result in “tipping points.”  Presumably these risks should be 
carefully weighed in any assessment of the risks from problem P3.  But 
if any of them appear imminent, humans would be better off taking 
practical steps to try to avoid them rather than to hope for a miracle.  
In other words, there is sufficient uncertainty concerning whether and 
when these events will happen such that it is beneficial to be prepared 
to move decisively to avert pending problems if they should arise (as-
suming that nothing is done to prevent them in the first place). 
Perhaps the scariest of these risks is (1), methane releases from 
melting permafrost.  A recent article describes the problem in graphic 
terms as follows:   
 The soils of the Arctic are crammed with organic matter—a frozen 
reservoir of beautifully preserved roots, leaves and other raw material 
that may contain as much carbon as the whole atmosphere.  They are 
quite unlike soils from more temperate regions, which are mostly made 
up of the parts that the bacteria cannot digest.  “We are  unplugging the 
refrigerator in the far north,” says [Phil] Camill [of Carleton College].  
“Everything that is preserved there is going to start to rot.”  
     Although such feedback has been discussed for almost as long as  the 
threat of global warming has been taken seriously by scientists,   the lack 
of firm data on the subject is striking.  “There is a lot that we don’t know 
at this point,” says Walter Oechel from San Diego State University in 
California.  “People haven’t quite pulled the whole picture together 
yet—but what we do know is that the potential amounts are huge and 
very, very scary.”41
One of the most widely publicized of these risks is (2).  Some sci-
entists have proposed that some of the past abrupt climate changes 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
 41 Gabrielle Walker, A World Melting from the Top Down, 446 NATURE 718, 718-21 
(2007). 
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were caused by a breakdown of the oceanic “conveyor belt” that brings 
warm water into the North Atlantic, warming Europe and Eastern 
North America, and carries away cold salty water to the South Atlantic 
and beyond.42  There are recent indications that the “conveyor belt” 
has weakened by about thirty percent in recent years, possibly because 
of an influx of less saline water into the North Atlantic as a result of 
global warming-induced thawing in the Arctic.43  The conveyor belt is 
believed to have broken down in the past.  Some scientists believe that 
this happened during the Younger Dryas cooling about 12,600 years 
ago.44  This event began suddenly, and for its 1000-year duration the 
North Atlantic region was about 5oC colder.45  Although this is not 
deemed an ice age in itself, it may have felt like one to the generations 
who lived through it and would certainly have large economic effects 
on Western Europe and possibly elsewhere if it should recur today.  
One recent study concluded that there is a fifty percent risk of such a 
conveyor belt collapse absent any action to prevent global warming.46  
But even with the addition of a carbon tax as might occur under MA2, 
the study found that there would still be a twenty-five percent risk 
which MA2 would not address even if it were fully implemented.  The 
authors’ conclusions would seem to have a direct bearing on the ques-
tions posed in this Article: 
 Such high probabilities are worrisome.  Of course they should be 
checked by additional modelling studies.  But, if these future studies find 
similar results, it would seem that the risk of a THC [conveyor belt] col-
lapse is unacceptably large and, therefore, that measures over and above 
the policy intervention of a carbon tax be given serious consideration.
47
42 See, e.g., Wallace S. Broecker, Thermohaline Circulation, the Achilles Heel of Our Cli-
mate System:  Will Man-Made CO2 Upset the Current Balance?, 278 SCIENCE 1582, 1582-84 
(1997) (describing the “conveyor belt” system). 
43 See Harry L. Bryden, Hannah R. Longworth & Stuart A. Cunningham, Slowing of 
the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation at 25º N, 438 NATURE 655, 655-57 (2005) 
(listing evidence that “suggests that the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation has 
slowed by about 30 per cent between 1957 and 2004”). 
44 Michael E. Schlesinger et al., Assessing the Risk of a Collapse of the Atlantic Thermo-
haline Circulation (Feb. 1, 2005), available at http://www.stabilisation2005.com/ 
Schlesingerm_Thermohaline.pdf. 
45 Terrence M. Joyce, Presentation to the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy:  
Abrupt Climate Change and the Oceans, 1 (Sept. 24-25, 2002), available at http:// 
www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/sep24_25_02/joyce_testimony.pdf. 
46 Schlesinger, supra note 44, at 1. 
47 Id. at 6-7. 
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Although the modeling results of this particular study may or may 
not be supported by future studies, and there is doubt among some 
scientists that global warming could bring about a new collapse of the 
conveyor belt, some scientists warn that global warming could result in 
other abrupt and serious regional climate changes.48
Despite considerable research to build better climate models, it is 
safe to say that considerable uncertainties remain.  One illustration of 
this is the debate over global dimming, and the extent to which in-
creased pollution in the twentieth century may have masked the im-
pact of higher CO2 levels on global temperatures.
49  It is even conceiv-
able (although probably unlikely) that, if pollution should 
substantially decrease (as might be the case if a successful effort were 
actually made to decrease CO2 emissions), the result could be an un-
expected plateau or even an increase in global temperatures as the 
dimming effect diminishes at the same time that GHG emissions de-
crease.  Given the lag between changes in emissions and changes in 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2, in fact, this could conceivably 
happen in the early years of an effective effort to decrease global CO2 
emissions. 
G.  Volcanic Eruptions and Nuclear Conflicts as a Cause of Climate Cooling 
(Problem P4) 
One known source of shorter-term climate cooling that is widely 
ignored in discussions of climate change is major volcanic eruptions 
that place sulfur-containing gases into the stratosphere.  As a result of 
observations concerning the climatic effects of major volcanic erup-
tions such as El Chichon and Mount Pinatubo, which resulted in sig-
nificant observed global cooling, it has been clear that sulfur-
containing gases that reach the stratosphere from major eruptions 
cool the planet,50 although they are clearly dirty and involve grossly 
48 See Richard A. Kerr, Confronting the Bogeyman of the Climate System, 310 SCIENCE 
432, 433 (2005) (surveying possible climate threats greater than a collapse of the con-
veyor belt). 
49 Gerald Stanhill & Shabtai Cohen, Global Dimming:  A Review of the Evidence for a 
Widespread and Significant Reduction in Global Radiation with Discussion of Its Probable 
Causes and Possible Agricultural Consequences, 107 AGRIC. & FOREST METEOROLOGY 255 
(2001) (discussing the causes and consequences of global dimming). 
50 See Alan Robock, Volcanic Eruptions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL CHANGE 738, 738-44 (Ted Munn ed., 2002), available at http:// 
climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/EGECVolcanicEruptions.pdf (describing the cooling 
impact of volcanic dust); Shanaka L. de Silva, Volcanic Eruptions and Their Impact on the 
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“oversized” aerosols lifted to a less than “optimal” altitude if the pur-
pose were to decrease global temperatures.  Sulfur combines with wa-
ter vapor in the stratosphere to form dense clouds of tiny droplets of 
sulfuric acid.  These decrease tropospheric temperatures because they 
absorb incoming solar radiation and scatter it back into space. 
The severity of the climatic effect depends on the magnitude of 
the eruption, the sulfur content of the magma, and the amount of sul-
fur released into the stratosphere as an aerosol.51  For extremely large 
eruptions, the climatic effects will persist until the sulfur compounds 
gradually drop to lower altitudes where they are washed out by rain.  
In the case of major eruptions such as Mount Tambora in 1815, the 
climatic effects were observed in 1816, the “year without a summer.”52
Volcanic eruptions come in many shapes and sizes.  The most 
devastating of them are characterized as supervolanic eruptions.  The 
effects of these can be disastrous in terms of the area buried by ash, 
the effects on the environment, and the resulting decrease in tem-
peratures as a result of stratospheric scattering of incoming sunlight.  
One study suggested that the Toba eruption in what is now Indonesia, 
occuring roughly 74,000 years ago, might have created 5,000 tons of 
sulphuric acid aerosols in the atmosphere.53  The authors concluded 
that this may have resulted in global temperatures falling by 3o to 5oC.  
They further suggested that the eruption may have accelerated the 
world into the last ice age, from which it only emerged about 10,000 
years ago.  Other researchers have found evidence of an abrupt five- 
to six-year decrease in temperatures close to the time of the erup-
tion.54  Based on all this an anthropologist has proposed that the Toba 
eruption may have been responsible for a human population “bottle-
neck” about that time in which only a few thousand survived.55  Other 
researchers are less certain.56  A calculation by still other researchers 
Earth’s Climate, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF WORLD CLIMATE 788, 788-94 (J. Oliver ed., 2002), 
available at http://www.space.edu/documents/Volcanoclimate.pdf. 
51 De Silva, supra note 50. 
52 Id. 
53 Michael R. Rampino & Stephen Self, Volcanic Winter and Accelerated Glaciation 
Following the Toba Super-Eruption, 359 NATURE 50-52 (1992). 
54 G.A. Zielinski et al., Potential Atmospheric Impact of the Toba Mega-Eruption, 23 
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 837, 837-40 (1996). 
55 Stanley H. Ambrose, Late Pleistocene Human Population Bottlenecks, Volcanic Winter, 
and Differentiation of Modern Humans, 34 J. HUM. EVOLUTION, 623, 623-51 (1998). 
56 Clive Oppenheimer, Limited Global Change Due to the Largest Known Quaternary 
Eruption, 21 QUATERNARY SCI. REV. 1593-1609 (2002). 
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has been made that there is a one percent chance of a super-eruption 
in the next 460 to 7,200 years.57
A very similar situation exists with regard to potential asteroid im-
pacts58 and nuclear conflicts,59 which can also result in global tem-
perature decreases.  Ben Mason et al. calculated that such volcanic 
eruptions are considerably more frequent than asteroid impacts of 
similar energy yield.60  Even regional nuclear conflicts would likely 
generate very large amounts of soot that would reach the stratosphere 
as a result of fires caused by nuclear explosions.61  Although the Toba 
eruption occurred before humans kept accurate climate or popuation 
records, it would appear that some such short-term volcanic events 
may have a greater impact on human welfare than those resulting 
from current global warming or asteroid impacts.  Although some ef-
fort is being proposed to reduce global warming and some effort is al-
ready being made to predict asteroid impacts, it appears that nothing 
is being done to reduce the climatic effects of large volcanic erup-
tions. 
Unlike global warming, adaptation is very difficult in the case of 
major eruptions or nuclear conflicts since their timing and the magni-
tude of their effects are currently unpredictable.  There can be little 
doubt that there will be future major volcanic eruptions that will affect 
climate.  There were approximately ten in the twentieth century, or an 
average of one per decade.62  None of these ten was catastrophic in 
terms of its effects.  De Silva states that it is generally accepted that 
there will be an average temperature decrease of 0.2o to 0.5oC for one 
57 Ben G. Mason, David M. Pyle & Clive Oppenheimer, The Size and Frequency of the 
Largest Explosive Eruptions on Earth, 66 BULL. OF VOLCANOLOGY 735, 735-48 (2004). 
58 T. Luder, W. Benz & T.F. Stocker, Modeling Long-Term Climatic Effects of Impacts:  
First Results, in Catastropic Events and Mass Extinctions:  Impacts and Beyond, GEOLOGICAL 
SOC. OF AM. 717-29 (Special Paper 356, C. Kocherl & K.G. McLeod eds., 2002); avail-
able at http://www.climate.unibe.ch/~stocker/papers/luder02gsa.pdf (noting that 
temperature drops and darkness lasting many months are some of the outcomes trig-
gered by impact of asteroids and comets on the earth). 
59 See Alan Robock et al., Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts, 6 AT-
MOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS DISCUSSION 11,817, 11,818 (2006), available at 
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acpd-6-11817.pdf (predicting famine for bil-
lions as a result of a nuclear winter that would follow the massive use of nuclear weap-
ons). 
60 Mason et al., supra note 57. 
61 Robock et al., supra note 59. 
62 See David Viner & Phil Jones, Volcanoes and Their Effect on Climate (Climatic Res. 
Unit, Sch. of Envtl. Scis., U.E. Anglia) (2000), available at http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/ 
cru/info/volcano. 
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to three years after a major eruption, although there is great variabil-
ity between eruptions based on the factors mentioned in the preced-
ing paragraph.63  This compares with an increase of global tempera-
tures of about 0.6oC during the twentieth century.  Although no 
estimate of the economic damages from such decreases is available, 
there are very likely to have been substantial costs, perhaps even as 
much as the costs of global warming to date, given the greater diffi-
culty of adapting to these effects.  It is also highly probable, if not cer-
tain, that one or more future volcanic eruptions will at some time be a 
supervolcanic eruption.64  Many scientists believe that such a supervol-
canic eruption can be expected in Yellowstone National Park as well as 
elsewhere.65  Such eruptions have occurred about 600,000 to 700,000 
years apart near Yellowstone, and it has been 640,000 years since the 
last one.  When it occurs, it is expected to have catastrophic results for 
both the United States and the world.  There is no known way to de-
crease the direct effects of such an eruption, such as pyroclastic flows 
and nationwide ash falls, but it would appear possible to prevent or 
reduce the indirect effects on global temperatures if immediate action 
could be taken to increase global temperatures when such eruptions 
occur.  These indirect effects on global temperatures, sometimes de-
scribed as a volcanic winter, would probably decimate agricultural 
production and thus human food supplies, something that the survi-
vors would desperately need.  It should be noted that the question ap-
pears to be not whether there will be future eruptions that will affect 
climate, but rather when and where they will next occur and how seri-
ous the effects will be.  The risks of such adverse events are somewhat 
different from those of the other three problems listed in Part I.B.  
There is a virtual certainty of short-term impacts averaging 0.2o to 
0.5oC once a decade or so and a risk of extremely catastrophic events 
with a much longer and even more uncertain time interval.  There 
appear to have been few if any attempts to reduce these risks from 
volcanic eruptions. 
63 See de Silva, supra note 50. 
64 A super-volcano is defined as one that has a volcanic explosivity index (VEI) of 
8.  See Bill McGuire, How To Measure the Size of a Volcanic Eruption, GUARDIAN (London), 
Sept. 2, 2004, at 9. 
65 Ilya N. Bindeman, The Secrets of Supervolcanoes, SCI. AM., May 22, 2006, at 36, 38, 
40 available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/print_version.cfm?articleID=0006E0BF- 
 BB43-146C-BB4383414B7F0000. 
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H.  What Might the Future Hold? 
What can we conclude from this brief overview of climate change 
science?  Global temperatures appear to be affected by both human 
activities as well as short- and long-term natural events and forces.  
This makes predictions of future temperatures risky, although it is 
clear that they need to be viewed from both a much shorter and a 
much longer time horizon than that of the current warming period.  
Ruddiman provides an extensive discussion of some of the possibili-
ties.66  He agrees that warming is the principal threat in the next few 
centuries, but that an ice age is a longer-term possibility.  A recent 
study with a longer than usual time horizon concludes that a “busi-
ness-as-usual” approach to the use of fossil fuels is likely to lead to an 
8.05o C (14.5ºF) rise in average global temperatures by the year 2300.67  
It appears likely that the global warming that occurs will be inter-
rupted every decade or so (on average) by unpredictable one- to 
three-year global cooling from major volcanic eruptions, and although 
much less likely, it is even possible that there will at some point in the 
future be a volcanic or nuclear winter (as a result of a supervolcanic 
eruption or a nuclear conflict) or other abrupt climatic change result-
ing in serious global cooling.  There may also be “tipping points,” 
where a continued rise in global temperatures will trigger very adverse 
environmental effects.  It would therefore appear prudent for humans 
to consider how best to counter continuing global warming while at 
the same time developing the capability to counter shorter-term 
global cooling or warming on a rapid response basis. 
III.  WHY THE KYOTO PROTOCOL WILL NOT PREVENT CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND IS UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS 
The most prominent current management tool to control global 
climate change is represented by the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to 
limit emissions of GHGs by the wealthier nations.  The next objective 
of this Article is to analyze the Protocol to see if it is likely to prevent 
adverse climate change or to achieve the goals set for it.  Most econo-
mists who have examined it have seen it as deeply flawed.68  But before 
66 See RUDDIMAN, supra note 19, at 171-74. 
67 See G. Bala et al., Multicentury Changes to the Global Climate and Carbon Cycle:  Re-
sults from a Coupled Climate and Carbon Cycle Model, 18 J. CLIMATE 4531, 4532-33 (Nov. 
2005). 
68 Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the 
Post-Kyoto Era, 96 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 35, 35 (2006). 
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examining the Protocol, it is important to define what the phrases 
“Kyoto approach” and “prevent global warming” mean as used in this 
Article. 
A.  What Is Meant by the Kyoto Protocol and Approach? 
The “Kyoto Protocol” as used in this Article includes any control 
measure explicitly sanctioned by the Kyoto Protocol and its approved 
implementing instruments.  The “Kyoto approach” includes both 
those actions specifically called for by the Protocol as well as other 
regulatory decarbonization proposals that would have the same effect 
and use the same general means.  Examples of other measures in-
clude the recent law enacted in California requiring drastic reductions 
in GHGs emitted in the state,69 and bills that have been introduced 
into the U.S. House and Senate to do roughly the same thing nation-
ally.70  Although Part III deals primarily with the Protocol, many of the 
conclusions reached also apply to other proposals that would fall un-
der the Kyoto approach.  These other proposals are dealt with more 
explicitly in Part V.E. 
B.  UN/EU Goals for Controlling Global Warming 
The common understanding of the phrase “prevent global warm-
ing” is presumably that global temperatures would not be allowed to 
rise beyond what they currently are.  This is not, however, the defini-
tion used in the discussion of the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  Its much less demanding defini-
tion is that there be “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations . . . at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system.”71
The UNFCCC definition of “dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence” is a very slippery one since the effects on global temperatures 
depend on when the levels are stabilized and the GHG concentrations 
they are stabilized at, which in turn depends on what level is needed 
to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”  In other words, this definition does not prevent global warm-
69 See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 38500 (West 2007). 
70 See, e.g., H.R. 5642, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006). 
71 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771, avail-
able at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
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ing in the common understanding of the phrase.  Rather, it says that 
atmospheric GHG levels should be stabilized at a level that is not 
“dangerous.”  The European Union has a target of restricting global 
warming to 2oC above preindustrial levels, presumably because it be-
lieves that any temperature rise above that amount would be “danger-
ous.” 72  Most of the major proposals to limit GHG emissions use this as 
their goal, so it will be used in this Article as the basis for judging the 
effectiveness of the global warming aspects of the management ap-
proaches analyzed.  Two bills introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2006 
specify a similar goal of average temperature rises of no more than 
2oC and stabilization of CO2 levels at 450 ppm.
73
One obvious question is whether a reasonable solution to the 
global warming problem would be to change the interpretation of the 
goal so that warming above 2oC would be acceptable.  This is a very 
important question, but it is outside the scope of this Article, since the 
Article assumes that the goal for global warming control is that which 
is specified by the proponents of GHG control.  There are several 
points that need to be made concerning this assumption, however. 
The first point is that P3, the risk of abrupt climate changes result-
ing from higher average world temperatures, presumably increases as 
temperatures rise.  So, although there is no certainty that all abrupt 
changes can be avoided if temperature changes are kept below 2oC, 
there is believed to be a rapidly increasing risk above that level and no 
certainty that 2oC is entirely safe either.  Possibly for this reason, the 
2oC limit has become the “standard” by which the effectiveness of cli-
mate change control strategies are usually judged, and it is the basis 
for most proposals to reduce global warming, as well as the one used 
in this Article. 
The second point is that reasonable variations on the 2oC limit 
would not change the major conclusions of this Article.  If the limit 
 72 Council of the European Union, Climate Change:  Medium and Longer Term 
Emission Reduction Strategies, Including Targets—Council Conclusions, Brussels, 
March 11, 2005, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st07/ 
st07242.en05.pdf.  According to George Monbiot, the aim of preventing more than 
2oC warming has also been overtly adopted by the UN and implicitly by the British, 
German, and Swedish Governments.  He also describes his rationale for the target.  See 
George Monbiot, Giving Up on Two Degrees, May 1, 2007, available at http:// 
www.monbiot.com/archives/2007/05/01/1058.  The article is also available as George 
Monbiot, The Rich World’s Policy on Greenhouse Gas Now Seems Clear:  Millions Will Die, 
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (London), May 1, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/story/0,,2069395,00.html.   
73 See H.R. 5642 § 702; S. 3698, § 701. 
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were 3oC or even 4o or 5o, engineered climate selection would still be 
the lowest cost means for meeting the higher limit since the cost is 
roughly 1/4000 as much as for meeting the 2oC limit using Remedy 2.  
So, although it is not clear what the cost might be for higher limits, it 
is clear that it is not three or four orders of magnitude less.  If, on the 
other hand, there is no temperature change that would result in sig-
nificantly increased risk of abrupt climate changes, there is no need 
for any climate change control to reduce P3. 
The third point is that hopefully the risks listed above in Part II.F,  
as well as others, were carefully weighed by those who set the 2oC limit, 
although some were probably not even known at the time. 
C.  GHG Stabilization Under the Kyoto Protocol 
1.  Kyoto Goals Unlikely To Be Met by  
Most Participating Annex I Countries 
The first question to be asked is whether the emission goals speci-
fied in the Kyoto Protocol are likely to be met by the participating 
Annex I countries (i.e., those that ratified the Protocol and are obli-
gated by it to make emission reductions).  Currently available infor-
mation suggests that it is highly unlikely that the reductions specified 
in the agreement will be fully achieved in most of these countries.  In 
November 2005, the European Environment Agency warned “that the 
EU was likely to cut its emissions by only 2.5% by the year 2012.”74  In 
December 2005, the Institute for Public Policy Research concluded 
that ten of fifteen EU signatories would miss their Kyoto targets with-
out “urgent action.”75  An earlier 2003 European Environment Agency 
report reached the same conclusion.76
Reductions in possible later follow-on periods are likely to prove 
even more difficult for a number of participating Annex I nations 
(such as Germany and Russia) because of the fortuitous choice of 
1990 as a base year when emissions were high relative to later in the 
1990s. 
 
 
74 Europe ‘Behind on Kyoto Pledges’, BBC NEWS, Dec. 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/uk_news/politics/4561576.stm. 
75 Id. 
76 Norm Dixon, Global Warming:  Can Kyoto Accord Really Help?, BALT. CHRON. & 
SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://baltimorechronicle.com/021805Dixon.shtml. 
  
1432 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1401 
Figure 2:  World Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Two Cases,  
1990, 2010, and 203077
 
 
2.  If Achieved for Participating Nations, Kyoto Goals Are Not 
Projected To Stop CO2 Emission or Temperature Increases 
The most recent estimates of future world CO2 releases, assuming 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in participating Annex I coun-
tries and a continuation of it in future possible follow-on agreements, 
suggest that CO2 emissions will continue to increase  (see Figure 2).
78  
Specifically, the U.S. Department of Energy projects that in this case 
world CO2 emissions will increase 44% from 2010 to 2030 and 106% 
from 1990 to 2030 (as compared with a Kyoto proposed decrease of 
5.3% from 1990 to 2012).79  As long as emissions continue to increase, 
CO2 concentrations will not fall.  Other analyses of atmospheric con-
centrations of GHGs also indicate that CO2 would continue to in-
crease,80 although perhaps at a slower rate than it otherwise would. 
 
 77 This figure is taken from U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUT-
LOOK 2006, at fig.6 (2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/ieo06/ 
highlights.html. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 John Bongaarts, Population Growth and Global Warming, 18 POPULATION & DEV. 
REV. 299, 302 (1992); Ken Caldeira, Atul K. Jain & Martin I. Hoffert, Climate Sensitivity 
Uncertainty and the Need for Energy Without CO2 Emission, 299 SCIENCE 2052, 2052-54 
(2003) . 
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The much more drastic reductions in overall fossil fuel use re-
quired for temperature stabilization81 are highly unlikely, particularly 
during a period when use by less developed countries is rapidly in-
creasing and is uncontrolled under the Protocol.  Any “savings” from 
decreased developed country use are likely to be more than lost to 
Asian fossil fuel use increases (see Figure 3).   
 
 
Figure 3:  World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region,  
1990--203082
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The extra annual emissions of CO2 from new coal-fired plants in 
China, India, and the United States are expected to exceed the pro-
jected reductions from Kyoto by more than a factor of five by 2012.83
Current projections of CO2 releases by the International Energy 
Agency similarly suggest that the Kyoto targets will not be met on a 
worldwide basis.84
81 Bongaarts, supra note 80, at 312. 
 82  This figure is taken from INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006, supra note 
77, at fig.65. 
83 For an excellent graph representing these expectations, see Scott Wallace, 
Sources and industry estimates for Extra Annual Emissions of CO2, UDI-Platt’s, U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 2004. 
84 The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) Reference 
Scenario projects, based on policies in place, that by 2030, CO2 emissions will have in-
creased by 63% from today’s levels, which is almost 90% higher than 1990 levels.  Even 
in the WEO’s 2004 World Alternative Policy Scenario—which analyzes the impact of 
additional mitigation policies up to 2030—global CO2 emissions would increase 40% 
from today’s level, putting them 62% higher than in 1990.  See IEA, Overview:  Pros-
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One study, presented in early 2005, concluded that GHG emis-
sions would have to fall to between 30% and 50% of 1990 levels by 
2050 if there is to be a 50-50 chance of avoiding a temperature in-
crease of more than 2oC.85  That would mean a 50% to 70% decrease 
from 1990 levels and an even greater decrease from 2006 levels.  
Greater assurance than a 50-50 chance of meeting the goal would re-
quire even larger reductions.  The two bills introduced into the U.S. 
Congress in 2006 specify a goal of an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions 
by 2050 from 1990 levels in order to prevent more than a 2oC rise in 
temperature above the preindustrial average and global atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs (presumably they actually mean CO2) from 
exceeding 450 ppm.86  In other words, the average person in the 
world would have to decrease his or her direct and indirect GHG-
emitting activities by two-thirds or even four-fifths at the same time 
that the developing countries are trying to rapidly increase their en-
ergy use.  If, as the developing countries now insist, they continue to 
very rapidly increase their emissions, the percentage reductions re-
quired by the developed world would be still greater.  Caldeira and his 
coauthors conclude that even if climate sensitivity is at the lower end 
of the range of uncertainty, over 75% of primary power would need to 
come from non-CO2 emitting sources if the 2
oC goal is be met.87  And 
if climate sensitivity is at the higher end of the range of uncertainty, 
“nearly all of our primary power will have to come from non-CO2 emit-
ting sources.”88  Put in simpler terms, this would mean that nearly 
every electric power plant would need to be replaced with a hydro-, 
wind-, or nuclear-based facility.  This strongly suggests that trying to 
meet the 2oC goal using this approach would be somewhere between 
extremely difficult and impossible.  Reuel Shinnar and Francesco 
Citro estimate that $170 to $200 billion per year would be required to 
achieve a 70% reduction in U.S. CO2 emissions over 30 years.
89  Pre-
sumably if other countries did not meet similar reductions, the United 
States would have to achieve much higher percentage reductions if 
pects for CO2 Capture and Storage (2005), available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/ 
npsum/ccsSUM.pdf. 
85 Jenny Hogan, Only Huge Emissions Cuts Will Curb Climate Change, NEW SCIENTIST.COM, 
Feb. 3, 2005, http://www.newscientist.com/channel/earth/climate-change/dn6964.  
Monbiot, supra note 72, says that an 80% cut from current levels would be needed. 
86 See H.R. 5642, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006). 
87 See Caldeira et al., supra note 80, at 2053. 
88 Id. at 2054. 
89 Reuel Shinnar & Francesco Citro, A Road Map to U.S. Decarbonization, 313 SCI-
ENCE 1243, 1244 (2006).  The total undiscounted cost would be about $6 trillion. 
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the 2oC goal were to be met.  So it is not impossible—just extremely 
expensive and impractical unless the population is placed on a free-
dom-of-choice limiting energy rationing system, such as has recently 
been discussed in Great Britain, and unless the rest of the world (in-
cluding the developing nations) achieves similar reductions. 
The emissions reductions required by the Kyoto Protocol would 
have a negligible effect on global temperatures.  A study by the Na-
tional Center for Atmospheric Research concluded that the change in 
global temperatures, even with United States participation, would be a 
reduction of 0.11o to 0.21oC (about 6%) off global average tempera-
tures by 2100 assuming that the Annex I nations continued to observe 
the Kyoto limits beyond 2012.90  If they went back to business as usual 
after 2012, the reduction would only have been about 3%.  The non-
participation by the United States in Kyoto Protocol would make these 
effects even lower. 
But the Kyoto goals currently only apply to industrialized partici-
pating signatories to the Protocol, whereas much of the increase in 
CO2 emissions are projected to come from the less developed coun-
tries in coming years.  “Mature market economies” are projected to 
increase their CO2 emissions by 1.0% per year over the period 2002 to 
2025;91 “emerging economies” are projected at 3.2% including China 
at 4.0%.92
The response of those advocating GHG emission control has been 
to argue that improved technology will come to the rescue.93  More 
90 T.M.L. Wigley, The Kyoto Protocol:  CO2, CH4 and Climate Implications, 25 GEO-
PHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 2285 (1998), summary available at http://www.ucar.edu/ 
news/record/#kyoto. 
91 Energy Info. Admin., Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2004, Re-
port No. DOE/EIA-0573, at tbl.1 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
oiaf/1605/gg05rpt/emission_tbls.html. 
92 Id. 
93 Some of the proponents of the Kyoto Protocol approach have recently made 
quite sophisticated arguments concerning the effects of endogenous technical change 
on the costs of control, which they believe will bring down the cost of meeting the 
EU/UNFCCC goal considerably.  Jonathan Köhler et al., The Transition to Endogenous 
Technical Change in Climate-Economy Models:  A Technical Overview to the Innovation Model-
ing Comparison Project, ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 2006, at 17, 36-38.  Although there 
would undoubtedly be endogenous technical change, these arguments are question-
able on a number of grounds.  They assume that much of the relevant technical 
change will result from “learning by doing” rather than from unrelated developments 
in other sectors.  Experience with the development of motor vehicle hybrids, however, 
which depend on sophisticated computer technology, among other developments, 
make such assumptions dubious.  They also appear to assume that increased R&D on 
emissions reduction technology will not have serious adverse effects on other sectors 
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generally, proponents of Kyoto appear to believe that Kyoto was never 
intended as the ultimate solution to global warming, but rather as a 
first step down a path that would ultimately lead to achievement of the 
UNFCCC goal.  Currently, however, there is little evidence that coun-
tries not listed in Annex I are making any serious efforts to reduce 
GHG emissions.  Proponents hope that possible follow-ons to Kyoto 
will involve much greater GHG emission reductions that would make 
goal achievement possible.  Whether there will be follow-ons and if so, 
whether they would involve more effective reductions, is uncertain at 
this time.  The COP11 meeting in Montreal in late 2005 and the 
COP12 meeting in Nairobi in late 2006 were not particularly encour-
aging in this respect since the underlying disagreements between the 
developed and less developed countries appear to be unchanged. 
3.  Even If a Program To Implement the EU/UNFCCC Goals Were 
Somehow Effectively Implemented Worldwide, There  
Would Still Be a Substantial Risk of Temperature  
Exceedences and the Need for Adaptation 
 Worldwide CO2 emissions are projected to increase at roughly 
2% per year in the period 2002 to 2025,94 which probably implies an 
increase in atmospheric CO2 levels of about 2 ppmv per year;
95 atmos-
pheric CO2 levels were about 380 ppmv in 2006.
96  Taking into ac-
count other GHGs besides CO2 (such as methane), however, CO2e 
equivalent levels were at least 420 in 2006.97  Hare and Meinshausen 
from which scarce R&D resources would be diverted since these costs appear not to 
have been factored in. 
 94 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International 
Energy Outlook 2005 78 (2005), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/ 
forecasting/0484(2005).pdf. 
 95 Atmospheric levels have been increasing about 2 ppmv per year, see Dialing in 
Your Own Climate, Fig. 2a, http://www.worldclimatereport.com/index.php/2006/04, 
in very recent years, up from an average annual increase of 1.4 ppmv from 1959 to 
2004.  See C.D. Keeling & T.P. Whorf, Atmospheric CO2 Records from Sites in the SIO Air 
Sampling Network, in U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, TRENDS:  A COMPENDIUM OF DATA ON 
GLOBAL CHANGE. (Carbon Dioxide Info. Analysis Ctr., 2005), available at http:// 
cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/co2/sio-mlo.htm. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Bill Hare and Malte Meinshausen state that there is a 40 ppm difference be-
tween CO2 and CO2e levels.  Bill Hare & Malte Meinshausen, How Much Warming Are 
We Committed to and How Much Can Be Avoided? 75 CLIMATIC CHANGE 111 (2006).  The 
Stern Review uses 430, see supra note 3, at vii.  Other recent estimates of CO2e range as 
high as 459.  See Monbiot, supra note 72.  Keeling and Whorf report atmospheric con-
centrations of 377 ppm CO2 in 2004, Keeling & Whorf, supra note 95.  At a 2 ppm per 
year increase, the 2006 level of CO2e would be about 420. 
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conclude that only with CO2 levels stabilized below 400 CO2 (or 440 
CO2e) is there more than a 66% chance of limiting global mean tem-
perature increases to below 2oC.98  They further state that “Four out of 
the 7 more recent climate sensitivity … estimates suggest that CO2eq 
concentrations have to be even lower in order to have a ‘likely’ chance 
of achieving a 2°C target, namely below 400ppm CO2eq in equilib-
rium.”99  Put another way, they conclude that “only for stabilization levels 
of 400 ppm CO2 equivalent and below, the possibility that warming of 
more than 2°C will occur could be classified as ‘unlikely.’”100  Since by 
2007 we are now at least 20 ppm over 400 CO2e and 20 ppm or less un-
der 440, it appears safe to conclude that there is a significant risk that 
the 2oC increase target will be exceeded, and that within 10 years 440 will 
be exceeded except in the unlikely case that extremely drastic action is 
taken to bring down future emissions over the next few years.  These 
higher temperatures would presumably result in considerable human 
adaptation, thus decreasing the economic benefits from imposing emis-
sion controls, in addition to the risk of abrupt climate changes (P3). 
4.  Successful Achievement of Goals Is Too Demanding  
of People and Their Governments 
Attempting to control CO2 and other GHG concentrations to lev-
els that would meet the EU/UNFCCC goals by using the Kyoto ap-
proach would require a large measure of international collaboration, 
development of complex regulatory systems, willingness of govern-
ments to ignore their countries’ self-interest, and willingness of bil-
lions of people to make personal sacrifices.  The benefits made possi-
ble by CO2 emissions are basic to modern civilization and provide 
huge economic incentives for continued increases.  Efforts to control 
CO2 emissions suffer from the immense costs of shifting modern soci-
ety away from its increasing dependence on fossil fuels as a source of 
energy for economic growth and development.  Significant progress 
assumes that people would agree to, and actually implement, greatly 
decreased fossil fuel consumption, which assumes that people would 
be willing to give up some of the very real benefits they enjoy from the 
use of fossil fuels at current or higher levels without a clear-cut, im-
mediate “crisis” to spur them into making such sacrifices.  The follow-
ing quotation from Ruddiman explains some of the problems very 
 98 Hare & Meinshausen, supra note 97. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 25. 
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well, from the point of view of someone with as intimate a knowledge 
of the GHG emissions reductions that would be required as probably 
anyone: 
 [There is] an unspoken truth about global warming that for some 
reason politicians of both parties ignore.  To reduce current and further 
greenhouse-gas emissions to levels that would avoid most of the projected 
future warming, draconian economic sacrifices would have to be enacted 
that almost everyone would find intolerable:  much more expensive fuel 
for travel and heating, much lower/higher thermostat settings in houses 
and workplaces, and extremely costly upgrades (or total replacements) 
of power plants.  The drag on the economy and on quality of life from 
such efforts would be enormous, and few citizens would stand for it.  At 
this time, with current technologies, we simply cannot afford the effort 
that would be required to mitigate the main impact of global warm-
ing.
101
This paragraph points out one of the fundamental problems in 
the current approach to climate change problems adopted by most of 
the developed world.  Almost no one except Ruddiman has tried to 
explain the magnitude of the problems that would result if GHG 
emissions were to be reduced sufficiently to avoid both warming and 
adverse climate feedbacks, or “tipping points.”  An effective GHG 
emission control approach is not a matter of maintaining the current 
lifestyle in the developed world with a few adjustments and the use of 
more energy-saving technology.  Rather, as discussed above in Part 
III.C.2, it would require wholesale changes in lifestyles in the devel-
oped world and radical changes in the development efforts of the less 
developed world, as well as the introduction of most available tech-
nology, probably regardless of how expensive it may prove to be.  It is 
hard to overemphasize the importance of this reality.  As Ruddiman 
says, this is “an unspoken truth.”102
A more analytical approach might separate the GHG reduction 
problem into two components: 
(1)  Those measures that involve achieving roughly the same level 
of individual welfare and personal freedom of choice, at a lower cost 
in GHG emissions.  The disadvantage of such reductions is that they 
will usually increase the costs involved, which usually have an indirect 
effect on living standards as well as on international competitiveness if 
101 See RUDDIMAN, supra note 19, at 183. 
102 Id. 
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not undertaken by everyone in the world.  Examples include substitut-
ing nuclear power for fossil fuel based electric power.103
(2)  Those measures whose primary effect is to lower individual 
welfare and freedom of choice, by directly discouraging people from 
using energy for purposes that they have previously used it for and 
would like to continue doing so, are likely to result in considerable 
public dissatisfaction.  Examples include discouraging people from 
making out-of-town trips (or requiring the use of particular modes to 
do so), reducing the use of automobiles in favor of other forms of 
transportation, or instituting an “annual carbon allowance” as Great 
Britain is said to be considering.104
The reason for making this distinction is the difference in the po-
litical impact of these measures.  In sufficiently wealthy countries 
where the change in energy costs may not have a large impact on the 
public, it may be possible for politicians to persuade their constituents 
to accept some measures involving (1) but it may be almost impossible 
to do so for those primarily involving (2).  But in many less developed 
countries where prices of electricity, heating oil, and other forms of 
energy are already being subsidized due to strong popular demand, 
even increases in prices due to (1) are likely to be politically unpalat-
able.  Even in wealthier countries, politicians are likely to be very cog-
nizant of increases in energy prices that are likely to make the country 
less competitive internationally.  They will probably favor price in-
creases where they will not have a major impact on the price of ex-
ports and where there is no international source that could provide a 
103 Although regulated industries often try to exaggerate the difficulties involved 
in meeting proposed regulations, it may be significant that the Electric Power Research 
Institute has carried out a new study that claims that it would take twenty years for the 
U.S. electricity utility industry, which emits about one-third of U.S. global warming 
gases, to reduce emissions to 1990 levels (Kyoto requires reductions below 1990 levels) 
regardless of how much the industry spends.  Matthew L. Wald, Study Questions Prospects 
for Much Lower Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at C2. 
104 One of the most prominent “prescriptions” as to how emissions can be drasti-
cally cut includes an example of component (2) since it proposes that annual average 
miles driven per vehicle be reduced from 10,000 miles to 5,000 miles based on “urban 
design, mass transit, and telecommuting.”  Stephen W. Pacala & Robert H. Socolow, 
Stabilization Wedges:  Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technolo-
gies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 970 (2004).  To the extent that this is done through coercion 
rather than voluntary change (which is almost certain given people’s widely observed 
reluctance to give up using their cars), this would be an example of component (2).  
An even more drastic proposal for actual individual emission rationing is reported un-
der consideration in Great Britain.  See David Adam, Swipe-Card Plan To Ration Consum-
ers’ Carbon Use, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, July 19, 2006, available at  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,,1823853,00.html. 
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substitute good or service at a lower cost.  Electricity generation is 
probably a good example.  Such increases have only an indirect effect 
on competitiveness. 
Proponents of GHG control argue that the cost will be just a few 
percent of the GNP and that future growth will be many times the 
costs involved.  Those who will have to pay those costs, particularly if it 
is not a very broad cross-section of the population, are likely to object 
strongly, however.  To persuade them otherwise would require an ad-
vertising or information campaign of unprecedented scope and cost.  
These costs are not usually factored into the costs of emission control, 
and the public is more likely to see them as a tax that someone has 
proposed to impose on them, rather than a contribution of a small 
percentage of their future economic gains.  Many in the developed 
world will also see global warming control as a type of often unpopu-
lar foreign aid since many of the costs of global warming may fall on 
less developed countries with high dependence on agriculture. 
There are strong economic incentives not to reduce GHG emis-
sions.  The increasing use of fossil fuel energy to replace animal and 
human power has been one of the hallmarks of modern civilization.  
It has occurred because there are strong economic incentives to do so.  
These incentives could be changed by government actions, but they 
are so fundamental that these changes might prove to be very difficult 
to bring about.  As illustrated by the current problems faced by many 
EU countries and Canada in meeting their Kyoto commitments, poli-
ticians would be required to maintain unusually strong resolve and ac-
tually implement the reductions, even as the population learns what 
the real effects of the measures would be on them.  Under current 
circumstances, politicians can argue that higher energy prices are a 
result of the operation of the laws of supply and demand in the mar-
ketplace.  But if markedly higher prices or energy use restrictions were 
imposed by politicians for the purpose of reducing global warming, 
they would be faced with a much more difficult situation. 
It is difficult to see why politicians would be willing to force their 
constituents to adopt unpopular and expensive constraints on their 
activities, or why many of their constituents would not pursue every 
available loophole or alternative avenue to avoid observing the con-
straints that are imposed.  In the case of type (2) measures, grand-
mothers may not agree that trips to see their grandchildren on the 
opposite coast can be dispensed with, particularly if politicians (and 
their possible future environmentalist supporters) do not fully explain 
in advance the degree of sacrifice that would be required.  If the esti-
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mates of “needed” reductions in GHG emissions discussed in Part 
III.C, above, are correct, it appears unlikely that all the reductions 
could be implemented in type (1) ways but would require use of some 
type (2) measures as well.  In other words, effective action under the 
Kyoto approach appears to assume that individual citizens would co-
operate in ways that would involve significant sacrifices of personal 
freedom to choose. 
Although global warming is perceived as the world's single largest 
environmental problem in the spring of 2007 by about one-third the 
U.S. population (and double the number who gave it the top ranking 
in 2006), there is little consensus as to what should actually be done 
about it.105  Global warming has all the psychological characteristics (a 
long time horizon in human terms, uncertainty, familiarity with tem-
perature changes, and no clear and visible effects that constantly re-
mind people that there is a problem that needs to be solved) that are 
likely to keep it at a low priority level.106  Elke Weber, of the Center for 
Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University, also be-
lieves that there are underlying psychological reasons why global 
warming does not scare people.107  The economic costs of the large 
GHG emissions reductions required to meet current interpretations 
of UNFCCC goals would be enormous—so much so that very few 
countries would willingly undertake them, particularly if all countries 
did not.108  Achievement is unlikely to occur given the difficulty of in-
stituting and using weak international bureaucratic systems to cope 
with strong economic incentives to use fossil fuel energy and other 
processes that release GHGs. 
105  Juliet Eilperin & Jon Cohen, Growing Number of Americans See Warming as Lead-
ing Threat, Most Want U.S. to Act, but There Is No Consensus on How, WASHINGTON POST, 
April 20, 2007.  The survey reported in the Post article found that only one in five favor 
higher taxes on electricity to encourage conservation, and about a third support 
higher gasoline taxes. Sixty-two percent of those surveyed say the government should 
require power plants to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.  Forty-two percent think 
the government should require greater fuel efficiency for vehicles, and thirty-six per-
cent want to require manufacturers to produce more efficient air conditioners, refrig-
erators, and other appliances.  See also Andrew C. Revkin, Yelling 'Fire' on a Hot Planet, 
N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 4, at 14 (reporting on the unassuming urgency of the 
global warming problem). 
106 Id. 
107 Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term 
Risk:  Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103 (2006) (ex-
ploring the phenomenon of humans’ risk perception of climate problems). 
108 See infra Part V.A for a discussion of the economic costs. 
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Because of very slow response times by many components of the 
earth’s climate, the effects of GHG emission reductions will be a long 
time coming and will only gradually affect those changes that have al-
ready occurred.  Proponents argue that the Kyoto Protocol is a useful 
first step down a long road, but given the larger picture, it seems rea-
sonable to ask whether it is sufficient if the stabilization of GHG levels 
in the atmosphere and therefore the mitigation of global warming are 
not likely to meet current interpretations of UNFCCC goals. 
In many ways, the Kyoto approach to global warming assumes that 
CO2 and other GHGs are just another set of pollutants that need to be 
controlled.  The approach taken in the Kyoto Protocol is the rollback 
approach used often in many previous pollution control efforts.  
Where reasonably priced alternatives exist or the costs of nonuse are 
not prohibitive, this approach has indeed worked well in many devel-
oped countries for other pollution problems.  But because of the cen-
tral role that fossil fuel use plays in modern civilization and that GHGs 
play in Earth’s climate, GHGs are not just another set of pollutants.  
GHG emissions control therefore requires a careful reexamination of 
what it is that is to be achieved and what is the best means for doing 
so.  The pollutant control approach is not only unlikely to succeed but 
is also extremely expensive as well as probably not meeting econo-
mists’ larger objective of maximizing human welfare.109
5.  Lack of Effective International Enforcement  
or Payment Mechanism 
Voluntary international agreements often do not have much of a 
history of success.  Even if there should be a follow-on to Kyoto, it ap-
pears unlikely that that it would be any more successful.  The reason 
for this is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a mecha-
nism for ensuring compliance with any global scheme adopted.110  
And without an assurance of effective penalties or other incentives, 
there will be overwhelming incentives for nations to “free ride” on 
contributions by others.111  Kyoto does not effectively address this 
109 See infra Part V.A for a discussion of the economics involved. 
110 See Lee Lane, Reflections on Transatlantic Climate Policy, paper presented at Sym-
posium on Climate Policy in the Coming Phases of the Kyoto Process:  Targets, In-
struments, and the Role of Cap and Trade Schemes, Brussels, February 20-21, 2006 
(on file with author). 
111 See Scott Barrett & Robert Stavins, Increasing Participation and Compliance in In-
ternational Climate Change Agreements, 3 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS:  POLITICS, LAW & 
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problem for participating Annex I countries or for others.  Presuma-
bly, the reason is that there was no way to do so.  The idea that “moral 
shame” will somehow persuade large CO2 emitters like the United 
States, India, or China to undertake costly and politically painful miti-
gation efforts appears highly dubious.  But without strong interna-
tional penalties or incentives, any Kyoto follow-on is equally likely to 
flounder at the cost of the additional time that it will take for this to 
become apparent to everyone involved.  Presumably one way to pro-
vide incentives to the less developed countries would be to offer large 
incentive payments from the major economic powers.  But who would 
be willing to provide them, given the “free rider” problem?  The 
United States is not known for high levels of foreign aid, the budget 
category that these expenditures are likely to be lumped into, and 
which already is being used to further many other objectives.  It ap-
pears equally unlikely that the participating Annex I countries would 
be willing to foot the bill by themselves. 
6.  Lack of Support from Major GHG Emitters 
The lack of support by the United States and the lack of emissions 
reductions required of the rapidly growing countries of Asia pretty 
much doom the Kyoto Protocol in its present form from playing any 
meaningful role in controlling climate change.  Without active GHG 
emissions reductions by at least India, China, and the United States, it 
is extremely doubtful that anything meaningful can be achieved.  One 
reason that the United States is not participating is the lack of a con-
tribution from the other two countries.  This argues that the cause of 
global climate control would be better served by substituting a differ-
ent approach based on incentives rather than governmental coercion, 
a sharing of the burden based on past and present contributions to 
the problems, and the ability to use a wider array of technological ap-
proaches to solve the problems.  The advantage of incentives is that 
those faced with the lowest cost of control would do the controlling, 
rather than those who happen to have been allocated the most strin-
gent quotas.  Coercion is likely to result in more resistance than pro-
gress.  And contributions based on the share of the problem caused 
would make the rationale explicit and possibly even “equitable.” 
ECON. 349, 358 (2003) (recognizing the importance of increasing countries’ participa-
tion in reducing GHG emissions). 
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7.  Weak Basic Rationale 
One of the basic problems with the Kyoto Protocol is the lack of a 
careful rationale for the approach used.  This appears to be one of the 
reasons that the United States has rejected participating in it.  Viewed 
as a purely technical issue, the damages from CO2 emissions are 
caused by the additional emissions to the atmosphere.  A good case 
can be made that any emissions of CO2, past or present, have had 
roughly the same adverse effects since the time that CO2 concentra-
tions exceeded “normal” levels.  Although CO2 is lost each year, pri-
marily to the oceans, it now appears that this has adverse effects too.112  
A rough cut at an “equitable” system to allocate damages might be to 
calculate the total incremental anthropogenic CO2 emissions since the 
diversion from “normal” levels for each country.  This would result in 
the largest allocations to those countries with the greatest and longest 
standing emissions, but it would not exempt developing countries ei-
ther. 
Instead, Kyoto completely exempts developing countries and sets 
what appear to be arbitrary limits on emissions from developed coun-
tries.  The “equitable” system just discussed would place a significant 
penalty on developing countries with large emissions and encourage 
them to cut their emissions while still placing the major burden on 
countries with substantial and longstanding emissions (like the United 
States).  Although estimates of these previous emissions are inherently 
uncertain, it appears possible to make useable estimates and therefore 
country allocations.  This approach would at least create a credible ra-
tionale for the allocation of the costs of climate control between coun-
tries. 
8.  Partial Exclusion of Nuclear Power and Exclusion of  
International Aviation and Shipping Fuels 
The Kyoto Protocol excludes nuclear energy under two of the 
three “flexibility mechanisms” that can be used by participating Annex 
I nations to meet their commitments.  Nuclear power is one of the few 
possible substitutes for fossil fuel power to supply base load power, so 
112 See ROYAL SOCIETY, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC 
CARBON DIOXIDE:  POLICY DOCUMENT 12/05 25-30 (2005), available at http:// 
www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=13539 (studying the effects of atmospheric 
CO2 on ecosystems in the oceans). 
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giving it second-class status further constrains the possible solutions to 
the climate change problem. 
The Protocol also excludes any consideration of emissions from 
international aviation and shipping fuels.  International aviation and 
shipping are both growing sources of GHG emissions, and their exclu-
sion places an increased burden on the remaining sources. 
9.   A Brief Summary Concerning the Kyoto Protocol 
Few voluntary international agreements have been successful in 
meeting their goals.  Goals that can only be met with the active coop-
eration of most of the world’s governments and people, including 
those that have not participated in the agreements or have not made 
any commitments to actively contribute, are particularly unlikely to be 
met.  Agreements that have no effective enforcement mechanism are 
even less likely to succeed, especially when everyone has an interest 
not to cooperate.  The Kyoto approach in general and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol in particular appear to be highly unlikely ways to meet world-
wide goals for reducing GHG emissions in a timely or effective way.  
These goals are very demanding, and there is no reason to believe that 
the Kyoto approach would be an exception to previous experiences 
with voluntary international agreements. 
IV.  SOME ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING  
CLIMATE CHANGE 
If the Kyoto Protocol—or even the Kyoto approach—will not pre-
vent climate change or even mitigate it to the extent envisioned, and 
prevention or mitigation is something that humans want to achieve, 
what are some of the other tools available to control climate change, 
and how should they be evaluated?  In order to answer this question, 
it is important to first examine the criteria to be used in determining 
the answer.  Part I.A outlined the proposed evaluation criteria; this 
Part discusses the primary remedies, tools, and approaches that have 
received some attention and that are to be evaluated in this Article. 
A.  Nonstabilized “Business-As-Usual” Carbonization and Adaptation (R1) 
This “remedy” assumes that no significant changes will be made to 
the current situation in which GHGs continue to be released into the 
atmosphere as rapidly as in the recent past and few are removed ex-
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cept through natural processes.  This means increases in atmospheric 
CO2 levels of two to three parts per million per year. 
B.  Kyoto Management Plus Conventional Decarbonization Technology (R2) 
This remedy assumes continuation of the management approach 
provided by the Kyoto Protocol, but that only “conventional” techno-
logical approaches (TA1) plus nuclear power (which Kyoto does not 
encourage) are used to control climate change. 
C.  Nonconventional Decarbonization or Sequestration (R2a) 
1.  CO2 Sequestration 
Several alternatives have been proposed to increase the absorp-
tion of CO2 from the atmosphere by plants.
113  CO2, and presumably 
other GHGs, can also be artificially removed from the atmosphere and 
directly stored in a number of places.  In addition, CO2 can be re-
moved from fossil fuel-burning emissions before reaching the atmos-
phere.  This last option may not constitute geoengineering as the 
term is used elsewhere since it can be viewed as source mitigation, but 
this distinction will be ignored in this discussion. 
a.  Using Artificial Sequestration (RC) 
A number of ideas have been suggested for the artificial sequestra-
tion of CO2, including terrestrial, nonbiological sinks located in a 
number of geological formations (including depleted oil and gas 
fields, deep coal beds, and deep saline aquifers).  In addition, there is 
the possibility of oceanic nonbiological sinks, using very deep areas of 
the oceans.  Finally, there is the possibility of neutralizing the acidity 
of the carbonic acid resulting from dissolving CO2 in water and dispos-
ing of the neutralized compounds into the ocean.114
113 See generally Keith, supra note 17, at 259-68 (reviewing various proposals to ma-
nipulate the climate, including increasing the amount of outgoing infrared radiation 
or increasing albedo); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], 
CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE:  SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS AND TECHNI-
CAL SUMMARY 1, 2 (Bert Metz et al. eds, 2005), available at http://arch.rivm.nl/env/ 
int/ipcc/pages_media/SRCCS-final/ccsspm.pdf (describing how CO2 capture and 
storage could help mitigate climate change). 
114 See Greg H. Rau et al., Enhanced Carbonate Dissolution as a Means of Capturing and 
Sequestering Carbon Dioxide, 2001 FIRST NATIONAL CONF. CARBON SEQUESTRATION 1-4, 
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b.  Enhancing Natural Sequestration (RD/RE) 
Although a wide variety of proposals have been made, the princi-
pal proposals for terrestrial biological sinks involve intensive man-
agement of forests or other terrestrial ecosystems to stimulate their 
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere beyond what would otherwise 
take place naturally.  The principal proposals for natural oceanic se-
questration involve fertilizing the ocean surface with phosphate or 
iron in order to stimulate algae growth by supplying a biologically lim-
iting nutrient (RE).115  Some of the algae will ultimately fall to the 
ocean floor as organic matter, carrying carbon absorbed from the at-
mosphere with them.  More algae falling mean more carbon seques-
tered. 
D.  Engineered Climate Selection or Changing Earth’s Radiation  
Balance Directly (R3) 
To the extent that there is a need for preventing or mitigating 
only the temperature-related effects of global warming, there is strong 
evidence that this can be done by altering Earth’s radiation balance.  
This was discussed as long ago as 1979 by Freeman Dyson and Gregg 
Marland116 and perhaps most prominently by a 1992 National Acad-
emy of Sciences global change panel,117 which noted what appeared to 
the panelists to be its surprisingly great practicality. Other scientists 
have recently expressed interest.118  There are a variety of proposals to 
change the world’s temperatures by altering either the heat coming 
into the earth from the sun or changing the amount of heat reradi-
ated back into space from the earth.  It is important to note that this 
approach differs from the previous ones in that GHG levels in the at-
available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proceedings/01/carbon_seq/p24.pdf 
(describing the process of enhanced carbonate dissolution). 
115 See generally Ben Fertig, Ocean Gardening Using Iron Fertilizer (Aug. 2004), 
http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/oceangard/overview.php (exploring the idea of 
using iron to sequester CO2). 
116 Freeman J. Dyson & Gregg Marland, Technical Fixes for the Climatic Effects of CO2, 
in U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WORKSHOP ON THE GLOBAL EFFECTS OF CARBON DIOXIDE 
FROM FOSSIL FUELS (Report No. CONF-770385, 1979). 
117 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 18, at 100-09 (discussing the science of al-
tering the heat balance through radiative forcing and radiative feedback mechanisms). 
118 See Broad, supra note 6, at F1 (describing the increasing populatiry of the sul-
fate aerosol proposal); Hanley, supra note 6, at A9 (reporting also on the method of 
sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere to slow warming); Wigley, supra note 6, at 452 (pro-
posing the use of sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere to provide time for humans to 
mitigate warming through reductions in greenhouse gas emissions). 
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mosphere are not directly altered.  Only three of these proposals will 
be discussed here in order to simplify the discussion, but it is highly 
likely that there are others of equal or greater merit that have or will 
be proposed.  So these proposals should be viewed as illustrative of the 
possibilities available and not as a definitive list. 
The Livermore papers119 suggested and explored the feasibility of 
engineered climate selection approaches to altering Earth’s radiation 
balance to affect climate.  To counteract global warming, Teller et al. 
advocate allowing a little more of Earth’s thermal radiation to pass out 
of the earth and/or allowing a little less of the sun’s thermal radiation 
in.120  To counter global cooling, they suggest allowing a little less of 
Earth’s thermal radiation out and/or a little more of the sun’s in.  
This discussion concerns only a few of these proposals, which will be 
referred to as “radiative forcing” in this Article, and is intended to in-
119 Edward Teller et al., Active Climate Stabilization:  Practical Physics-Based Approaches 
to Prevention of Climate Change 1, 1 (Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab.,  
Preprint UCRL-JC-148012, 2002) [hereinafter Teller, Practical Physics-Based Approaches], 
available at http://www.llnl.gov/globalwarm/148012.pdf (preferring active technical 
management of the radiative forcing of the temperatures of the earth’s fluid envelopes 
over the administrative management of atmospheric greenhouse gas inputs); Edward 
Teller et al., Active Climate Stabilization: Presently-Feasible Albedo-Control Ap-
proaches to Prevention of Both Types of Climate Change, Presentation to the Tyndall 
Centre and Cambridge-MIT Institute Symposium on Macro-Engineering Options for 
Climate Change Management, at slides 4-6 (Jan. 7-9, 2004), [hereinafter Teller, Active 
Climate Stabilization], available at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/events/past_events/active.pdf 
(proposing the use of radiative forcing of Earth’s temperatures); Edward Teller et al., 
Global Warming and Ice Ages:  I. Prospects for Physics-Based Modulation of Global Change 1, 1 
(Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., Preprint UCRL-JC-128715, 1997), [here-
inafter Teller et al., Physics-Based Modulation], available at http://www.llnl.gov/global-
warm/231636.pdf (proposing the use of scatterers to reduce the effects of GHGs); Ed-
ward Teller et al., Long-Range Weather Prediction and Prevention of Climate Catastrophes:  A 
Status Report 1, 3-8 (Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., Preprint UCRL-JC-
135414, 1999), [hereinafter Teller et al., Long-Range Weather Prediction], available at 
http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/236324.pdf  (reporting on the progress 
of high technology forecasting, such as isolation modulation, as a means to address 
global warming); Lowell Wood, Earth Albedo Engineering:  A Rio Convention-
Indicated Approach to Mesoscale Climate Stabilization as Atmospheric CO2 Levels Rise 
Toward the “Agricultural Optimum”, Presentation to the Energy and Environment 
Study Group, at slides 8-14 (Apr. 7, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wood, 
Earth Albedo Engineering] (exploring the technical options available for modifying 
Earth’s albedo); Lowell Wood, Geoengineering:  Albedo Modulation Approaches to 
Preferred Climates as the Atmospheric CO2 Level Rises Towards the ‘Agricultural Op-
timum’ Energy Modeling Forum’s Workshop on Critical Issues in Climate Change, 
Snowmass, CO, July 26-Aug. 4, 2005 [hereinafter Wood, Geoengineering]. 
120 See Teller et al., Global Warming and Ice Ages, supra note 21, at 9-12 (describing 
the use of scatterers to cool the climate in a way similar to the emission of sulfur parti-
cles from volcanic eruptions). 
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clude the most attractive proposals found in the Livermore papers in-
volving the stratosphere and space. 
1.  Dispersing Sulfate Particles into the Stratosphere (RF) 
As discussed previously in Part II.G.4, it is clear that sulfur-
containing gases that reach the upper atmosphere from major vol-
canic eruptions cool the planet.121  Human dispersion of such gases, 
presumably in a more optimized formulation, should have the same 
effect.  Such approaches have been discussed in the Livermore papers, 
by the National Academy of Sciences,122 and most recently by P.J. 
Crutzen.123
2.  Optimized Radiative Forcing Using the Stratosphere (RG) 
The idea in Remedy G is to add “optimized” particles to the strato-
sphere that would affect various parts of the thermal radiation passing 
through it.124  The authors of the Livermore papers suggest using par-
ticular types of very fine particles that would reduce the amount of ul-
traviolet light striking the earth’s surface, and offer a number of sug-
121 See Alan Robock, Volcanic Eruptions, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL CHANGE 738, 741 (Michael C. MacCracken & John S. Perry eds. 2002), avail-
able at http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/EGECVolcanicEruptions.pdf (“Global 
sulfur emission by volcanoes to the troposphere is about 14% of the total natural and 
anthropogenic emission, thereby leading to a cooling influence at the surface.”). 
122 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 18, at 448-54 (proposing the use of sulfuric 
acid aerosol to mimic the effects of radiation-reducing screens produced by volcanic 
aerosols). 
123 See Crutzen, supra note 6, at 212 (describing the use of “sunlight reflecting 
aerosol in the stratosphere”). 
124 For the most recent such proposal, see Teller et al., Active Climate Stabiliza-
tion, supra note 119.  For global warming prevention, Teller et al. propose: 
• Controlled scattering of incoming sunlight back into space, by sub-microscopic 
minimum-feature-size 
•  Dielectrics-–e.g., [about 1 million tons per year of] ~ 100 nm sulfate aerosol-
spherules [σ~V2 << λ6] 
•  Metals-–e.g., [about 0.05 millions per year of] “‘UV chaff,’” super-P metal 
balloon-ettes 
•  Resonant scatterers-–e.g., [about 0.5 million tons per year of coated dye 
molecules] fluorescence options:  strato-heating; brighter photosynthetic 
bands]. 
Id. at 8.  For global cooling prevention they propose: 
•  ‘[Long wave infrared chaff]’:  10 μm mesh Al screen & 0.1 μm ‘ribs’ . . . 
•  Semiconductor (e.g., Si)-walled super-P balloon-ettes . . . pass optical insola-
tion; reflect Earth-sourced [long wave infrared] . . . . 
Id. at 13. 
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gestions as to how they would be inserted into the stratosphere.  The 
Livermore papers further argue that variations in the latitude where 
the substances are dispersed would make it possible to change global 
temperature distributions if desired, although this proposal is not part 
of the remedy considered here and could raise significant issues of 
who would lose and who would gain. 
3.  Optimized Radiative Forcing Using Space-Based Deflector (RH) 
Some of the earlier Livermore papers also describe another op-
tion125 involving the positioning of a specialized deflector between the 
earth and the sun designed to change the amount of sunlight reach-
ing the earth.  The authors believe that this could be built in a very 
flexible manner to allow for either increasing or decreasing the 
sunlight reaching Earth as required. 
V.  A COMPARISON OF SOME OF THE ALTERNATIVES FOR  
CONTROLLING CLIMATE CHANGE 
It is surprising how little attention has been given to engineered 
climate selection approaches to global temperature control involving 
changing Earth’s radiation balance, given the widely reported prob-
lems with the more “conventional” approaches.  With a few excep-
tions, these geoengineering approaches have generally been ignored, 
dismissed out of hand, or, at best, recommended for more research.126  
125 Technically, the deflector would be ideally placed at the L-1 (Lagrange 1) point 
between the earth and the sun and could be moved as needed from slightly off (to 
prevent ice ages) to directly on (to prevent global warming) the Earth-Sun line.  The 
L-1 point is a point in space on a direct line between the earth and the sun, 1.5 million 
kilometers away from Earth.  At that point, the gravity of the earth is balanced with that 
of the sun in such a way that anything placed there will, if gently nudged back into 
place every twenty-five days or so, orbit the sun once every year.  This means that it will 
remain directly between Earth and Sun with almost no fuel expenditure.  Currently 
there is a solar observatory satellite called SOHO there.  The more technical specifica-
tions of this option, as proposed in Teller, Active Climate Stabilization, supra note 119, 
at 10, are: 
•  Total mass of 3,000 T emplaced over 100 yrs.—zero maintenance 
• 1 Shuttle-launch per year of construction mass (104km2 area)  [– Area of 
104km2] 
•  ‘Raw’ –cf. 10 MT previous design; ~0.01 MT ‘dressed’ 
•  ~30 μm-pitch (e.g., Al) metal screen-–with ~25 nm ‘ribs.’ 
126 See Allenby, supra note 2, at 8-10 (lamenting the rejection of technological solu-
tions to global climate change).  One example can be found in IPCC, WORKING 
GROUP III, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  MITIGATION:  TECHNICAL SUMMARY (Rajenda 
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Although more research would be desirable, enough is known to sug-
gest many of the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches.  
Some of the less attractive proposals are accorded only brief attention 
here.  It should be noted, however, that the costs and benefits of vari-
ous specific opportunities to reduce global warming vary considerably 
even within a single option, so that there may be “attractive” opportu-
nities within remedies that do not appear to be generally attractive. 
A.  Nonstabilized “Business-As-Usual” Carbonization and Adaptation (R1) 
and Kyoto Using Conventional Decarbonization Technology (R2) 
Remedy 1 (R1) is assumed to be the base case in this analysis, so 
that the benefits and costs of this “remedy” are assumed to be zero.  
Given the likely ineffectiveness of R2, R1 currently appears to be the 
most probable approach that the world will follow, primarily as a re-
sult of inertia and the perceived lack of an imminent disaster.  As out-
lined in Part II.H, this appears likely to result in increasing atmos-
pheric CO2 levels, increasing ocean acidity, and rising global 
temperatures. 
A number of the characteristics of R2 (shown as Remedy B in Ta-
ble 2 and Figure 1) have already been discussed extensively in Part III, 
supra, since the emphasis under the Kyoto approach is what I have de-
fined as “conventional” approaches.  The results of some of the oth-
ers, such as those discussed above in Part IV.C, could theoretically be 
counted under the Protocol, but are not usually actively considered 
for major roles in implementing it.  One of the most apparent aspects 
of the “conventional” approach is that the outcome is uncertain since 
it depends not only on what actions various governments and indi-
viduals actually take, but also on how the resulting changes in emis-
sions affect global temperatures.  Current discussions of implement-
ing Kyoto usually center around the use of a “cap-and-trade” 
approach, which has a good chance of minimizing the costs involved 
due to the inherent efficiency of using economic incentives.  But since 
the methods to be used are necessarily unknown, the results are also 
Pachavri ed., 2001), which has a very brief and general discussion of geoengineering 
approaches.  It states that “although there appear to be possibilities” for it, 
human understanding of the system is still rudimentary.  The prospects of un-
anticipated consequences are large, and it may not even be possible to engi-
neer the regional distribution of temperature, precipitation, etc.  Geo-
engineering raises scientific and technical questions as well as many ethical, 
legal, and equity issues.  And yet, some basic inquiry does seem appropriate. 
Id. at 43. 
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uncertain and hard to predict—clearly a disadvantage of these con-
ventional approaches relative to those involving changing Earth’s ra-
diation balance, since they should yield much more direct control 
over global temperatures.  In summary, Remedy 2 does poorly against 
most of the criteria, since it has negative efficiency, low cost effective-
ness, poor environmental outcome, little equity, little flexibility to 
meet new conditions or possible global cooling, and places a great 
burden on participation and compliance.  As noted in Part III, the 
current indications concerning implementability are not too encour-
aging. 
The costs of implementing this approach are very much depend-
ent on how rapidly the GHG emissions mitigation efforts are assumed 
to be implemented and on the percentage reductions assumed to be 
needed.  Charles Kolstad and Michael Toman argue that marginal 
control costs increase with the percentage of carbon emissions con-
trolled and may exceed $400 per ton for percentages in the range of 
18% to 31% depending on the regions of the world involved.127  Since 
considerably more control would be required to stabilize tempera-
tures, their study would suggest that marginal costs would exceed $400 
per ton.  Carolyn Fischer and Richard Morgenstern analyze eleven dif-
ferent studies and also find that control costs increase with the per-
centage reduction in carbon emissions.128  For abatement above 25%, 
marginal costs range from just under $50 to $350 per ton in the 
United States.   
The reason that marginal costs vary with how rapidly mitigation is 
undertaken is that controlling GHG emissions can be undertaken 
most economically when the equipment that is producing the emis-
sions needs to be replaced for other reasons.  If the replacement is 
undertaken on a hurried or urgent basis without regard to these other 
reasons for replacement, the cost is much higher than those indicated 
earlier in this Section.  If the replacement occurs for other reasons, 
the marginal cost is only the added cost of the GHG reduction fea-
tures of the new equipment.  If, however, the current equipment 
would otherwise not need to be replaced, then the entire cost of the 
replacement should be counted against the cost of controlling GHGs.  
127 Charles D. Kolstad & Michael Toman, The Economics of Climate Policy (Res. for 
the Future, Discussion Paper No. 00-40 REV, 2001), available at http://www.rff.org/ 
rff/Documents/RFF-DP-00-40.pdf. 
128 Carolyn Fischer & Richard D. Morgenstern, Carbon Abatement Costs:  Why the 
Range of Estimates?  9 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-42 REV, 2005), 
available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-03-42-REV.pdf. 
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When one is dealing with tens of thousands of very expensive thermal 
electric power plants or hundreds of millions of motor vehicles or 
hundreds of millions of home heating and air conditioning units, ur-
gent replacement quickly becomes astronomically expensive.  It is as-
sumed in this Article that marginal costs are likely to be $50 to $400 
per ton carbon.  Lasky reviews a large number of cost studies that 
show estimated costs in this general range.129  Although it is not always 
clear whether estimates are based on long-term replacement costs 
(just the added cost of replacing high-emission components with low-
emission ones), most available estimates appear to be so based.  One 
of the most comprehensive recent studies of actual opportunities for 
reducing emissions quotes costs of $100 per ton carbon.130  John 
Deutch and Ernest Moniz estimate that a carbon tax of about $100 per 
ton carbon would equalize the cost of electricity from nuclear, coal, 
and gas sources.131  This is significant, given that nuclear is one of the 
few technologies currently available that can substitute for fossil fuel-
based base load power plants. 
Although it carries its own environmental risks, there may well be 
a tradeoff that would have to be made between the risks of CO2 emis-
sions and nuclear power.  Reuel Shinnar and Francesco Citro estimate 
that a carbon tax equivalent to $155 to $160 per ton carbon would be 
required to achieve a 70% reduction in CO2 emissions over 30 years.
132  
An earlier study found that stabilizing global CO2 emissions would re-
quire a carbon tax in the range of $200.133  The important point here 
is not the upper bound (which depends on both the speed of mitiga-
tion and the percentage reduction, and could rapidly reach astro-
nomical levels under extreme cases) but rather that the marginal cost 
is not likely to be less than $50 per ton of carbon removed. 
129 Mark Lasky, The Economic Costs of Reducing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases:  A Survey 
of Economic Models (Cong. Budget Office, Technical Paper Series No. 2003-3, 2003), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/41xx/doc4198/2003-3.pdf. 
130 Robert Socolow, Keynote Address at the Scientific Symposium on Stabilisation 
of Greenhouse Gases, Stabilization Wedges:  Mitigation Tools for the Next Half-
Century, (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://www.stabilisation2005.com/day3/Socolow.pdf. 
131 See John M. Deutch & Ernest J. Moniz, The Nuclear Option, 295 SCI. AM. 76, 81 
(2006) (showing how a $100 per ton carbon tax would raise coal and gas prices to 
seven cents per kilowatt-hour, reaching parity with nuclear power costs). 
132 Shinnar & Citro, Supporting Online Material for A Road Map to U.S. Decarboni-
zation, supra note 89, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/313/ 
5791/1243/DC1. 
133 ALAN S. MANNE & RICHARD G. RICHELS, BUYING GREENHOUSE INSURANCE:  THE 
ECONOMIC COSTS OF CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS LIMITS 62 (1992). 
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Based on a broad review of the literature, Professor Richard Tol 
concludes that marginal benefits of carbon dioxide control of $15 per 
ton “seem justified,” and $50 or more per ton “cannot be defended 
with our current knowledge.”134  But based on Tol’s review, the net 
benefits appear to be negative and probably strongly negative for 
Remedy B.  Although the approach, methodology, and values given by 
Nordhaus are different, his conclusions appear broadly consistent 
with Tol’s findings since he finds that the benefit-cost ratio for the 
Protocol is 1/7.135  On the other hand, the 2006 Stern Review reaches a 
very positive conclusion with regard to the net benefits of a regulatory 
decarbonization proposal.136  It appears, however, that the Review used 
a much-below-market interest rate137 and apparently ignored the large 
costs of public information and advertising campaigns to encourage 
the public to pursue energy conservation and to explain to them how 
to do so.138  Neither of these assumptions appears justifiable and also 
has the effect of greatly reducing the costs relative to the benefits of 
the program they analyzed.  The Review also assumed stabilization at 
550 ppm CO2e, which is unlikely to limit temperature increases to 
2oC139 and reduces the cost of the program compared to lower stabili-
zation levels that have a greater likelihood of limiting the increases. 
At the same time, it must be emphasized that both Tol’s benefit 
estimates and the cost estimates used in this subsection are far from 
precise or generally accepted.  Although they may well be the best 
currently available, the uncertainties are substantial.  Readers are 
therefore encouraged to use this analysis as a way of thinking about 
the problem rather than as the last word on each of the values used. 
One difference between Remedy B and the others is that B might 
result in reduced use of petroleum (depending on which actual re-
134 Richard S.J. Tol, The Marginal Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions 4 (July 7, 
2003) available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/carboncost/ 
pdf/tol.pdf. 
135 William Nordhaus & Joseph G. Boyer, Requiem for Kyoto:  An Economic Analysis of 
the Kyoto Protocol, 1999 ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE:  THE COSTS OF THE KYOTO PROTO-
COL) 93, 93, available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/Kyoto.pdf. 
136 See STERN, supra note 3, at 236 (“This resources-cost analysis suggests that a 
globally rational world should be able to tackle climate change at low cost.”). 
137 See Shots Across the Stern, supra note 5, at 80 (citing Nordhaus’s claim that the 
economics “are absurd”). 
138 I received this information from a personal discussion with a Stern Review staff 
member. 
139 See Hare & Meinshausen, supra note 97, at 112 (noting that the European Un-
ion has set a global goal of not exceeding preindustrial warming levels above 2°C). 
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ductions in fossil fuel use were actually implemented).  Since the later 
remedies on the list do not involve reducing energy use, it may be rea-
sonable to include such benefits under Remedy B to the extent that 
petroleum use would actually be reduced.  Presumably these benefits 
would primarily involve increased security resulting from decreased 
reliance on insecure or unstable sources of petroleum.  It is nearly 
impossible to estimate these benefits because it is difficult to estimate 
the extent to which reductions in petroleum use would be used to 
meet Kyoto goals, the extent of the increased energy security, or its 
value.  But these benefits of Remedy B should be considered signifi-
cant, although nonquantified. 
It should be noted that there are almost certainly some low-cost 
“conventional” opportunities in a wide range of areas, and some of 
them might even be comparable to some of the low-cost geoengineer-
ing options discussed above.  There may even be some “conventional” 
opportunities where the private benefits exceed the private costs, al-
though economists argue that they would have already been imple-
mented in a perfectly competitive world if they were known to exist.  
The cost estimates shown in Table 2, Row B, infra, should be regarded 
as an attempt to bound the marginal costs needed to achieve the goals 
of the UNFCCC as interpreted by the EU.  In other words, what is the 
cost of the most expensive “conventional” remedy that would have to 
be used to result in goal achievement (presumably that needed to 
limit temperature rise to 2oC) where the lower-cost remedies are used 
first?  Because the CO2 reductions under this option or remedy are 
varied and unpredictable given the learning curve that would un-
doubtedly evolve should implementation be attempted, there is no 
engineering estimate that can be made as to what the marginal cost 
would be.  Rather, such estimates are at best guesstimates based often 
on model simulations.  By contrast, most of the other options or 
remedies considered in this Article can be more reliably estimated us-
ing engineering cost estimates, since somewhat similar technologies 
are likely to be used on each project that might be implemented.  Ac-
cordingly, the full range of estimated costs is shown for each of the 
other remedies, rather than the marginal cost.140
To the extent that there exist low-cost opportunities to lower GHG 
emissions using conventional means, these options are certainly worth 
pursuing.  Although this will not be mentioned further, it almost goes 
140 However, a dotted vertical line has been added to Remedy B in Figure 1 to 
show the full range of costs. 
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without saying.  However, it appears highly unlikely, given the cur-
rently available research on marginal costs, that enough low-cost op-
portunities exist to meet the GHG reduction goals.  Substituting more 
efficient light bulbs and reducing the power needed to keep appli-
ances instantly available, if indeed these are very low-cost options, can 
only reduce GHG emissions a limited amount.  But it is economically 
rational to pursue any energy efficiency project that can be justified in 
terms of the benefits of reducing the nontemperature effects of 
GHGs.  Since the temperature effects can be controlled at very low 
cost using other options, these effects are unlikely to justify more than 
the lowest cost conventional measures. 
Remedy 2 is particularly ill suited to situations where there is likely 
to be any significant change in the urgency of remedial actions be-
cause of the huge costs involved and the lengthy delays that would be 
needed to adjust the time frames, the country quotas, the particular 
regulations and incentives, and the actual investments by each indi-
vidual country, industry, and individual.  So to the extent that reduc-
ing climate change may be urgent (such as might be the case if there 
were an abrupt climate change due to a volcanic eruption or other 
cause), the conventional approach to reducing it becomes even less 
attractive than it otherwise would be, and perhaps even useless in the 
extreme case. 
B.  Nonconventional Decarbonization or Sequestration (R2a) 
In general, CO2 sequestration offers slightly more flexibility than 
the conventional approaches since implementation requires only ini-
tial agreement among those nations involved and individual citizens 
do not have to make decisions contrary to their immediate self-
interest.  But it is nevertheless difficult to see how it could be effec-
tively used to respond to abrupt changes in conditions, particularly to 
counteract global cooling. 
1.  Artificial Sequestration (RC) 
When using artificial sequestration, one difficulty is that fossil fuel-
generated energy is often required, which generates more CO2 and 
results in a lower net reduction.  The costs of underground and oce-
anic injection (Remedy C) appear to be higher than many of the 
other remedies.  The costs of carbonate dissolution in seawater, one of 
the lesser-known options, may be lower than those shown if the CO2 
source is located on the ocean and there is a nearby source of lime-
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stone.  Greg Rau et al. quote costs as low as $25 to $160 per ton car-
bon in these favorable circumstances.141  In those cases where concen-
trated CO2 is sequestered it may be possible to release it fairly rapidly 
if global cooling threatened. 
2.  Enhancing Natural Sequestration (RD/RE) 
The costs of intensive forestry (Remedy D) appear to be broadly 
similar but possibly higher than the “conventional” approaches.  The 
approach offers very little flexibility to the extent that trees are in-
volved because of their long life span, although it would presumably 
be possible to burn the trees if cooling threatened. 
The costs of oceanic fertilization with minerals or nutrients such 
as iron (Remedy E) appear to be substantially lower than GHG mitiga-
tion but more than Remedies G and H.  The impacts on the plant and 
animal life of the oceans is an area of concern but would presumably 
be generally positive since phytoplankton form the basis for most of 
the oceanic food chain.  Most of the (relatively small scale) open 
ocean experiments carried out so far appear to support the general 
concept,142 but have not always yielded encouraging results as to the 
ratio of the observed amount of carbon exported to the deep ocean 
per amount of iron supplied.143  One estimate is that dumping huge 
amounts of iron into large swaths of the sea would absorb no more 
than 3% of annual CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning.
144  New re-
search, however, indicates that the ratio observed in nature may be an 
order of magnitude higher.145  Although the implications of this new 
research for the use of Remedy E have not been worked out, it does 
suggest that much higher ratios are theoretically possible by using 
lower concentrations of iron and possibly adding other nutrients.146  It 
141 Greg H. Rau et al., Poster Presentation at First National Conference on Carbon 
Sequestration:  Enhanced Carbonate Dissolution as a Means of Capturing and Seques-
tering Carbon Dioxide 3 (May 14-17, 2001), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/ 
publications/proceedings/01/carbon_seq/p24.pdf. 
 142 A summary of the current scientific knowledge on the subject can be found in 
Fertig, supra note115. 
 143 Quirin Schiermeier, Only Mother Nature Knows How to Fertilize the Oceans: 
Natural Input of Nutrients Works Ten Times Better than Manmade Injections, 
news@nature.com, April 23, 2007, http://www.nature.com/news/2007/070423/full/ 
070423-8.html. 
 144  Id. 
 145  Stephanie Blaine et al., Effect of Natural Iron Fertilization on Carbon Sequestration in 
the Southern Ocean, 446 NATURE 1070-74 (2007). 
 146  Inference based on references in supra notes 143, 145. 
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may be more expensive for humans to imitate nature in this way, but 
on the other hand further research may reveal variations on nature’s 
approach that would be even more efficient.147  This appears to be an 
extremely useful and urgent area for research.   
C.  Engineered Climate Selection or Changing Earth’s Radiation Balance (R3) 
A major advantage of options that change Earth’s radiation bal-
ance is that they would allow global temperatures to be changed in ei-
ther direction and determined relatively precisely and independently 
of GHG levels.  Additionally, this could be done without the necessity 
for decisions by individuals against their immediate self-interest.  
Global temperatures could be maintained at what may be determined 
to be optimum on the basis of other criteria, while the economic ad-
vantages of higher-than-natural corresponding atmospheric CO2 lev-
els, such as reduced control costs and increased growth of some 
plants—including most domesticated crops148—are maintained.  This 
has both good and bad results.  It is good in that most of the adverse 
effects of global warming, including almost all those commonly dis-
cussed, could be eliminated rapidly and cheaply so that there would 
be no need to undertake expensive efforts to reduce GHG levels in 
terms of their climatological impacts.  But the use of engineered cli-
mate selection would not affect the nontemperature change impacts 
of elevated GHG concentrations, which would therefore not be miti-
gated.  So far, the most important nontemperature impact identified 
is elevated CO2 concentrations on ocean acidification,
149 which in time 
would likely have adverse effects on calcifying marine organisms (in-
cluding corals).150  The extent and importance of these effects would 
therefore appear to be an important research issue in judging be-
tween the alternatives. 
 147 Schiermeier quotes one expert who believes that man cannot achieve nature’s 
efficiency in this regard, but offers no justification for this dubious belief.  Schiermeier, 
supra note 143. 
148 See Leanne M. Jablonski et al., Plant Reproduction Under Elevated CO2 Conditions:  
A Meta-Analysis of Reports on 79 Crop and Wild Species, 156 NEW PHYTOLOGIST 9, 9-10 
(2002) (citing the carbon and nitrogen allocation typical of domesticated crops as the 
primary reason for its reproductive response to CO2).
149 See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 1 (“There is a growing concern that as 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 continue to rise, the increasing acidity will have 
significant effects on the marine system.”). 
150 See also Caspar Henderson, Paradise Lost, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 5, 2006, at 28-
33, for a recent summary of the effects of acidification on the oceans. 
  
2007] GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL 1459 
 
1.  Dispersing Sulfate Particles into the Stratosphere (RF) 
The proof of concept for this remedy has already been provided 
by nature and has recently been further reinforced by P.J. Crutzen.151  
Based on observations of the climatic effects of adding volcanic sulfur 
to the stratosphere discussed previously in Part II.G, Remedy F—
adding sulfate particles to the stratosphere—would clearly be effective 
against global warming (but not cooling), given the previously noted 
widely accepted experience with the climatological results of major 
volcanic eruptions, but could possibly be risky in terms of unintended 
environmental effects on the stratosphere, especially the ozone layer.  
One question, for example, is the effect of such particles on rainfall 
distribution.  Luke Oman et al. suggest that the 1783 eruption of the 
Laki Volcano in Iceland may have resulted in a weak African and In-
dian monsoon that year.152  Lowell Wood argues that particles would 
be emplaced well infra the ozone layer and that there is only slow ver-
tical mixing, but does advocate “real air” measurements.153  The im-
portance of this option is that volcanic experience with this remedy 
has already demonstrated its strong climatic effects. 
2.  Optimized Radiative Forcing Using the Stratosphere (RG) 
It is very reasonable to assume that humans could greatly improve 
on nature’s efforts by optimizing this last approach (Remedy F) to the 
problems of global warming and cooling.  The Livermore papers dis-
cuss the use of specialized materials in the stratosphere and find these 
approaches to be much less expensive and more effective than the 
“conventional” approach of trying to adjust the emission rates of 
GHGs.  In fact, they state that the net costs of at least some of their 
approaches can be “strongly negative” (i.e., there would be no net 
costs, only benefits).154  This is because of benefits their approaches 
may provide in other areas, such as reduced exposure to ultraviolet 
radiation and thus a reduction in skin cancer, greatly increased plant 
growth and agricultural productivity made possible by higher CO2 lev-
els created by the decoupling of CO2 levels from climate, and even (if 
desired) a changed distribution of the heat energy from the sun fal-
151 See Crutzen, supra note 6. 
152 Luke Oman et al., High-Latitude Eruptions Cast Shadow over the African Monsoon 
and the Flow of the Nile, 33 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L18711, at 2 (Sept. 30, 2006). 
153 Wood, Geoengineering, supra note 119. 
154 Teller et al., Practical Physics-Based Approaches, supra note 119, at 1. 
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ling on various parts of the world so as to make it more even.  One of 
the more important additional benefits would be the ability to re-
spond rapidly, and presumably effectively, to unanticipated and unde-
sired changes in global temperatures in either direction, such as those 
that may occur as a result of major volcanic eruptions.  Remedy G ana-
lyzes the stratospheric approaches advanced in some of the recent 
Livermore papers.  Remedy G meets all of the criteria discussed in 
Part I.A, including environmental effectiveness, and would appear, 
based on the claims of its proponents, to be one of the best remedies 
discussed in this Article, even though they agree some research and 
development would be useful before it is actually implemented.  It is 
particularly strong on the very important flexibility criterion as well as 
the economic ones.  The only drawbacks appear to be that it does not 
address the adverse effects of elevated CO2 levels on ocean acidifica-
tion, that it could have possible adverse environmental impacts on the 
stratosphere, and that the impacts on rainfall patterns are not well 
understood (which is true of increasing CO2 levels as well). 
Although precise cost calculations are difficult to make, the 
equivalent cost per ton of carbon removed appears to be in the range 
of two to ten cents, compared to $50 to $400 for the more conven-
tional approaches (see Table 2 and Figure 1).  This estimate is based 
on costs presented by Wood155 and an assumed offset of 10 gigatons of 
carbon per year, and appears to be consistent with David Keith’s 2001 
estimate.156  Even if the costs are underestimated (as sometimes hap-
pens with new technological proposals) by one or even two orders of 
magnitude, the conclusions remain the same.  According to its pro-
ponents, it meets the first aspect of the flexibility criterion by making 
possible timely adjustments of global temperatures to “fine tune” 
them towards any of the goals listed above in Part III.B.  It seems to 
have a better chance than any of the other options (besides Remedy 
H) to control abrupt climate changes if advance agreement is reached 
as to what is to be done under specified circumstances, or if rapid 
agreement could be reached as to what is to be done under new cir-
cumstances.  It meets the second aspect of the flexibility criterion 
155 See Wood, Earth Albedo Engineering, supra note 119. 
156 David W. Keith, Geoengineering and Carbon Management:  Is There a Meaningful 
Distinction?, in GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 1192, 1196-97, tbl.1B (David Williams et al. eds., 2001) 
available at http://www.ucalgary.ca/~keith/papers/41.Keith.2001.GeogineeeringAnd 
CarbonManagment.f.pdf (providing cost of mitigation estimates for various geoengi-
neering methods, including space shields). 
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concerning the ability to control both global warming and cooling.  
And, according to its proponents, it even meets the third aspect of the 
flexibility criterion concerning the ability (but not the necessity) to 
change the geographic distribution of global temperatures.  The 
benefits and costs are assumed to be what the Livermore paper au-
thors say they are, although they are very close to those provided by 
Keith.157  This may be a minor leap of faith since most of the Liver-
more papers are nonpeer-reviewed literature, but does not alter the 
clear effectiveness of this general type of remedy, as demonstrated by 
the climatic effects of major volcanic eruptions.  Nordhaus argues that 
several geoengineering options are of such low cost that the costs can 
be ignored, so that the net benefits are roughly equal to the benefits 
from global warming control.158  Presumably this would apply to this 
particular remedy, although it is not specifically mentioned by Nord-
haus.  On this basis, the efficiency of this remedy would appear to be 
strongly positive. 
Although the basic physical and engineering principles needed to 
implement Remedy G appear to be on solid ground, there are many 
unanswered questions concerning whether this option really has been 
optimized, exactly how it would be implemented, exactly how much it 
would cost, and the nature and extent of nonglobal warming envi-
ronmental effects that need to be answered before actual implementa-
tion could reasonably be undertaken.  Proponents agree that some re-
search and development would be useful before it is actually 
implemented.  In 1999, Teller et al. suggested additional research and 
development of about $100 million to further refine this remedy and 
examine side effects;159 their Tyndall presentation in 2004 mentions 
157 See Keith, supra note 17, at 254 (“A 1% change in reflectivity might be brought 
about for about $500 million a year.” (quoting President’s Sci. Advisory Comm., Restor-
ing the Quality of Our Environment, PSAC65 (1965))); Teller, Physics-Based Modulation, 
supra note 119 (providing annual cost estimates ranging from $200 million per year for 
metallic scatterers to $1 billion per year for dielectric scatterers). 
158 See William D. Nordhaus, An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse 
Gases, 258 SCIENCE 1315, 1317 (1992), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/ 
p08a/p0829.pdf (“[G]eoengineering would introduce a hypothetical technology that 
provides costless mitigation of climate change. . . . Several geoengineering solutions 
have extremely low economic costs compared to conventional mitigation techniques 
and can therefore be treated as costless.”). 
159 Teller et al., Long-Range Weather Prediction, supra note 119, at 3-4 (exploring the 
potential of a subscale proof-of-concept scattering system experiment “whose presence 
could be sensed and studied with sophisticated technical means but which would have 
completely imperceptible climatic consequences” for under $100 million). 
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about $1 billion.160  Several of the other “nonconventional” remedies 
would also require additional refinement, but Remedy G might re-
quire more than most of the others given the numerous options and 
potential environmental risks that need more thorough exploration.  
The authors recommend a series of trials using scaled-down quantities 
to make sure that their theoretical calculations hold up in the real 
world and that they have not overlooked some negative environ-
mental effects.  In the case of the stratospheric options, the effects of 
these small-scale trials would be designed to dissipate in less than five 
years if any should be detrimental as a result of the movement of the 
materials of concern down out of the stratosphere.  Therefore, in the 
proponents’ view, these trials should not be considered a permanent 
alteration of the stratosphere even at a small scale.  These trials ap-
pear prudent and would hopefully alleviate possible concerns that this 
novel approach is overly risky, as long as the approach could be aban-
doned when and if adverse new information is acquired.  Wood lists 
some of the research that he recommends be undertaken.161  Lee 
Lane, however, reports that no research is currently being undertaken 
and recommends that it should be.162
If the research and development were successful and subsequently 
implemented, this approach would break the relationship between 
CO2 levels and temperature.  Humans could increase CO2 levels sub-
stantially, if that is otherwise the desired outcome, without incurring 
most of the costs imposed by unwanted global warming.  And if CO2 
gets too low and/or an ice age threatens, temperatures could be rap-
idly increased to avert it.  But it would not decrease the nontempera-
ture effects of increased CO2 levels in the atmosphere, such as in-
creased ocean acidification. 
To date, the principal scientific attack on the Livermore papers 
has come from Stephen Schneider on the grounds that varying insola-
tion and albedo would “mess up” everyone’s local (micro)climate.163  
160 Teller, Active Climate Stabilization, supra note 119, at 15 (discussing an ex-
perimental program to explore stratospheric scatterers in subscale scoped at $1 bil-
lion). 
161 Wood, Earth Albedo Engineering, supra note 119, at 16-17. 
162 LEE LANE, STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR BUSH ADMINISTRATION CLIMATE POLICY 70-
73 (2006). 
163 Email from Lowell Wood, Stanford University and Lawrence Livermore Na-
tional Laboratory, to author (July 18, 2005, 21:44 EST) (on file with author); see also 
Stephen H. Schneider, Earth Systems Engineering and Management, 409 NATURE 417, 419 
(2001) (“Because of the patchy nature of the greenhouse effect itself, even if we could 
engineer our stratospheric aerosol injections to balance on a [global] basis the amount 
  
2007] GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL 1463 
 
The proponents believe that research reported by Bala Govindasamy 
on this issue provides an adequate response to this question.164  Go-
vindasamy’s paper reported on detailed modeling and argued that the 
“deep modes” of the current climate system maintain at least meso-
scale climates worldwide without significant alteration, as the space- 
and time-averaged insolation is varied by a few percent in order to off-
set 2X or 4X increases in atmospheric CO2.
165  The proponents believe 
that Govindasamy shows that their remedies would provide reasonably 
good compensation for any global warming due to higher CO2 lev-
els.166  The proponents have tried to anticipate and answer many other 
potential criticisms of their proposals as well.  A recent news report 
provides some interesting insights into the motivation for the Liver-
more papers and the internal questioning, research such as that men-
tioned above, and ultimately agreement that went on within the Labo-
ratory concerning these proposals.167
3.  Optimized Radiative Forcing Using Space-Based Deflector (RH) 
A space-based deflector is likely to take substantially longer to put 
into place and to be much more expensive than stratospheric parti-
cles, but it would be just as effective in reducing incoming sunlight, 
much more permanent and flexible, have fewer environmental side 
effects, and involve lower maintenance costs.168  Keith’s 2001 estimate 
of [globally] averaged heat, . . . we would still be left with some regions heated to ex-
cess and others left cooler.”). 
164 B. Govindasamy et al., Geoengineering Earth’s Radiation Balance To Mitigate Climate 
Change from a Quadrupling of CO ,2  37 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 157, 159 (2003) 
(reporting that even though varying insolation and albedo causes “residual climate 
change” to certain regions, “these residual climate changes are everywhere much 
smaller than the change from the quadrupling of CO2 alone”). 
165 See id. at 162 (“Comparison of surface temperature results by latitude band and 
season indicates that a reduction in solar luminosity may largely compensate for the 
impact of increased atmospheric CO2, despite the differences in the latitudinal and 
seasonal pattern of these radiative forcings.”). 
166 Id. at 166 (suggesting that “geoengineering may be a promising strategy for 
counteracting climate change”).  For additional discussion of this general issue, see 
Morton, supra note 6, at 133-34. 
167 Anne McIlroy, Going to Extremes To Fight Global Warming, TORONTO GLOBE & 
MAIL, June 3, 2006, at A1 (describing the early debate between Edward Teller, a strong 
advocate for using geoengineering to fight global warming, and Ken Caldeira, a fellow 
researcher at Lawrence Livermore who was initially skeptical of Teller’s theories). 
168 Keith, Geoengineering and Carbon Management, supra note 156, at 1194 (noting 
that while the “possibility of shielding the earth with orbiting mirrors is the most tech-
nologically extravagant geoengineering scheme,” its costs are offset by fewer, less sig-
nificant, and more predictable side effects that could be eliminated at will). 
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is that the equivalent cost per ton of carbon removed is between 
twenty cents and two dollars,169 although there is no evidence that this 
is based on a careful engineering assessment of the problems in-
volved.  One of the more important additional benefits compared to 
Remedy G would be the ability to respond even more rapidly (pre-
sumably immediately if adequate planning and coordination were ac-
complished ahead of time) to unanticipated changes in global tem-
peratures, such as those that may occur as a result of major volcanic 
eruptions, nuclear conflicts, or abrupt climate changes.  It presumably 
would also avoid most or all of the possible environmental side effects 
that could result from placing particles in the stratosphere.170  But it 
would involve something beyond what has ever previously been ac-
complished:  namely, assembling and maintaining a large structure far 
out in space.  Despite the recent problems with the space shuttle, 
there are no obvious reasons that this could not be done, but it might 
well require significant time as well as technical and other resources to 
accomplish.  Only a very careful engineering study could fully estimate 
the costs involved.  Since it would also take much longer to design, 
transport, and build, one possibility might be to consider this as a pos-
sible longer term, more permanent solution that could be built dur-
ing a period when optimized stratospheric particles are used to con-
trol global temperatures as an “interim” measure. 
D.  General Conclusions Concerning Alternatives for  
Controlling Climate Change 
Geoengineering is more than a little controversial, as illustrated by 
the disparity in views between Schneider and Michaelson.  Schneider 
argues that although “adaptation alone may prove inadequate,” he 
would 
prefer to reduce slowly our economic dependence on carbon fuels, 
rather than to try to counter the potential side effects with centuries of 
injecting sulphuric acid into the atmosphere or iron into the oceans.  
Laying stress instead on carbon management, with little manipulation of 
biogeochemical or energy fluxes in nature, is a much less risky pros-
pect.
171
169 See id. at 1196 tbl.B1 (providing cost of mitigation estimates for solar shields). 
170 See id. at 1194 (noting that “solar shields effect a ‘clean’ alteration of the solar 
constant” without the side effects of particle-based solutions). 
171 Stephen H. Schneider, Earth Systems Engineering and Management, 409 NATURE 
417, 421 (2001). 
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Michaelson, however, argues that 
the response to the claim that geoengineering “just won’t work” is to ar-
gue that such a claim is premature in practice and foolish in principle.  
Of course, the case for any new technology is “uneasy,” and uncertainty 
will remain up until a geoengineering project is put into place, but such 
uncertainty is not sufficient reason to fail to initiate research now.  Nor 
can we be daunted by the prospect of vast, unforeseen secondary conse-
quences of tampering with the Earth’s climate; again, it is too early to 
tell.  Caution is wisdom—but inordinate skepticism flies in the face of a 
century of technological achievement.
172
Considering only temperature-related effects, it is hard to find 
anything to like about Remedy B other than that it is already largely in 
place in terms of its structure, at least until 2012.  As outlined above in 
Part III, continued substantial reliance on it is most likely to result in 
substantial global warming because of its ineffectiveness,173 a depend-
ence on individuals making decisions against their own self-interest, 
and a reluctance to search for better alternatives.  Remedy B also ap-
pears useless as a way to control global cooling.  And the economic ef-
ficiency of this option appears to be strongly negative.  The other po-
tential remedies (other than A—no change) range somewhere 
between B and G in their attractiveness.  Remedies E through H ap-
pear to offer positive efficiency and to make lower demands on indi-
viduals for implementation, but have varying costs and environmental 
side effects.  Option G appears to be equal to or better than all the 
other options under each criterion (although H offers lower envi-
ronmental risks at potentially much higher costs in time and money), 
so would appear, with one important footnote, to be reasonably called 
a superior option for dealing with gradual global warming, despite 
Schneider’s reservations concerning geoengineering options.  There 
are many unanswered implementation questions, however, concern-
ing whether this option really has been optimized, exactly how it 
would be implemented, precisely how much it would cost, who would 
pay for it, and the nature and extent of nonglobal warming environ-
mental effects that would need to be answered before actual imple-
mentation could reasonably be undertaken.  But there would appear 
to be a case for undertaking an early but limited research and devel-
opment effort to answer the geoengineering implementation ques-
172 Michaelson, supra note 18, at 80 (footnote omitted). 
173 See RUDDIMAN, supra note 19, at 172-73 (describing what the world might look 
like under these circumstances). 
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tions before making large investments in any high-cost remedies that 
might be undertaken under the Remedy 2.  Remedy G can also be 
viewed as a rapidly implemented interim measure—while longer-term 
CO2 reducing remedies are put into place and become effective—and 
as an emergency response measure in the case of rapid climate 
changes, such as major volcanic eruptions or nuclear conflicts. 
Although there is less experience with using these options than 
with option B, the technical risks appear controllable through careful 
experimentation.  In the unlikely event that such experimentation 
shows that all the permutations of option G have significant environ-
mental side effects, this would suggest the use of option H.  Rejecting 
geoengineering approaches because of their remaining technical un-
certainties or unfamiliarity, as Schneider does, is not a conclusion 
based on careful analysis.  The major footnote to this conclusion con-
cerns mitigating the nontemperature effects of increases in GHG lev-
els (Problem 2, as defined in Part I.B), which the radiative forcing ap-
proaches would not affect, but which will be discussed in more detail 
in Part V.F.2. 
The experience to date with the Kyoto Protocol has not shown 
that approach to be effective in significantly reducing the growth of 
GHG emissions or stabilizing atmospheric CO2 levels.  There would 
obviously be considerable difficulty in reaching an international 
agreement to undertake geoengineering projects not covered by the 
Kyoto Protocol, although the same would be true of follow-ons to the 
Protocol.  The advantage of the geoengineering approaches, however, 
is that once agreed upon, there is no need for individual cooperation 
by most of Earth’s energy-using population, as would be required for 
effective, worldwide energy conservation or other mitigation efforts 
on the scale that would be needed to bring CO2 emission levels back 
to less than “dangerous” levels.  And if (as seems almost certain) there 
are major volcanic eruptions that send material into the stratosphere, 
nuclear conflicts that send soot into the stratosphere, or if there is a 
collapse of the ocean conveyor belt or other abrupt or unforeseen 
climate changes, there would appear to be no other feasible remedy 
that could effectively mitigate the effects of those events on climate.  
Careful preparations for geoengineering approaches involving Rem-
edy G may be justifiable even if they are never used for reducing 
global warming, but merely as an insurance policy against abrupt ad-
verse climate changes such as these. 
Continued pursuit of only regulatory decarbonization (Remedy 2) 
appears to be counterproductive given the implementation problems 
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inherent in it.  Unfortunately, an unintended consequence may be to 
discourage consideration of more effective measures during the long 
period needed for the major deficiencies of Remedy B to become evi-
dent to all.  Thus, although regulatory decarbonization is strongly fa-
vored by many environmentalists, the net result of pursuing it alone 
may be to postpone effective action to control global warming for as 
long as it takes for the world to recognize that this approach is very 
unlikely to significantly decrease atmospheric GHG levels to the ex-
tent needed to reach the EU temperature limits, or even to decrease 
them at all. 
E.  Other Management Approaches Besides Those Already Analyzed 
In Part I.C, several other possible management approaches be-
sides those analyzed so far were briefly listed.  The question now is 
how the conclusions above might differ if these other management 
tools were used.  The analysis suggests the conclusions discussed be-
low. 
1.  (MA1a) Business-as-Usual with Voluntary Decarbonization174
This management option involves purely voluntary efforts by indi-
viduals or corporations concerned enough to do something, either 
with or without public educational efforts to persuade them to do so.  
This option presumably eliminates the potential political backlash 
from angry constituents whose GHG-producing activities would be re-
duced. It should also result in the use of relatively efficient control 
measures.  Similarly, only those willing to be internationally less com-
petitive would undertake such solutions, presumably eliminating its 
political problems.  Although such efforts are likely to have a positive 
effect and deserve to be encouraged, it appears unlikely that a purely 
voluntary effort would have a significant effect on one or more of the 
four problems, since the effects are likely to be very small compared to 
what would be required to meet the UNFCCC goals as currently in-
terpreted.  Kyoto was undertaken in large part because of a concern 
that purely voluntary actions would be unlikely to meet the UNFCCC 
goals.  This seems unlikely to have changed. 
174 See supra Part.I.C.1 (discussing this approach). 
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2.  (MA2b) Decentralized Regulatory Decarbonization175
If one or even a few local jurisdictions (or even single countries) 
should decide to take a decentralized approach as a result of a politi-
cal or judicial decision, such initiatives might result in progress toward 
solving a small portion of the larger problem originating in that local 
jurisdiction or jurisdictions.  But unless only low-cost solutions were 
imposed, the results would likely be less efficient and effective than 
under the Kyoto management approach applied to the countries or 
jurisdictions involved, since they would presumably be the only ones 
to pursue this approach and would be limited to whatever control 
measures might be available under current national laws in the case of 
local jurisdictions.  The costs would presumably be higher compared 
to MA2a, since a locally based approach is likely to be less efficient 
than one based on new national legislation tailored to minimizing the 
costs of control for these particular pollutants (such as by the use of 
economic incentives such as cap and trade), and a single-country solu-
tion is likely to be less efficient than one based on an international 
agreement such as the Kyoto Protocol. 
This does not mean, of course, that decentralized decisions could 
not be used by local jurisdictions to “push” the political process at the 
national level by creating costly or otherwise unpalatable alternatives 
unless alternative political decisions were made at the national level.  
But since most of the projected increased emissions worldwide are ex-
pected to originate in rapidly growing countries that presumably 
would not be involved, it appears highly unlikely that GHG emissions 
would be sufficiently reduced to meet the EU/UNFCCC goal or even 
to make a noticeable change in atmospheric GHG levels using this 
approach.  Most of the proposals at the state and national level in the 
United States assume that all the other states or countries would take 
equivalent actions; if, as appears much more likely, they do not, there 
would be no way to meet the EU/UNFCCC goal even if a state or 
country met its goal in terms of GHG emissions reductions. 
3.  (MA2c) Liability-Based Regulatory Decarbonization176
One or more countries could adopt liability laws or legal prece-
dents that make it very expensive for companies to sell or use products 
with very high GHG emissions.  Unless all countries adopted them 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
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and had similarly effective legal institutions, the results would proba-
bly be less effective and efficient than under the Kyoto approach.  Pre-
sumably only those countries with strong judicial systems, liability-
based legal traditions, and strong motivation could effectively utilize 
this approach.  In addition, such an approach is unlikely to result in 
the adoption of the lowest cost control options given that no one ex-
ecutive branch institution would coordinate the control efforts for 
that purpose. 
As in MA2b, however, it is entirely possible that climate change 
torts could be used to “encourage” the political process to take other 
actions to solve the problem.  But if this process actually determined 
the control measures used, the results would probably be less efficient 
and effective than under the Kyoto approach, and probably less than 
under MA2b.  Most of the comments made above under MA2b con-
cerning the difficulty in achieving the EU/UNFCCC goal appear to 
apply. 
4.  (MA4) International Approach Using All Available Technologies 
and Management Approaches177
The intention here is to fashion a replacement for Kyoto that cor-
rects at least some of its major deficiencies.178  The place to start is to 
correct the weak rationale for Kyoto.  As outlined in Part III.C.7, a 
much more logical basis for such an international agreement would 
be the “polluter pays” principle, as opposed to the “rollback” ap-
proach with exemptions embodied in Kyoto.  Under the former ap-
proach, those countries responsible for present and past GHG emis-
sions would pay an amount based on the lesser of the damages these 
emissions have caused or will cause and the cost of solving the result-
ing problems.179  Most likely, some allowance could be arranged for 
countries to spend a portion of what they would owe internally for cli-
177 See id.. 
178 See supra Part III.C (discussing the major deficiencies of Kyoto). 
179 A related “Brazilian” proposal was actually considered in the negotiations lead-
ing to the Kyoto Protocol and has received some attention since.  See generally, Emilio 
L. La Rovere et al., The Brazilian Proposal on Relative Responsibility for Global Warming, in 
BUILDING ON THE KYOTO PROTOCOL:  OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING THE CLIMATE 157, 158 
(Kevin A. Baumert et al. eds., 2002), available at http://pdf.wri.org/ 
opc_chapter7.pdf (describing the innovative “Brazilian” proposal, which included a 
“complex methodology” for “distribut[ing] emission reduction burdens among coun-
tries—according to each country’s relative responsibility for the global temperature 
increase”). 
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mate control purposes.  Where the damages and costs for past and 
present emissions are roughly the same, as in the case of CO2, the 
amount paid by each country would presumably be proportional to 
their total anthropogenic emissions since the time that human-caused 
emissions started causing problems.  Where past emissions cause less 
damage and cost less to control than current emissions, the total 
amount paid by each country would be the sum of the damages and 
costs from past and current emissions.  These payments, in turn, 
would be used to provide incentives for the development and applica-
tion of technologies that reduce GHG emissions.  Because all coun-
tries that have emitted GHGs that have failed to dissipate in noninju-
rious ways would be obligated to pay, all such countries would have an 
incentive to reduce emissions.  Although the payments would be man-
datory, the emission decisions would be voluntary.  In the case of CO2, 
all emissions since the time that atmospheric levels of CO2 started to 
rise would be included, because these emissions are either still in the 
atmosphere or have been absorbed by the oceans (causing a deleteri-
ous effect on ocean acidification).  Funds generated by these manda-
tory payments could be used to pay for the least expensive and most 
effective remedies—including engineered climate selection, nuclear 
power, incentives to reduce CO2 emissions from air travel, and public 
educational efforts aimed at where they are likely to be effective—
regardless of where these remedies occur or what technologies they 
use. 
It is important that this “ideal” successor to Kyoto be fully en-
forceable.  One critical design issue would be how to establish fair and 
equitable payments for emissions.  The ideal approach would be to set 
levels that would just accomplish the desired goals—for instance, a 
limit of 2oC on world temperature increases and a corresponding (but 
as yet unestablished) goal for limits on ocean acidification.  If the 
temperature goals were to be achieved using stratospheric radiative 
forcing only, the fee levels would presumably be very low—-probably 
so low that such a complicated agreement might not be worth pursu-
ing.  If, on the other hand, a serious effort were undertaken to pre-
vent ocean acidification, much higher levels would be required.  It 
would be important to allow some flexibility so that prices could be 
changed if goals were or were not being met.  Such an approach 
would encourage an incentive approach rather than a coercive ap-
proach to climate change control.  Individuals and nations could de-
cide whether to burn and pay, or use alternatives and not pay.  They 
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could also choose whether to accept financial assistance from the 
fund. 
It must be emphasized that such a proposal would not solve all the 
problems of Kyoto.  The principal remaining difficulty would be the 
high cost of preventing ocean acidification and the reluctance of peo-
ple and governments to pay that cost.  But if the world wants to reduce 
global GHG emissions, this proposal may offer a possible way forward 
toward that end, and might provide a basis on which the nations of 
the world could agree.  All countries would be liable, although most 
(but not all) of the costs would still be paid by the developed world. 
F.  Conclusions with Respect to Specific Climate Change Problems 
Part V.D summarized the general conclusions regarding efficiency 
and effectiveness of each remedy for the climate change problem as a 
whole.  This Section applies those conclusions to suggest solutions to 
each of the four specific climate change problems delineated in Part 
I.B and in Tables 1 and 1a.  Table 1 presents the results in the form of 
words; Table 1a uses the numbers from Table 2 to provide rough 
semi-numerical estimates of the effectiveness and cost of the four 
remedies to each of the four problems. 
1.  Gradual Increase in Global Temperatures (Problem P1) 
A gradual increase in global temperatures has benefits as well as 
costs.  The benefits are primarily that fewer humans will be subjected 
to cold temperatures and that some of the less useable Arctic areas 
will be more available for human use.  The costs have been widely de-
scribed by those concerned about global warming, but are reduced by 
the ability of humans to adapt to gradual changes. 
The general conclusions outlined in Part V.D apply to this prob-
lem without change, so that Remedy G—adding optimized particles to 
the stratosphere—appears to be the superior remedy.  Gradual in-
creases in global warming could most efficiently and effectively be 
controlled using one of the radiative-forcing remedies.  Attempts to 
control global warming through GHG control are unlikely to be suc-
cessful because of the lifestyle changes required and high costs in-
volved.  The principal result of efforts to do so may be to delay effec-
tive action.  Radiative-forcing remedies are among the few realistic 
alternatives available.  They could best be carried out on an interna-
tionally cooperative basis, but could also be implemented on a “go-it-
alone” basis at the risk of possible international condemnation. 
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2.  Nontemperature Effects of Higher Atmospheric GHG Levels (P2) 
Some of the nontemperature effects appear to be positive rather 
than negative; the positive ones actually favor the use of Remedy G, 
since it would not disturb the increasing atmospheric CO2 levels.  The 
primary example is the positive effect of elevated CO2 levels on some 
plant growth.  Presumably, both those plants whose growth is stimu-
lated by higher CO2 concentrations, as well as the animals and hu-
mans who consume them, will be better off by such higher concentra-
tions.  Current research suggests that cultivated crops and some 
weeds180 may indeed benefit, though perhaps at the expense of other 
plants that are not stimulated by higher CO2 levels.  The stimulation 
of cultivated crops may be a major benefit to humans.  The major ad-
verse, nontemperature-related effect of elevated GHG levels appears 
to be increased ocean acidification, but others may be documented in 
future years.  Any of the remedies other than A, F, G, and H can be 
used to decrease or control the growth of atmospheric CO2 levels, and 
therefore ocean acidification.  Remedy C, (artificial CO2 sequestra-
tion), Remedy D (intensive forestry), and Remedy E (ocean fertiliza-
tion) can be used to directly remove CO2 from the atmosphere.  The 
capture and use of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery and the addition of 
limestone or other alkaline minerals to streams of newly generated 
CO2, or possibly directly to the oceans, may be somewhat lower in cost 
than other options in limited geographical settings.  The Royal Society 
argues that using limestone is infeasible on an oceanwide basis,181 but 
does not comment on its use in CO2 streams and does not provide 
cost estimates or other bases for judging this.  Furthermore, it pro-
vides only vague cautionary comments concerning the possibility of 
iron fertilization of the oceans.182
Therefore, many questions appear to need answers:  What would 
be the benefits gained from increased output from cultivated agricul-
ture?  What would be the cost of ocean neutralization using lime-
stone?  And to what extent would large scale phytoplankton fertiliza-
tion increase carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere and the 
180 See Henry Fountain, Climate Change:  The View from the Patio, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 
2006, § 4, at 16 (noting that some weed-like plants and certain tree species thrive in an 
atmosphere rich in CO2). 
181 See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 37 (suggesting that practical concerns, 
such as transport and processing costs, as well as unknown environmental effects, mili-
tate against this approach). 
182 Id. (noting that this approach may also exacerbate chemical changes to the 
ocean and have potentially negative biological impacts). 
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oceans in the longer term and with what effects on ocean ecosys-
tems?183  Despite the efforts by the Royal Society to discuss remedies,184 
we may still be in the early stages of analyzing what can and should be 
done about ocean acidification.  Since all the current CO2 emission 
mitigation strategies have been designed to treat Problem P1, some 
effort would appear to be needed to refine them for treating ocean 
acidification.   
The ocean acidification problem is likely to be the most difficult 
of the problems identified in this Article because of its potentially 
high cost, many unknowns, and relative invisibility to most humans.  
This is illustrated by the views of Ken Caldeira, a prominent scientist 
in the area of ocean acidification and one of the authors of the Royal 
Society report.  He has suggested that ocean acidification can really 
only be addressed by avoiding almost any further CO2 emissions since 
he believes any net emissions will have an adverse effect.185  He has 
suggested a 98% reduction from current emission levels,186 apparently 
assuming that other natural forces reducing atmospheric CO2 levels 
might counteract the remaining 2%.  The Royal Society report and 
Caldeira cite the high cost and practical difficulties of geoengineering 
approaches toward mitigating the chemical effects of increased at-
mospheric CO2 concentrations on the oceans.
187  But as noted in Part 
III, decreasing CO2 emissions will be a difficult and at best a very slow 
undertaking.  Reducing them by 98% does not appear to be within 
the realm of realistic possibility in the current world.  But not reduc-
ing CO2 emissions will result in the extinction of the world’s coral 
reefs, Caldeira argues.188  Surely before this is allowed to happen it 
183 For a discussion of some of the scientific issues implicated by ocean neutraliza-
tion strategies, see generally SCOR/IOC Symposium Planning Comm., The Ocean in a 
High-CO2 World, OCEANOGRAPHY, Sept. 2004, at 72. 
184 See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 37. 
185 See, e.g., Ken Caldeira, What Corals Are Dying To Tell Us About CO2 and 
Ocean Acidification, lecture paper for the Eighth Annual Roger Revelle Commemora-
tive Lecture presented by the Ocean Studies Board of the National Academy of Sci-
ences (Mar. 5, 2007); see also Elizabeth Kolbert, The Darkening Sea, NEW YORKER, Nov. 
20, 2006, at 70. 
186 Caldeira, supra note 185, at 9, 14. 
187 See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 37, for a discussion of using limestone to 
reduce ocean acidity.  This characterization of Caldeira’s views on both using lime-
stone and other geoengineering approaches is based on a personal discussion with 
him on March 5, 2007. 
188 Caldeira is quoted as stating that “[c]oral reefs will go the way of the dodo 
unless we quickly cut carbon-dioxide emissions.”  Press Release, University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, Regardless of Global Warming, Rising CO2 Levels Threaten Ma-
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would be worthwhile to carefully reexamine all available geoengineer-
ing options, including those rejected by the Royal Society and Cal-
deira, since these would appear to be the only realistic options avail-
able that might satisfy Caldeira’s concerns as to the effects of ocean 
acidification. 
Although it has not really been demonstrated, this Article will as-
sume that a careful analysis would show that preventing ocean acidifi-
cation that would substantially damage the Earth’s coral reefs or other 
marine ecosystems is worthwhile from an economic viewpoint.  This is 
by no means clear and deserves much further study, but appears to be 
the most conservative assumption under current circumstances of un-
certainty.  It does appear likely that the most effective remedies are 
those that can be implemented without the need for changes in per-
sonal lifestyle decisions.189  That would suggest primarily Remedy E 
(ocean fertilization), or Remedy C (artificial CO2 sequestration), or 
possibly the use of limestone to neutralize the acidification caused by 
the higher levels of CO2.  Fertilizing the oceans appears to be effective 
in reducing atmospheric CO2 levels and is one of the lower cost reme-
dies for reducing atmospheric CO2, but there is a need for research to 
greatly increase its effectiveness in exporting carbon to the deep 
ocean.190
Another important question is whether the use of Remedy E 
might directly reduce ocean acidification in the ocean layers in which 
phytoplankton live.  Increased CO2 removal by fertilized phytoplank-
ton would presumably decrease concentrations of carbonic acid in 
these waters.  This would likely trigger increased absorption of CO2 by 
the oceans from the atmosphere in order to maintain chemical equi-
librium and would lower atmospheric concentrations, but might nev-
ertheless directly result in increased ocean pH levels as well.  If so, 
Remedy E would be (1) an attractive option for lowering atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations and, indirectly, ocean acidification; (2) the most 
attractive option for directly reducing ocean acidification; and (3) an 
interesting opportunity to increase ocean productivity, since phyto-
plankton forms the base of much of the oceanic food chain.  This 
would seem to be a very useful area for further research.  Artificial 
rine Life (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Newsroom/ 
MediaAlerts/2007/2007030824507.html. 
189  As previously discussed in Section III.C.4. 
 190  See supra Part V.B.2. 
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CO2 sequestration appears to cost much more, but it has fewer uncer-
tainties. 
3.  Potential for Triggering “Tipping Points”(P3) 
Although not widely discussed in the popular literature, this may 
well be the real danger of global warming since the resulting changes, 
if they occur, may be sudden and catastrophic in nature, and may be 
very difficult for humans or other life forms to adapt to.  It appears 
reasonable that the risks from “tipping points” or other abrupt climate 
changes may be proportional to global or regional temperature 
changes.  The lower the increase in temperatures, the lower the 
chance that a “tipping point” will be hit.  If global temperatures could 
be held at levels typical for interglacial periods, presumably the 
chances would be even less based on evidence from previous such pe-
riods.  But conversely, any time that a higher “target” temperature is 
adopted, the risk is presumably increased.  Thus, failure to actually 
achieve a given goal or target may carry with it an increased risk of 
abrupt climate change.  The EU and others have decided that an in-
crease of less than 2oC does not carry with it significant risks,191 but 
there is no way to know whether this is actually the case without carry-
ing out the experiment.  Rather, it appears more plausible that risk 
increases along with any increase in temperature, notwithstanding 
targets for acceptable temperature increase.  So if, for example, the 
Kyoto approach does not achieve a particular objective, there is likely 
to be some increase in the risk relative to the situation if it were met. 
Since this Article has argued that the Kyoto approach is unlikely 
to meet many of the current targets, it is important to ask which 
remedies may offer something useful if it becomes evident that a par-
ticular “trigger point” is about to be hit or an abrupt climate change is 
about to occur.  In this case, among those remedies discussed in this 
Article, only the radiative-forcing ones might be implemented rapidly 
enough to control global temperatures and thereby avert the pending 
risk.  It would appear feasible to use radiative-forcing remedies in a 
“rapid response” mode to greatly reduce these risks if advance prepa-
rations are in place.  The issue here is the ability to react rapidly 
enough to signs that a “tipping point” is approaching so as to avoid 
actually triggering it.  All of the remedies have the potential to curb 
191 Press Release, EU, Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius (Jan. 
10, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
MEMO/07/16. 
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the gradual increase in temperatures, but only F, G, and H appear to 
have the flexibility to actually take evasive action if a “tipping point” 
should appear imminent. 
Implementing rapid changes in global GHG emissions in response 
to unexpected events is next to impossible.  Because of its extreme 
flexibility, Remedy H has perhaps the greatest potential, followed by 
Remedies F and G.  It is important to note that these remedies would 
have to be in place and ready to go in order to be useful in most 
“rapid responses,” such as those envisioned in this paragraph and in 
Part V.F.4, infra.  Waiting until the need becomes evident to make 
these preparations would make an effective response more problem-
atic.  In the case of Remedy G, being in place and ready to go involves 
carrying out the further development work discussed in this Article—
i.e., building international agreement as to how this remedy would be 
employed if needed and arranging for the needed manufacturing and 
delivery means.  In the case of Remedy H, it would mean actually 
building the solar deflector and building a command and control ca-
pability to use it effectively.  Remedies B through E have very little to 
nothing to offer with regard to this problem. 
4.  Short-Term Cooling from Major Volcanic Eruptions and  
Nuclear Conflicts (P4) 
Because of the unexpected nature of such events and the need to 
respond in a very short period of time if global cooling is to be 
avoided, only Remedies F, G, and H have the potential to play a useful 
role in responding.  H is probably more useful than G, assuming that 
it could be built in time, because of the possibly lower lag time re-
quired to move a deflector than to launch particles into the strato-
sphere.  Depending on the particles used, there might also be conflict 
with the sulfur compounds emitted during a volcanic eruption.  Be-
cause significant global cooling probably has greater adverse effects 
than warming, and because of the risk that short-term cooling could 
turn into long-term cooling—even an extremely destructive ice age—
the benefits of avoiding short-term cooling appear to be greater than 
often realized. 
G.  Implications for the Choice of Remedies 
There would appear to be two conclusions from this analysis. 
First, the participating Annex I nations appear to have selected 
one of the more difficult, expensive, and probably ineffective ap-
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proaches—the Kyoto Protocol—to climate change control examined 
in this Article.  If it could be fully and effectively implemented and 
expanded upon in future agreements, Kyoto might help to control 
ocean acidification (problem P2), but the available evidence indicates 
that all the other presently known climate change problems could be 
mitigated more rapidly, cheaply, efficiently, and effectively using en-
gineered climate selection involving radiative-forcing—i.e., Remedy G, 
or possibly Remedies F or H.  Even if effectively implemented, Kyoto 
would not provide protection against global cooling from major vol-
canic eruptions or nuclear conflicts (Problem P4) or the ability to 
evade “tipping points” (P3) if not recognized decades in advance.  
However, Kyoto does appear to be more effective and efficient than 
most of the alternative management tools examined in Part V.E, with 
the exception of a “go-it-alone” strategy involving radiative forcing. 
Second, an efficient and effective solution would seem to be active 
pursuit of both geoengineering approaches involving radiative forc-
ing, as well as a new effort to reduce ocean acidification, with immedi-
ate priority given to the former in order to rapidly solve what are po-
tentially the most critical problems.  Although significant efforts 
would be needed in order to fine tune the proposals to implement 
these geoengineering approaches, to build an international mecha-
nism for making decisions, and to manufacture and launch the 
needed material and hardware, this approach could be used to rapidly 
reduce the risks of adverse feedback and tipping point problems due 
to global warming and global cooling from major volcanic eruptions 
or nuclear conflicts, and to rapidly stabilize global temperatures at any 
desired level.  At the same time, the current GHG emission-control ef-
forts could be refocused on the problem of reducing ocean acidifica-
tion, with an early review of how acidification can best be mitigated 
and how the present international GHG emission-control efforts 
could be modified to make them much more efficient and effective 
for this new (but probably closely related) purpose. 
The net result would be much earlier and more efficient control 
of three of the more detailed problems and at least the same progress 
(or lack thereof) in controlling ocean acidification as under the Kyoto 
approach (Remedy B).  This would appear to provide significant gains 
and no losses compared to the Kyoto-only approach.  This should also 
allow some time to better understand ocean acidification and to de-
sign and carry out a carefully crafted program to reduce it. 
Several suggestions have been made concerning those geoengi-
neering approaches that appear to be the most efficient and effective 
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ways of reducing acidification, but it is clear that the problem deserves 
much greater attention and research.  The problem of increasing 
global temperatures could theoretically also be solved by carbon diox-
ide emission controls, although it is doubtful how effective this ap-
proach would be.  If such emission controls were used, the place to 
start would appear to be implementation of the lowest cost options 
first, while possibly delaying the more expensive ones until the prob-
lem is better understood.  Such a delay would be economically ra-
tional given the sensitivity of the costs of carbon dioxide emissions re-
ductions to the rapidity with which they occur.  Substituting lower 
emission technology would be much cheaper if the goods in which 
the technology is embedded need to be replaced anyway due to old 
age or technological obsolescence.  T.M.L. Wigley provides some at-
mospheric modeling along these lines.192  This approach might also 
provide time to build a better replacement for Kyoto that remedies 
some of its most glaring problems. 
The proposed priorities among the various remedies are shown in 
Tables 1 and 1a.  The rationale is as follows:  Remedy G appears to be 
very inexpensive and very effective in rapidly solving all climate 
change problems other than ocean acidification.  Therefore, it is 
given the highest priority, or 1. 
It has been demonstrated on a small scale that oceanic phyto-
plankton growth and CO2 absorption can be increased by using Rem-
edy E (ocean fertilization).  This would be significantly more expen-
sive than Remedy G, but much less than Remedy C, and appears to be 
the most attractive of the carbon sequestration approaches.  It should 
also increase the productivity of the seas.  So it is accorded a priority 
of 2, but with some questions concerning how humans can efficiently 
imitate nature in stimulating phytoplankton to export carbon onto 
the sea floor. 
Ocean acidification can be addressed directly using limestone ei-
ther to neutralize those streams of CO2 near oceans and sources of 
limestone or to advance oil recovery, but this is much more expensive 
and would be feasible only in limited geographical areas.  Remedy C is 
thus accorded the third highest priority, or 3. 
192 See T.M.L. Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate Stabi-
lization, 314 SCIENCE 452, 452-54 (2006).  More specifically, Wigley concludes that 
stratospheric geoengineering “could substantially offset future warming and provide 
additional time to reduce human dependence on fossil fuels and so stabilize CO2
 con-
centrations cost-effectively at an acceptable level.”  Id. at 452. 
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If it appears efficient to further reduce ocean acidification beyond 
what could be achieved with Remedy E, it would also appear that the 
most efficient remedies would involve CO2 sequestration somewhere 
other than the ocean, since this could be done without worldwide co-
operation.  If it appears efficient to go beyond what CO2 sequestration 
can efficiently accomplish to reduce ocean acidification, emission 
controls would be required as a last resort, hopefully under something 
similar to MA4.  So this approach is accorded a priority of 4. 
Whether ocean acidification reduction is worth pursuing beyond 
purely voluntary efforts would appear to be the most difficult analyti-
cal issue concerning the most efficient and effective solutions to cli-
mate change problems.  There would appear to be two major issues.  
The first is the question of how much confidence one should have in 
the Royal Society report conclusions.193  Despite the eminence of its 
authors, should the world really spend many trillions of dollars reduc-
ing ocean acidification on the basis of a single report, no matter the 
source?  Surely it is worth a small percentage of such expenditures to 
re-check and re-analyze the report’s conclusions and even initiate new 
experiments to verify its critical points. 
The second major issue is whether the economic benefits of ocean 
acidification reduction would exceed the costs.  An economic evalua-
tion of the issue based on currently available information depends 
critically on the value of avoiding further ocean acidification offset by 
the value of the positive effects of CO2 buildup in the atmosphere.  
The Royal Society report suggests that if the world follows a business-
as-usual approach with regard to the buildup of CO2 in the atmos-
phere, the resulting ocean acidification would in time have very severe 
effects on the oceanic ecosystem.194  This could indeed inflict great 
damage on humans as well.  Given the potentially very large cost of 
mitigating this effect, a greatly expanded research program and ana-
lytical effort is crucial to making an informed decision on whether 
and how rapidly to proceed with these very expensive CO2 mitigation 
efforts. 
Assuming that a decision is made that CO2 mitigation is worth-
while because of these effects, the inexpensive stratospheric geoengi-
neering approaches, which would hopefully already be underway, 
193 See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 39-42 (detailing the “significant adverse 
effects of ocean acidification” and recommending action to address the problem). 
194 See id. at 39 (noting the rapid rate at which ocean pH levels will decrease in re-
sponse to current emission patterns). 
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should prove to be a wise investment since they would reduce global 
warming until the ocean-acidification mitigation efforts took effect 
and would provide an insurance policy against abrupt adverse climate 
changes in either direction.  In the case where a decision is made to 
proceed with conventional CO2 emission reduction after Remedy G 
has already been implemented, the relatively small added costs of 
Remedy G would not be lost; all of the problems except ocean acidifi-
cation would have been addressed earlier.  In addition, the added ca-
pability to address problems P3 and P4 would presumably have proved 
useful in and of itself.  Finally, it should be noted that without advance 
development, planning, international agreements, manufacturing, 
and delivery systems, Remedies G and F could not fulfill these shorter-
term climate control functions. 
VI.  LIKELY MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO ENGINEERED CLIMATE SELECTION 
AND OTHER GEOENGINEERING REMEDIES 
Assuming that any remaining technical problems in implementing 
engineered climate selection and other attractive geoengineering 
remedies could be resolved through a research and development pro-
gram, the primary objections to these remedies are likely to be phi-
losophical, legal, governmental, and strategic, as well as concerns 
about the risk of unintended consequences.195
A.  Philosophical Objections 
The major philosophical argument is likely to question whether 
humans should take direct management responsibility for determin-
ing global temperatures and GHG levels in the atmosphere.  Although 
humans have been exerting an increasing effect on temperatures and 
GHG levels, it has heretofore been left to nature rather than humans 
to determine the outcome of this important aspect of the environ-
ment.  The argument is likely to be that it is not acceptable to change 
nature by changing Earth’s radiation balance or atmospheric GHG 
levels directly.  It seems to be generally agreed that it is acceptable to 
change global temperatures by increasing or decreasing GHG emis-
sions as long as it does not involve overt decisions.  In other words, it 
has until recently been acceptable to increase GHG emissions as long 
as the increase is done for nonclimatic reasons, such as human gain or 
195 For a much more comprehensive discussion of the first three of these and 
other likely objections, see Michaelson, supra note 18, at 122-38. 
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convenience, and the effects were generally unknown.  Similarly, it 
has been acceptable to decrease GHG emissions to an earlier level 
since this merely rolls back some of humankind’s effects on the envi-
ronment.  But some may argue that it is not acceptable to deliberately 
remove GHGs already in the atmosphere or to change Earth’s radia-
tion balance directly, even though such an action would be for exactly 
the same purpose—to decrease global warming.  That, it may be ar-
gued, would be interfering with “nature.”  A very good case, however, 
can be made that human-induced GHG releases are already interfer-
ing with “nature,” as would proposed reductions, just in a less overt 
and less effective way.  And directly managing global temperatures 
and GHG concentrations focuses attention on an environmentally 
important issue—the optimal temperature regime and GHG concen-
trations for the earth. 
An additional aspect of this argument is that although human ac-
tivities have brought about a number of adverse unintended conse-
quences as a result of economic development, humans heretofore 
have responded to these problems by finding new technical, scientific, 
and natural resource solutions without significantly reducing human 
welfare.  The use of engineered climate selection and other geoengi-
neering approaches would follow this tradition rather than slowing 
human development in order to deal with the latest such problem in 
what some may regard as a more “natural” way. 
B.  Legal Obstacles 
Attempts to use engineered climate selection or other geoengi-
neering remedies to “solve” climate change problems might run into 
the problem that much of the western legal system assumes that there 
is no recovery for damages resulting from “acts of God.”  But if a per-
son or government deliberately alters Earth’s radiation balance or at-
mospheric GHG levels, even for a positive purpose, this may open up 
the possibility that those responsible could be sued for damages sus-
tained due to climate-related events believed to be a result of their ac-
tions.  The most obvious solution to this problem would be a change 
in the law to either deny recovery of damages from the use of such 
remedies or to make such liabilities fall onto governments, who would 
have to fund them out of taxes.  This appears to be an area where le-
gal inputs would be much needed if such remedies are to be actually 
used. 
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C.  Governmental Issues 
In a world of sovereign countries, an international process would 
need to be worked out to determine if, when, and how to deliberately 
alter global temperatures or GHG levels.  This process would have to 
include processes for determining when results were unsatisfactory 
and how policy changes would be instituted to solve problems that 
might be encountered.196  Although finding an acceptable process 
would not be without difficulty, it is hard to imagine that it would be 
more difficult than the negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol, 
and such a process would be needed if there are to be enforceable fol-
low-on agreements, if such can even be accomplished.  But once an 
agreement is reached, the actual implementation would not depend 
on the cooperation of many governments and people, as is the case 
under Kyoto and other governmental regulatory decarbonization ap-
proaches.  Obviously it would matter not only which governmental or-
ganizations were selected to carry out geoengineering, but also how 
good a job they would do, since errors might well be costly.  The main 
hope is that the organizations could be held accountable and would 
thereby have an incentive to do a good job.  The alternative is to leave 
the outcome to nature, which is not accountable and which has no in-
centive to help humans. 
D.  Strategic Difficulties 
Some scientists may oppose the geoengineering conclusions 
reached in this Article on the grounds that if global warming is 
“solved” through engineered climate selection or other geoeneering 
approaches, then it may be harder to persuade people to reduce fossil 
fuel use.197  This raises the question of whether the goal is to solve en-
vironmental problems or to achieve some other objective.  The posi-
tion taken here is that the purpose should be to solve important envi-
ronmental problems in the most effective and efficient way available.  
196 For discussion of some of the alternatives for implementation, see Alan Carlin, 
Implementation and Utilization of Geoengineering for Global Climate Change Control, 7 SUS-
TAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2007, at 56, 56-58. 
197 See Ralph J. Cicerone et al., Global Environmental Engineering, 356 NATURE 472 
(1992) (arguing that geoengineering solutions need to be taken more seriously); 
Crutzen, supra note 6, at 217 (discussing the importance of “[b]uilding trust between 
scientists and the general public”); Thomas C. Schelling, The Economic Diplomacy of 
Geoengineering, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 303, 303-07 (1996); Stephen H. Schneider, Geoen-
gineering:  Could—or Should—We Do It?  33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 291, 291-302 (1996). 
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Those who advocate a regulatory decarbonization-only approach risk 
achieving nothing, and thereby contributing to the risks facing our 
planet, in the hopes of achieving a different objective.  It is better to 
separate the various problems—gradual global warming, ocean acidi-
fication, global warming tipping points, and global cooling from vol-
canic eruptions and nuclear conflicts—and design a realistic program 
to tackle each one.  Otherwise, we risk everything on a single overall 
solution that appears unlikely to be achieved, and which cannot solve 
all of the problems anyway. 
E.  Unintended Consequences 
An argument can be made that the earth’s climate system is so 
complex and poorly understood that any attempt to directly manage it 
through geoengineering would risk unintended adverse conse-
quences.  Humans got themselves into their current situation because 
of the unintended consequences that resulted from their use of fossil 
fuels and other GHG-producing activities to increase human produc-
tivity and welfare.  Decarbonization approaches also carry substantial 
risks that proponents almost never acknowledge—that they too may 
result in unintended consequences198 and that they may not be effec-
tively implemented and, as a result, the world will continue to warm, 
with all the adverse effects that have been discussed.  But it is also 
conceivable that geoengineering would substantially solve the global 
climate change problem while creating other unintended conse-
quences.  Certainly, there is much that we do not yet understand 
about the climate system and how it would respond to various geoen-
gineering efforts.  But any approach would involve some amount of 
uncertainty, especially before serious research and testing is under-
taken.  History suggests that it is not until humanity is confronted with 
an immediate task and the need to learn enough to solve it that we 
normally come to understand all that we need to know about a par-
ticular subject. 
198 See, e.g., Eric A. Mazzi & Hadi Dowlatebadi, Air Quality Impacts of Climate Mitiga-
tion:  UK Policy and Passenger Vehicle Choice, 41 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 387, 387-92 (2007) 
(concluding that taxing vehicles according to CO2 emission rates has resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in consumer choice of small cars and diesel engines, which will have 
significant adverse health effects); see also Elisabeth Rosenthal, Once a Dream Fuel, Palm 
Oil May Be an Eco-Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at C1 (describing rising demand 
for palm oil in Europe that has brought about the clearing of huge tracts of Southeast 
Asian rainforest by burning and the overuse of chemical fertilizer). 
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Although we cannot rule out the possibility of unintended conse-
quences, this possibility can be minimized by a careful approach to 
testing and implementing proposed geoengineering solutions that 
take this possibility into account.  For example, proposals can be 
tested on smaller scales before implementing them on a larger scale.  
This small-scale testing could ensure that changes were made or the 
project terminated outright if serious adverse effects are encountered.  
This is particularly needed when the effects of a large-scale approach 
are not easily reversed. 
Fortunately, the leading engineered climate selection proposals 
do not appear to involve irreversibilities, and the effects appear to dis-
appear in a relatively brief period.  For example, in the case of strato-
spheric optimized particles, their effects could first be modeled fur-
ther; if modeling did not reveal significant problems, we could follow 
with subscale, real world experiments, and could finally try the ap-
proach in a limited geographical area—such as the Arctic, which is 
experiencing the most rapid warming and has the lowest human 
population.  If significant adverse effects were observed, they would 
dissipate within a year or two as particles gradually fell into the tropo-
sphere and were removed by normal atmospheric processes.  In this 
circumstance, other types of particles could be tested or the project 
could be abandoned in the unlikely case that each type of suitable 
particle proves to result in critical, adverse, and unintended conse-
quences.  But pursuit of the decarbonization approaches currently 
proposed is very likely to result in continued global warming while the 
world waits for, and is likely to be disappointed by, the meager results. 
One could also argue that not enough is known to justify using 
these relatively new geoengineering technologies.  At the same time, 
little or no effort has been made to carry out the research and devel-
opment199 required to supply the information needed to use these 
technologies more effectively and efficiently.  Given the promise of 
many of these technologies, the modest cost of the necessary research, 
the very large expenditures required for (and likely public dissatisfac-
tion with) extensive GHG emission controls, and the possibly urgent 
need to reduce global warming, it is difficult to argue that the re-
search should not be undertaken. 
A recent editorial by a prominent member of the U.S. scientific 
establishment supports such research but also advocates a moratorium 
199 See supra note 162 and accompanying text (noting the lack of research in 
geoengineering). 
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on any large-scale field experimentation.200  Such a moratorium, how-
ever, is inconsistent with the urgency expressed by those concerned 
about global warming who advocate very large expenditures to control 
GHG emissions.  It would appear premature to spend such sums on 
emissions control without first fully testing the alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
As of late 2006, many environmentalists, some developed nations, 
and the state of California appear to have concluded that there is only 
one climate change problem—global warming—and only one solu-
tion—reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, usually through the 
Kyoto Protocol or similar regulatory decarbonization approaches.  
This Article has argued instead that there are actually four major, in-
terrelated problems, and after a careful analysis of these problems and 
possible remedies for each of them, concluded that several different 
approaches will be required to solve all of them.  Although some 
remedies can address certain climate change problems, none can ad-
dress all of them.  An effective and efficient climate change control 
program needs to use the best available approaches to solving each 
problem, instead of simply the single approach of reducing GHG 
emissions. 
This Article has assumed that global climate change is a major en-
vironmental problem—perhaps the most difficult one that the world 
has ever faced.  For the purposes of this Article, the climate change 
problem includes four related problems:  continued and gradual 
global warming over the next few centuries; adverse effects unrelated 
to temperature of increasing levels of GHGs in the atmosphere; the 
potential effects of “tipping points” where warming may trigger par-
ticularly serious and abrupt adverse effects; and shorter-term episodes 
of global cooling caused by volcanic eruptions or nuclear conflicts.  
The Article then asked how effective and efficient a variety of man-
agement and technological approaches, particularly the Kyoto Proto-
col, would be in preventing or mitigating each of these problems, and 
whether there are alternative approaches that would be more so.  The 
Article has taken a very broad view of the problem by including both 
long- and short-term impacts of human activities and natural forces on 
global temperatures and GHG levels.  It is only by looking at all the 
200 Ralph J. Cicerone, Geoengineering:  Encouraging Research and Overseeing Implemen-
tation, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 221, 221-26 (2006). 
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major aspects of the problem that effective and efficient solutions can 
be meaningfully discussed. 
The Protocol and similar regulatory decarbonization approaches 
will not prevent either global warming or cooling, nor will they meet 
international goals for maximum temperature increases.  If fully im-
plemented, Kyoto would probably result in minor decreases in the 
temperature rise that would otherwise occur and would not provide 
any capability to respond to global cooling.  One fundamental prob-
lem is that achieving the EU/UNFCC goals through a Kyoto-type ap-
proach would require the participation of most of the world’s gov-
ernments and population—including many rapidly growing countries 
that have not agreed to undertake any emission reductions—to re-
strict energy use in ways that would directly reduce their welfare, but 
the Protocol does not provide the effective incentives and penalties 
necessary to bring about such participation.  It is difficult to see why 
politicians would adopt such unpopular and expensive constraints on 
their constituents’ activities or why many of their constituents would 
not pursue every available loophole to avoid observing the imposed 
constraints. 
It is unlikely that possible Kyoto follow-on agreements could over-
come these implementation problems.  In addition to being very diffi-
cult to implement, the Kyoto approach is probably economically inef-
ficient and would have to be very expensive if it were to have a major 
impact on global temperatures.  Additionally, it does not provide 
credit for the use of much less expensive engineered climate selec-
tion, and it is particularly illsuited for affecting global temperatures 
rapidly or flexibly.  Trying to use it to rapidly decrease global warming 
would be even more expensive because of the need to replace GHG-
emitting equipment early in the plan’s life cycle.  Pursuit of regulatory 
emissions reduction approaches is counterproductive, given their in-
herent implementation problems.  Unfortunately, pursuing these ap-
proaches is likely to prevent serious consideration of more effective 
measures during the long period needed for the major deficiencies of 
this approach to become evident to all. 
Given these very serious problems with the Kyoto approach, the 
Article then asked if there are superior management and technologi-
cal alternatives for controlling climate change.  To that end, Parts IV 
through V.E reviewed a wide array of control options using effective-
ness, economic efficiency, and other relevant criteria.  That analysis 
concludes that superior alternatives exist involving radiative forcing 
and that these alternatives would be technically sound; would allow 
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continued growth of fossil fuel use; would very dramatically lower con-
trol costs; are economically efficient; would avoid the need for indi-
vidual actions to reduce GHG emissions; and would permit relatively 
precise, rapid, and flexible adjustment of global temperatures.  These 
alternatives, however,  would not decrease any nontemperature-
related adverse effects of GHGs, of which the most serious appears to 
be ocean acidification. 
With this as background, Part V.F then extended the analysis to 
the four more detailed climate change problems: 
(P1) Gradually increasing global warming could most rapidly, effi-
ciently, and effectively be controlled using some of the more interest-
ing radiative forcing or engineered climate selection remedies and re-
sult in significant adaptation expenses.  As discussed, attempts to 
control this warming through GHG control under the Kyoto Protocol 
and similar approaches are likely to be very slow and largely unsuc-
cessful.  Other management approaches based on decentralized con-
trols, voluntary actions, or liability for emissions would probably be 
even slower and less successful and efficient.  However well inten-
tioned and helpful they may be if they reduce emissions that are less 
expensive to control, there is also a danger that they will end up delay-
ing effective action by providing false hope that these efforts will 
prove sufficient.  Radiative forcing remedies, on the other hand, are 
some of the few realistic alternatives available to meet the current 
temperature goals.  They could best be carried out on an internation-
ally cooperative basis, but could also be done on a “go-it-alone” basis 
by technologically advanced countries, albeit at the risk of possible in-
ternational condemnation. 
(P2) The nontemperature-related effects of increasing GHGs in the atmos-
phere are both positive and negative.  The major positive effect of high 
levels of carbon dioxide (increased plant growth) would be lost if at-
mospheric levels were returned to “normal.”  The most serious nega-
tive problem appears to be ocean acidification, but this problem is not 
well understood and deserves much further research before poten-
tially very expensive remedies are undertaken.  The principal choices 
for dealing with ocean acidification in particular appear to be:  fertiliz-
ing the oceans with essential nutrients and minerals such as iron to 
promote the growth of carbon dioxide absorbing phytoplankton; us-
ing limestone to neutralize streams of newly generated carbon dioxide 
in advantageous circumstances; using carbon dioxide for enhanced oil 
recovery; sequestering carbon dioxide; and reducing atmospheric 
carbon dioxide emissions—in that order of decreasing attractiveness.  
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Fertilizing the oceans appears to be the lowest cost solution, but re-
search is needed to make it possible for humans to emulate the more 
efficient approaches used by nature to export carbon onto the sea 
floor. 
(P3) Risks from “tipping points” or abrupt climate changes would likely 
be reduced to the extent that atmospheric GHG levels and/or global 
temperatures were reduced.  But if, as also appears likely, GHGs are 
not reduced to “normal” levels, the radiative-forcing remedies could 
be used to directly control global temperatures, thereby greatly reduc-
ing the adverse feedbacks and risks resulting from temperature rises.  
If imminent dangers should threaten, it furthermore appears feasible 
to use some radiative forcing remedies in a “rapid response” mode to 
greatly reduce these risks if advance preparations are in place to do so. 
(P4) Shorter-term episodes of global cooling from major volcanic eruptions 
are a certain, and possibly even catastrophic, risk; nuclear conflicts may 
also occur with similar climatic consequences.  Both can only be ad-
dressed through radiative forcing approaches.  Advance preparations 
would again be required. 
An effective and efficient solution would be to actively pursue a 
combination approach involving both engineered climate selection—
radiative forcing by means of stratospheric particles optimized for this 
purpose—as well as a new effort to reduce ocean acidification.  Im-
mediate priority should be given to the former in order to quickly 
solve all the problems unrelated to ocean acidification, while the 
more difficult, much slower, and much more costly effort to reduce 
ocean acidification is undertaken.  The cost of achieving the 
EU/UNFCCC temperature goals by the use of engineered climate se-
lection would be modest and would not require any human lifestyle 
changes or adaptation to higher world temperatures (unless desired, 
of course).  It appears to be the most effective and efficient first step 
toward global climate change control.  This twofold approach could 
be used to rapidly reduce the risks stemming from adverse feed-
back/tipping point problems, from global warming, and from global 
cooling from major volcanic eruptions and nuclear conflicts.  It could 
also be used to rapidly stabilize average global temperatures to any de-
sired level.  This should also allow time for a greatly expanded effort 
to better understand ocean acidification and to determine the extent 
to which ocean pH levels need to be raised and how this can be best 
achieved.  Several suggestions have been made concerning geoengi-
neering approaches, but it is clear that the problem deserves much 
greater attention and research. 
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Some aspects of the climate change problem could theoretically 
also be solved by GHG emission controls, although it is doubtful how 
effective they would be.  If such emission controls were used, the place 
to start would appear to be to implement the lowest-cost options first, 
while delaying the more expensive ones until the problem is better 
understood.  Such a delay would be economically rational, given the 
sensitivity of the costs of GHG emissions reductions to the rapidity 
with which they occur.   
A significant effort would be required to fine-tune the proposals 
to implement engineered climate selection approaches, build an in-
ternational mechanism for making decisions, and manufacture and 
transport the needed material and hardware.  Notwithstanding this 
effort, this approach could be used to rapidly reduce the risks of ad-
verse feedback or tipping point problems, to avoid significant adapta-
tion expenses, and to rapidly stabilize global temperatures. 
Some may object that not enough is known about these relatively 
new technologies to justify their immediate use.  At the same time, 
however, little or no effort has been made to carry out the research 
and development necessary to reduce these risks.  Given the promise 
of these technologies, the modest cost of the research, and the very 
large expenditures necessary for, and likely public dissatisfaction with, 
extensive GHG emission controls, it is difficult to understand why so 
little of this research and development has been undertaken. 
This Article has reviewed several management approaches besides 
Kyoto and geoengineering projects, including voluntary efforts, non-
Kyoto-based regulatory decarbonization, and a new approach involv-
ing the use of all available technologies and approaches.  It finds that 
the voluntary, decentralized, and liability-based government-
determined decarbonization approaches are likely to be even less ef-
fective and efficient than the Kyoto approach.  Efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions on a less than national scale (as is being attempted in Cali-
fornia) or even in a few countries, without equivalent actions by the 
rest of the world—particularly the most rapidly developing ones—
cannot realistically achieve the temperature change limits adopted by 
the European Union and based on United Nations goals.  Failure to 
achieve this goal is believed by proponents of GHG emission controls 
to pose “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate sys-
tem.  Even a unified, worldwide effort to reduce GHG emissions to 
this extent, should it ever be undertaken, would be highly problematic 
because of the great dependence of modern society on energy use 
and the reluctance of most people to give up the advantages offered 
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by modern society.  The cost of achieving these goals by the use of en-
gineered climate selection, however, would be comparatively modest 
and would not require any human lifestyle changes.   
This Article therefore suggests a possible replacement for Kyoto, 
which would correct a number of the Protocol’s deficiencies.  If the 
world follows a Kyoto approach, this Article suggests a possible re-
placement for the Kyoto Protocol that would correct a number of the 
Protocol's deficiencies.  But even in this case global temperatures ap-
pear almost certain to continue to increase, perhaps even at roughly 
current rates.  At some point in the future this may become all too 
evident, and engineered climate selection may be more carefully con-
sidered.  It would seem far better, however, not to wait until this hap-
pens before using engineered climate selection, since this would re-
duce the risk of hitting a tipping point, increase the possibility of 
warding off abrupt climate changes, provide protection from volcanic 
cooling or nuclear winters, and avoid various climate-induced un-
pleasantries and costly adaptation expenses in the meantime.  Re-
cently some have begun to advocate engineered climate selection as a 
fallback or insurance policy, in case their preferred regulatory decar-
bonization approach does not solve the problem or an unforeseen 
event occurs that requires a rapid response.201  A more prudent and 
efficient strategy would appear to be to implement engieneered cli-
mate selection first and then see what further needs to be done. 
Finally, this Article discussed five of the primary impediments to 
the use of engineered climate selection and other geoengineering ap-
proaches.  Although these impediments are significant, they are easier 
to solve than the already evident problems surrounding the Kyoto ap-
proach. 
 
201 See Crutzen, supra note 6. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1:  Costs and Benefits of Carbon Removal 
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Table 1:  Usefulness of Selected Remedies in Solving Detailed  
Climate Change Problems 
 
 
P1:  Gradual 
Global Warming 
P2:  Ocean 
Acidification 
P3:  Risks 
from “Tip-
ping Points” 
P4:  Short-term 
Cooling from 
Volcanic Erup-
tions/Nuclear 
Conflicts 
Proposed 
Priority 
B:  Conven-
tional under 
Kyoto Pro-
tocol 
Effective if ever 
achieved, which 
is very unlikely; 
high cost; very 
slow results 
If ever 
achieved 
(unlikely), 
would reduce 
but not 
eliminate 
problem; 
high cost 
Vary with 
temperatures.  
Useless as a 
rapid re-
sponse to 
imminent 
threats and to 
cooling 
Useless 4 
C:  Artificial 
CO2 seques-
tration/ 
neutraliza-
tion 
Effective but 
high cost except 
possibly neu-
tralization in 
ideal cases 
Effective but 
high cost 
except some 
neutraliza-
tion 
Probably use-
less except 
for increasing 
temperatures 
by releasing 
concentrated 
CO2
Unlikely to be 
useful, although 
where CO2 is in 
concentrated 
form, it could 
theoretically be 
released with 
care 
 
 
 
3 
E:  Ocean 
fertilization 
Probably effec-
tive if humans 
can learn how 
to employ it as 
efficiently as 
nature does; 
relatively low 
cost. 
[Same as 
(P1)(E) cell.] 
Can be 
started and 
stopped rap-
idly, but ef-
fects probably 
too gradual 
to be effec-
tive 
Not applicable  
 
 
 
2 
G:  Opti-
mized parti-
cles in 
stratosphere 
Effective imme-
diately; lowest 
cost 
No effect Can be 
quickly re-
duced with 
temperatures 
and also used 
for fairly 
rapid re-
sponse 
Effective as soon 
as particles are 
distributed 
unless there are 
interactions with 
volcanic emis-
sions 
 
 
 
1 
 
The problem (P) numbers refer to those listed in Part I.B.  The control options are 
identified by letters corresponding to the row numbers in Table 2 and the remedy (R) 
letters used in Parts IV and V.  See Part V.G for an explanation of the proposed priori-
ties.  
Prepared by Alan Carlin based on Table 2 and text. 
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Table 1a:  Cost-Effectiveness of Selected Remedies by  
Detailed Problem in Symbols 
 
 
P1:  Gradual 
Global Warming 
P2:  Ocean 
Acidification 
P3:  Risks 
from “Tip-
ping Points” 
P4:  Short-term 
Cooling from 
Volcanic Erup-
tions/ Nuclear 
Conflicts 
Proposed 
Priority 
B:  Conven-
tional under 
Kyoto Pro-
tocol 
X 
$ $ $ $ 
 
X 
$ $ $ $ 
 
Long term: 
X 
$ $ $ $ 
 
Quick response: 
NA 
NA 4 
C:  Artificial 
CO2 seques-
tration/ 
neutraliza-
tion 
√√√√ 
$ $ $ $ 
 
√√√√ 
$ $ $ $ 
 
 
Long term: 
√√√√ 
$ $ $ $ 
 
Quick response: 
NA 
Usually NA 3 
E:  Ocean 
fertilization 
√√√ 
$/10 
√√√ 
$/10 
 
Long term: 
√√√ 
$/10 
 
Quick response: 
Limited 
NA 2 
G:  Opti-
mized parti-
cles in 
stratosphere 
√√√√ 
$/1000 
 
NA √√√√ 
$/1000 
√√√√ 
$/1000 
1 
 
Explanation of symbols used: 
X:  Ineffective 
√√√√:  Highly effective  
√√√:  Probably effective if humans can learn to employ it as efficiently as nature does. 
$:  Marginal cost of about $100 per ton carbon or equivalent 
$$$$:  Marginal cost of about $400 per ton carbon or equivalent 
$/10:  Cost of about $10 per ton of carbon removed 
$/1000:  Cost of about 10 cents per ton carbon or equivalent 
NA:  Not applicable 
 
Based on data in the corresponding rows of Table 2 but using the format of Table 1.  
Detailed estimates shown in Table 2 are used to approximate the effectiveness and cost 
of the remedies in an easier-to-understand form.  See Parts V.G of the text for an ex-
planation of the proposed priorities. 
Prepared by Alan Carlin based on Table 2 and text. 
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Table 2:  Evaluation of Some Alternative Detailed Remedies for  
Controlling Global Climate Change202
 
 
1:  Effective 
Environmental 
Outcome 
 
2:  Dynamic 
Efficiency 
 
3:  Cost  
Effectiveness 
3a:  Cost of 
Controla
4:  Distribu-
tional Equity 
R1/A:   No in-
tentional cli-
mate change 
control (busi-
ness as usual) 
Very low—
depends on 
“dumb luck” to 
muddle 
through 
Base case; 
not optimal 
due to high 
cost of cli-
mate 
change 
No costs in-
volved 
NAb Costs of warm-
ing may be 
greatest for 
those near sea 
level including 
low-lying LDCs 
R2/B:   Regula-
tory decarboni-
zation using 
“conventional” 
technologies 
under the 
Kyoto Protocol 
Probably low 
given limited 
mitigation 
goals, short-
term commit-
ments, and 
limited incen-
tives 
Probably 
strongly 
negative 
since mar-
ginal costs 
are higher 
than  cli-
mate 
change 
benefits of 
perhaps 
$15 per ton 
Low com-
pared to 
some techno-
logical ap-
proaches 
50-400ac 
Estimated 
marginal 
cost to 
achieve EU/ 
UNFCCC 
goals 
Only industrial 
countries face 
targets but 
LDCs help 
shape rules.  
LDCs receive 
some adapta-
tion assistance 
C:  CO2 artifi-
cial sequestra-
tion using  
injection un-
derground or 
neutralization 
in oceans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High if carried 
out on massive 
scale 
Negative to 
strongly 
negative 
Low 50-150;d
60-300h for  
CCS under-
ground; 80-
400h for 
ocean injec-
tion 
Implementa-
tion costs 
borne by initia-
tors; benefits 
and other pos-
sible costs 
borne by all 
D:  Intensive 
forestry to cap-
ture carbon in 
harvest-ed trees 
Low because of 
uncertainty 
about rate of 
accumulation 
Likely  to 
be negative 
but some 
projects 
could be 
positive 
Low 10-100d Implementa-
tion costs 
borne by initia-
tors; benefits 
and other pos-
sible costs 
borne by all 
 
 
E:  Ocean fer-
tilization with 
phosphate/ 
iron 
Probably high 
if humans can 
be as effective 
as nature is 
Probably 
high 
High—but 
not the high-
est 
1-10d Implementa-
tion costs 
borne by initia-
tors; benefits 
and other pos-
sible costs 
borne by all 
 
 
 
202 See supra Part V. 
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Table 2:   Evaluation of Some Alternative Detailed Remedies for  
Controlling Global Climate Change 
5:  Flexibil-
ity 
 
 
5a:  Alter 
Pace 
5b:  Global 
Cooling 
5c:  Temp. 
Redistri-
bution 
6:  Partici-
pation & 
Compli-
ance 
7:  Other 
Environ-
mental Risks 
8:  Addi-
tional Con-
siderations 
Little de-
sired or 
likely 
 
 
 
NA NA NA None 
needed 
None Included as 
base case 
Emission 
ceilings 
locked in 
but only 
for 5 years; 
climate 
response 
very slow 
Possible 
but very 
difficult 
No No Incentives 
very weak; 
requires 
massive 
interna-
tional co-
operation 
& bureau-
cratic ef-
fort; 
None 
known 
Protocol 
already in 
place calling 
for reduc-
tions by 
some coun-
tries; reduc-
tions in oil 
use in-
creases na-
tional secu-
rity 
Could be 
halted rap-
idly, but 
increase in 
pace could 
only be 
done slowly 
Yes Not likely 
but possi-
ble to re-
move CO2 
if concen-
trated 
No Interna-
tional co-
operation  
desirable 
for siting 
purposes 
Probably low 
risk except 
for ocean 
injection, 
which could 
contribute 
to ocean 
acidifica-
tion.  Poten-
tial leakage 
problems 
for under-
ground 
Some ex-
perience 
with old oil 
and gas 
fields; pos-
sible NIMBY 
problems 
elsewhere 
Almost no 
flexibility 
because of 
time re-
quired to 
stop, start, 
or harvest 
trees 
Only very 
slowly 
Could re-
move trees 
and burn 
them 
No Coopera-
tion and 
approval 
of land-
owners 
and proba-
bly gov-
ernments 
required 
Low risk; 
intensive 
cultivation 
will impact 
soils and 
biodiversity 
Political 
issues: who 
pays costs?; 
whose land 
is used? 
Medium to 
control 
warming 
but diffi-
cult to re-
duce nutri-
ent flow 
Yes No No Interna-
tional co-
operation 
desirable 
May be 
some risks 
due to many 
unknowns at 
large scales 
Possible 
liability and 
other legal 
concerns; 
increased 
productivity 
of ocean 
food chain 
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Table 2 (cont.)   
 
 
1:  Effective 
Environmental 
Outcome 
 
2:  Dynamic 
Efficiency 
 
3:  Cost  
Effectiveness 
3a:  Cost of 
Controla
4:  Distribu-
tional Equity 
F:  Sulfur-
containing par-
ticles added to 
stratosphere to 
control global 
warming 
Very high; 
proven by ma-
jor volcanic 
eruptions; no 
ocean acidifica-
tion mitigation 
Strongly 
positive; 
CO2 in-
creases 
would also 
aid agricul-
ture 
Very high for 
cooling pur-
poses 
<<1d Probably 
fairer;e  im-
plementation 
costs borne by 
initiators; 
benefits and 
other possible 
costs borne by 
all 
 
 
G:  Optimized 
radiative forc-
ing by injecting 
specialized 
substances in 
stratosphere, 
e.g., see supra 
note 124 
Very high 
based on (F) 
but unproven 
in real world 
trials; no ocean 
acidification 
mitigation 
Strongly 
positive for 
warming; 
Other 
benefits, 
e.g., UV 
protection, 
plant 
growth, 
offset vol-
canic erup-
tion 
 
Very high for 
both heating 
and cooling 
<<1f, or, at 
the risk of 
trying to be 
too precise, 
0.02 to 0.1g
Probably 
fairer;e imple-
mentation 
costs borne by 
initiators; 
benefits and 
other possible 
costs received/ 
borne by all 
H:  Optimized 
radiative forc-
ing by building 
flexible deflec-
tor in space 
between Earth 
and Sun as 
specified in 
supra note 125 
High but no 
experience 
with building 
anything  so 
large so far 
from Earth; no 
ocean acidifica-
tion mitigation 
Appears to 
be high for 
warming; 
other bene-
fits, e.g., 
UV protec-
tion, plant 
growth, 
offset vol-
canic erup-
tion 
 
 
High for 
both heating 
and cooling 
unless cost is 
very high 
0.2-2f (costs 
much less 
certain 
here, and 
probably 
underesti-
mated—see 
text) 
Probably 
fairer;e imple-
mentation 
costs borne by 
initiators; 
benefits and 
other possible 
costs received/ 
borne by all 
 
 
Prepared by Alan Carlin based on alternatives analyzed by Laskyc (Remedy B), Keith 
2000d (Remedies C, D, E, and F), IPCCh (E), NAS 1992j (F), Keith 2001f (G and H), 
Michaelsone (Columns 1, 4, & 6), and Teller et al. 1997, 1999, and 2002, and 2004i (F, 
G, and H). 
 
Footnotes for Table 2: 
a
 Marginal cost in U.S. dollars per ton carbon of CO2 emissions (or equivalent) miti-
gated for Row B only.  Other costs in this column represent the range of estimated 
costs for categories of technology.  There will be some cases where the costs of Row B 
remedies are a lot less than the marginal cost. 
b
 Does not apply; since none are mitigated, there is no cost of mitigation. 
c
 See Lasky, supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 
  
2007] GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL 1497 
Table 2 (cont.)   
5:  Flexibil-
ity 
 
 
5a:  Alter 
Pace 
5b:  Global 
Cooling 
5c:  Temp. 
Redistri-
bution 
6:  Partici-
pation & 
Compli-
ance 
7:  Other 
Environ-
mental Risks 
8:  Addi-
tional Con-
siderations 
High at 
least to 
control 
warming. 
Changes 
depend on 
residence 
time in 
strato-
sphere 
Intensify 
rapidly; 5 
year lag to 
decrease 
intensity 
Not with-
out chang-
ing sub-
stance 
used 
Possible 
but only to 
cool 
Not re-
quired 
once rem-
edy agreed 
on 
Medium--
possible 
adverse in-
teractions 
with other 
strato-
spheric spe-
cies; no re-
duction in 
ocean acidi-
fication 
Possible 
liability if 
courts 
should de-
cide that 
disasters 
have re-
sulted 
High for 
both warm-
ing and 
cooling. 
Good 
chance for 
controlling 
abrupt 
climatic 
changes, as 
from vol-
canic erup-
tion 
Intensify 
rapidly; 5 
year lag to 
decrease 
intensity 
Yes  by 
changing 
substances 
used 
Possible by 
varying 
applica-
tion by 
latitude 
Not re-
quired 
once rem-
edy agreed 
on 
Probably low 
risk but 
needs care-
ful research, 
particularly 
on impact 
on strato-
spheric 
chemistry. 
Ocean acidi-
fication not 
addressed 
Could re-
duce ad-
verse effects 
of solar ra-
diation on 
earth. Pos-
sible liability 
problem. 
Extremely 
high for 
both warm-
ing and 
cooling; 
best chance 
for control-
ling abrupt 
climatic 
changes as 
from vol-
canic erup-
tion 
Intensify 
almost 
immedi-
ately by 
adjusting 
deflector 
Yes  by 
changing 
deflector 
placement 
Not clear 
from avail-
able info; 
research 
required 
Not re-
quired 
once rem-
edy agreed 
on 
Probably 
even lower 
risk than G 
but still 
needs care-
ful research; 
quickly re-
versible if 
unforeseen 
problems.  
Ocean acidi-
fication not 
addressed. 
Possible 
liability 
problem 
 
d
 See Keith, supra note 17. 
e See Michaelson, supra note 18. 
f See Keith, supra note 156. 
g This range of estimates assumes an estimated cost of $0.2 to $1.0 billion per year, 
Teller,  Active Climate Stabilization, supra note 119, and an assumed offset of ap-
proximately 10 gigatons of carbon per year. The cost estimates assume that various 
types of particles are carried into the stratosphere using a fleet of six high-altitude 
cargo planes.  Ten gigatons is representative of the carbon emission reduction needed 
to achieve a 450 ppmv CO2 level in the atmosphere compared to projected IS92a emis-
sions in 2060. 
h See IPCC supra note 113; based on Table SPM.5 with dollar values for capture from 
new large-scale power plants with dollars per ton CO2 converted to dollars per ton car-
bon. 
i  See Teller, Active Climate Stabilization, supra note 119. 
j   See generally souces by Teller, supra note 18. 
